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The Ninth Circuit's decision in Alliance for the Wild Rockies v.
Salazar (Wild Rockies II)I is the latest battle regarding wolf rein-
troduction into the Northern Rocky Mountains (NRM). In April
2009, Secretary of the Interior (SOI) Ken Salazar upheld the Bush
administration's proposal to delist wolves in the NRM Distinct Pop-
ulation Segment (DPS),2 which included Montana, Idaho, eastern
Washington, eastern Oregon, and north-central Utah. Endangered
Species Act (ESA) protection was retained for the wolves in Wyo-
ming.3 As a result, environmental groups brought suit. In August
2010, Judge Donald W. Molloy in the United States District Court
for the District of Montana rejected the delisting proposal on the
* Professor, Department of Political Science, Wright State University; Ph.D.
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1. 672 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2012).
2. Policy Regarding the Recognition of Distinct Vertebrae Population Seg-
ments Under the Endangered Species Act, 61 Fed. Reg. 4722, 4725 (Feb. 7, 1996)
(detailing FWS and NMFS adoption of joint policy for listing and reclassifying
under ESA); 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (outlining ESA). DPS is defined as a group of
vertebrate animals that is both discrete from and significant to the taxon as a
whole. The population is discrete if "[i]t is markedly separate from other popula-
tion of the same taxon as a consequence of physical, physiological, ecological, or
behavior factors," or "[ilt is delimited by international governmental boundaries
within which differences in control of exploitation, management of habitat, con-
servation status, or regulatory mechanisms exist that are significant in light of
4(a) (1) (D) of the Act." Policy Regarding the Recognition of Distinct Vertebrae
Population Segments Under the Endangered Species Act, 61 Fed. Reg. at 4725.
The significance of the DPS is determined by its importance to the taxon as a
whole. Indicators include, but are not limited to, the use of an unusual or unique
ecological setting; a marked difference in genetic characteristics; or the occupancy
of an area that, if devoid of species, would result in a "significant gap in the range
of the taxon." Id. at 4724-25. If the population is both discrete and significant, it
can be evaluated pursuant to the five criteria of 4(a) (1) for listing, downlisting, or
delisting.
3. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Final Rule To Identify
the Northern Rocky Mountain Population of gray wolf as a Distinct Population
Segment and To Revise the List of Endangered and Threatened Wildlife, 74 Fed.
Reg. 15123-01 (Apr. 2, 2009) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17) [hereinafter 2009
Final Rule] (revising list of endangered and threatened wildlife in NRM DPS).
(351)
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ground that the NRM DPS cannot be subdivided on a state-by-state
basis, but must be treated as a single unit.4
Wolf hysteria struck the region.5 Fearing an adverse Congres-
sional reaction, the parties negotiated a settlement agreement,
which Judge Molloy rejected. Congress responded by enacting Sec-
tion 1713 of the Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing
Appropriations Act of 2011, which delisted the wolves in the NRM
DPS, except those in Wyoming, and precluded judicial review of
the regulation.6 Environmental groups again brought suit, alleging
Section 1713 violated the separation of powers by dictating the out-
come in the case. The United States District Court for the District
of Montana and the Ninth Circuit upheld the constitutionality of
the appropriation rider7 This article points out that the Ninth Cir-
cuit properly rejected the plaintiffs theory. Congress can change
the law to influence ongoing litigation through an appropriation
bill. Congress can remove the federal court's jurisdiction over the
issue. The exercise of each of these powers, however, reveals defi-
ciencies in the legislative process.
4. See Defenders of Wildlife v. Salazar, 729 F. Supp. 2d 1207 (D. Mont. 2010)
(Defenders) (rejecting delisting proposal); see generally Edward A. Fitzgerald, Defend-
ers of Wildlife v. Salazar, Delisting the Children of the Night in the Northern Rocky Moun-
tains, 31 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REv. 1 (2010) [hereinafter Fitzgerald,
Defenders] (analyzing court's decision in Defenders).
5. See Edward A. Fitzgerald, Delisting Wolves in the Northern Rocky Mountains:
Congress Ceries Wolf 41 ELR 10840, 10840 (Sept. 2011) [hereinafter Fitzgerald, Delist-
ing Wolves] (providing critical commentary on recent delisting of wolves).
6. Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, Pub.
L. No. 112-10, 125 Stat. 38 (2011) (including rider requirement that SOI reissue
final rule). Section 1713 states:
Before the end of the 60-day period beginning on the date of enactment
of this Act, the Secretary of the Interior shall reissue the final rule pub-
lished on April 2, 2009 (74 Fed. Reg. 15123 et seq.) without regard to any
other provision of statute or regulation that applies to issuance of such
rule. Such reissuance (including this section) shall not be subject tojudi-
cial review and shall not abrogate or otherwise have any effect on the
order and judgment issued by the United State District Court for the Dis-
trict of Wyoming in Case Numbers 09-CV-1 18J and 09-CV-138J on Novem-
ber 18, 2010 [involving Wyoming's management plan for gray wolves].
Id. President Obama signed the act into law on April 15, 2011. See also Eve Byron,
Budget Bill Rider Will Delist Wolves, INDEP. REc. (Apr. 15, 2011), http://helenair.
com/news/budget-bill-rider-will-delist-wolves/article_3afDb694-6727-1 1eO-9959-00
1cc4cOO2eO.html [hereinafter Byron, Budget] (detailing bill delisting wolves in
Idaho and Montana). On May 5, 2011, the FWS complied with Section 1713 by
reissuing the 2009 rule. 50 C.F.R. pt.17 (2012).
7. See Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Salazar (Wild Rockies 1), 800 F. Supp. 2d
1123 (D. Mont. 2011) (holding final rule does not violate separation of powers
doctrine); Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Salazar (Wild Rockies Hl), 672 F.3d 1170
(9th Cir. 2012) (same).
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This article proposes alternative theories of the case. Section
1713 was enacted in violation of Congressional rules that prohibit
the enactment of substantive legislation in an appropriation bill.
Section 1713 violated the public trust doctrine, which requires Con-
gress to protect public resources. Section 1713 violated the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment by impinging on the pub-
lic's limited property interest in species protection and the proper
management of public lands through a flawed legislative process,
an appropriation rider. Section 1713 should have been remanded
to Congress for reconsideration in an open deliberative process.
Furthermore, Section 1713 violated the Equal Protection compo-
nent of the Fifth Amendment by singling out the NRM wolves for
unique treatment. Section 1713 should have been subjected to
heightened scrutiny, which would have required the federal govern-
ment to explain how Section 1713 furthered the purposes of the
ESA. Congress could not deprive the federal courts ofjurisdiction
over the Constitutional issues.
This article evaluates contrary views regarding Congress. The
republican view posits that Congress is a deliberative body in search
of the public good. Congress is the "forum for identifying or defin-
ing [objectives], and acting towards those ends. The process is one
of mutual search through joint deliberation . . . Moral insight, soci-
ological understanding, and goodwill are all legislative virtues."8
The public choice model considers the legislature to be a mar-
ketplace in which public goods are distributed to private interests.
Legislation is an economic transaction in which legislators, who are
seeking reelection, enact policies that further private interests in
return for votes, campaign contributions, and political influence.
Legislation is not "reasonably related to some general social goal,"
but embodies deals that advance private preferences. There is no
deliberative process striving towards the achievement of public in-
terest."9 Instead, there are "too many laws that are 'rent-seeking'
8. Frank I. Michelman, Political Markets and Community Self-Determination: Com-
peting Judicial Models of Local Government Legitimacy, 53 IND. L.J. 145, 149 (1977)
(discussing judicial models of local government legitimacy).
9. EDWARD A. FITZGERALD, THE SEAWEED REBELLION: FEDERAL-STATE CONFLICTS
OVER OFesFHORE ENERGY DEVELOPMENT 7 (2001) (citing William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Dynamic Statutoiy Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1479, 1511-21 (1987) [hereinaf-
ter Eskridge, Interpretation] (arguing for "dynamic" statutory interpretation)) (dis-
cussing the policymaking process).
2014] 353
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(i.e., law that distribute resources to a designated group without any
contribution to society's overall efficiency)."1o
This article reviews wolf reintroduction into the NRM. The
Ninth Circuit decision upholding the delisting rider is analyzed in
terms of the passage of legislation to influence ongoing judicial de-
cisions, the enactment of substantive legislation through the appro-
priation process, and the removal of federal court jurisdiction.
Alternative theories are presented and analyzed. This article dem-
onstrates that the enactment of Section 1713 reflects public choice
theory. This article argues that judicial enforcement of Congres-
sional rules and heightened judicial scrutiny of special interest leg-
islation will help to further an open deliberative legislative process.
The impact of the decision on other states in the NRM DPS, such as
Washington, Oregon, Utah, and Wyoming, is examined.
II. ENDANGERED SPECIEs ACT PRIMER
The Supreme Court described the ESA as "the most compre-
hensive legislation for the preservation of endangered species ever
enacted by any nation."" Congress recognized that "various spe-
cies of fish, wildlife, and plants in the United States have been ren-
dered extinct as a consequence of economic growth and
development untempered by adequate concern and conservation,"
while other species "have been so depleted in numbers that they
are in danger of or threatened with extinction."' 2 The SOI is re-
quired to protect "species," which include "any subspecies of fish or
wildlife or plants, and any distinct population segment of any spe-
cies of vertebrate fish or wildlife."' 3 The ESA protects endangered
species, which are "any species which is in danger of extinction
throughout all or a significant portion of its range,"' 4 and
threatened species, which are "any species which is likely to become
an endangered species in the foreseeable future throughout all or a
significant portion of its range."15 Congress recognized that "these
species of fish, wildlife, and plants are of esthetic, ecological, educa-
10. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications for Public
Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275, 285 (1988) [hereinafter
Eskridge, Politics] (discussing public choice theory).
11. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 180 (1978).
12. 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (a) (2012) (indicating Congressional findings behind
ESA).
13. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(16).
14. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6).
15. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(20).
4
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tional, historical, recreational, and scientific value to the Nation
and its people." 16
The listing process begins with a petition submitted by a con-
cerned party. The SOI has 90 days to determine if there is "substan-
tial scientific or commercial information" to go forward.1 7 If there
is substantial information, the SOI has one year to determine
whether to list the species and the habitat range of its protection.
Utilizing the best scientific evidence, the SOI must determine if the
species is facing "(A) the present or threatened destruction, modifi-
cation, or curtailment of its habitat or range; (B) overutilization for
commercial, recreational, scientific, or educational purposes; (C)
disease or predation; (D) the inadequacy of existing regulatory
mechanisms; or (E) other natural or manmade factors affecting its
continued existence."18 Each factor is equally important. If the
SOI finds that a species is adversely affected by one factor, the spe-
cies must be listed as endangered or threatened.19 The same pro-
cess is followed for the downlisting and delisting of the species.20
Once the species is listed, the SOI must "develop and imple-
ment recovery plans . . . for the conservation and survival" of the
species, unless she "finds that such a plan will not promote the con-
servation of the species."21 Although recovery is not defined, the
U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI or the Interior) equates re-
covery with conservation, which is defined as "the use of all meth-
ods and procedures which are necessary to bring any endangered
species or threatened species to the point at which the measures
provided pursuant to [the. Act] are no longer necessary."22 The
16. 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (a).
17. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3) (A). "Substantial information" is defined as the
"amount of information that would lead a reasonable person to believe that the
measure proposed in the petition may be warranted." 50 C.F.R. § 424.14(b)
(1984).
18. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1) (listing various factors for determining endan-
gered species or threatened species status).
19. 50 C.F.R. § 424.11(c) (1980) (listing factors for classifying species under
ESA).
20. 50 C.F.R. § 424.11(d) (listing further considerations for delisting of spe-
cies); see also Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; 90-day Finding on
Petitions to Establish the Northern Rocky Mountain Distinct Population Segment
of gray wolf (Canis lupus) and to Remove the gray wolf in the Northern Rocky
Mountain Distinct Population Segment from the List of Endangered and
Threatened Species, 70 Fed. Reg. 61770, 61773 (Oct. 26, 2005) [hereinafter 90-day
Finding] (providing 90-Day Finding on petitions to delist gray wolf from federal
endangered species list pursuant to ESA).
21. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f).
22. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(3) (defining "conserve," "conserving," and "conserva-
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SOI is instructed to "give priority to those endangered species and
threatened species, without regard to taxonomic classification, that
are most likely to benefit from such plans."23
Once listed, a species is afforded ESA protection. Section 7
precludes any federal action that "jeopardize [s] the continued exis-
tence of any endangered species or threatened species or result [s]
in the destruction or adverse modification of [designated critical]
habitat."24 The federal agency can only proceed with the project if
authorized by the Endangered Species Committee.25 Section 9 pre-
vents any person from taking an endangered species.26 Taking is
defined as "to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap,
capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct."27
Section 4(d) of the ESA permits the SOI to adopt rules that allow
for the taking of threatened species under certain circumstances.28
Regulations issued under Section 4(d) are "usually more compati-
ble with routine human activities in the reintroduction area."29
The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) is the agency within the
DOI that is responsible for the implementation of the ESA.30
III. NRM WoLF REINTRODUCTION
The gray wolf occupied almost all the continental United
States.3 ' The expansion of human settlement, the move westward,
the growth of agriculture and the livestock industry, trapping and
hunting, competition with hunters, and federal and state predator
23. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f) (1) (A) (discussing requirements for development of
"recovery plans").
24. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (2).
25. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e)-(1) (discussing Endangered Species Committee's
responsibilities).
26. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a) (1) (B) (discussing prohibited acts under ESA).
27. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19).
28. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d). FWS regulations generally prohibit the taking of
threatened species. See Prohibitions, 50 C.F.R. § 17.31 (2010); see also Regulation
for Nonessential Experimental Populations of the Western Distinct Population
Segment of the gray wolf, 70 Fed. Reg. 1286, 1287 (Jan. 6, 2005) (to be codified at
50 C.F.R. pt. 17) [hereinafter Nonessential Experimental Populations].
29. See Nonessential Experimental Populations, supra note 28, at 1287 (dis-
cussing wide discretion provided by Section 4(d) of ESA).
30. See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(15) (defining "Secretary"). The SOI is granted pri-
mary responsibility for implementing the ESA with respect to territorial species.
The Secretary of Commerce has the same responsibility with respect to marine and
anadromous species. These latter responsibilities have been delegated to the FWS
and the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), respectively. See 50 C.F.R.
402.01(b) (2010) (designating responsibilities for administering ESA).
31. The southeastern United States, however, was inhabited by the red wolf.
For an overview of the red wolf controversy, see Edward A. Fitzgerald, Seeing Red:
Gibbs v. Babbitt, 13 VILL. ENVTrL. L.J. 1 (2002) [hereinafter Fitzgerald, Seeing Red].
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control led to the extermination of the wolf.32 By the 1970s, the
gray wolf had been extirpated from more than ninety-five percent
of its historic range.33
Following the enactment of the ESA in 1973, various subspe-
cies of the gray wolf were granted protection. 34 In 1978, the FWS
moved away from subspecies protection and listed the gray wolf as
an endangered species throughout the United States, except in
Minnesota where the wolf was downlisted to a threatened species.3 5
The FWS recognized the importance of subspecies distinctions,
so recovery plans and management decisions continued to focus on
subspecies.36 The FWS completed a recovery plan for the eastern
timber wolf in 1978, which was revised in 1992;37 for the Northern
Rocky Mountain wolf in 1980, which was revised in 1987;38 and for
the Mexican wolf in 1982.39 In 1994, the FWS considered a propo-
sal to develop a national recovery plan that would incorporate the
32. See Edward A. Fitzgerald, Lobo Returns from Limbo: New Mexico Cattle Growers
Ass'n v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 46 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 9, 9 (2006) [hereinafter
Fitzgerald, Lobo] (detailing Mexican wolf extermination).
33. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Final Rule To Reclas-
sify and Remove the gray wolf From the List of Endangered and Threatened Wild-
life in Portions of the Conterminous United States; Establishment of Two Special
Regulations for Threatened Gray Wolves, 68 Fed. Reg. 15804, 15805 (Apr. 1, 2003)
(to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17) [hereinafter 2003 Final Rule] (providing for
reclassification of gray wolves in three DPS).
34. See Amendments to List of Endangered Fish and Wildlife, 38 Fed. Reg. 14,
678, 14,678 (June 4, 1973) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17) (listing northern
rocky mountain wolf). The eastern timber wolf was listed in 1974. Taking, Posses-
sion, Transportation, Sale, Purchase, Barter, Exportation and Importation of Wild-
life, 39 Fed. Reg. 1157, 1176 (Jan. 4,1974) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17). The
eastern timber wolf was first classified as an endangered species under the Endan-
gered Species Preservation Act of 1966. See Notice of Public Hearing Regarding
Wilderness Study, 32 Fed. Reg. 4001, 4001 (Mar. 11, 1967). The Mexican wolf was
listed in 1976. See Determination that Two Species of Butterflies Are Threatened
Species and Two Species of Mammals Are Endangered Species, 41 Fed. Reg.
17,736, 17740 (Apr. 28, 1976). The Texas gray wolf was listed in 1976. See Endan-
gered Status for 159 Taxa of Animals, 41 Fed. Reg. 24, 062, 24066 (June 14, 1976).
35. See Reclassification of the gray wolf in the United States and Mexico, with
Determination of Critical Habitat in Michigan and Minnesota, 43 Fed. Reg. 9607,
9607 (Mar. 9, 1978) (providing for reclassification of gray wolf based on best availa-
ble biological data); see also 90-day Finding, supra note 20, at 61770.
36. See 90-day Finding, supra note 20, at 61770 (noting emphasis on subspe-
cies distinctions).
37. See Defenders of Wildlife v. Secretary, U.S. Dep't of Interior, 354 F. Supp.
2d 1156, 1161 n.5 (D. Or. 2005) (noting relisting of gray wolf in 1978).
38. See 2003 Final Rule, supra note 33, at 15815 (discussing Northern Rocky
Mountain Wolf Recovery Plan); see also Dale D. Goble, Of Wolves and Welfare Ranch-
ing, 16 HARv. ENvrL. L. REv. 101, 110 n.58 (1992) (indicating publication date of
Wolf Recovery Plan).
39. See FWS, MEXICAN WoLF RECOVERY PLAN (1982) (providing recovery plan
for Mexican gray wolf).
3572014]
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three recovery plans and provide a national strategy for gray wolf
recovery,40 but abandoned the effort.41
A. Wyoming Farm Bureau Federation v. Babbitt
Gray wolves from Canada were naturally re-colonizing North-
west Montana. 42 Gray wolves were reintroduced into Wyoming and
Idaho in 1995 and 1996 as nonessential experimental population
pursuant to Section 10(j) of the ESA.4 3 The Wyoming Farm Bureau
Federation (WFBF) brought suit challenging the reintroduction. 44
The United States District Court for the District of Wyoming held
that the reintroduction of wolves into Wyoming and central Idaho
violated Section 10(j) of the ESA. 4 5 The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit reversed and found the potential occur-
rence of an individual naturally dispersing wolf in the experimental
area did not violate Section 10(j) because an individual dispersing
wolf did not constitute a population.46 The FWS's determination
that the experimental population was "wholly separate geographi-
40. Plaintiffs Memo in Support of Summary Judgment at 9-10, Nat'l Wildlife
Fed'n v. Norton, 386 F. Supp. 2d 553 (D. Vt. 2005) (noting FWS commissioned
David L. Mech to compose "A Comprehensive Strategy for the gray wolf in the 48
Contiguous States"). Mech concluded:
The Service has no national strategy or goal for the number and/or dis-
tribution of wolves that needs to be reestablished for its ESA responsibil-
ity to be met. Nor is there any strategy/policy that would address the
above major issues. Instead, the Service seems to be on the course of
developing or modifying a recovery plan to cover every place wolves show
up. This a "strategy" of acquiescence rather than a deliberate proactive
plan based on our best biological judgment of where wolves could or
should live and be promoted as an important component of ecosystems.
Clearly, there is a strong need to get ahead of the issue and establish a
national plan for wolf recovery.
Id. (emphasis removed) (quoting Mech in nationwide gray wolf strategy docu-
ment).
41. Id. at 9-11, 46-49 (noting abandonment of recovery efforts).
42. See 2003 Final Rule, supra note 33, at 15817-18 (discussing Northern
Rocky Mountain Wolf Recovery Plan).
43. Id. at 15806 (citing Establishment of a Nonessential Experimental Popula-
tion of Gray Wolves in Yellowstone National Park, 59 Fed. Reg. 60252, 60266 (Nov.
22, 1974)) (explaining why gray wolves returned to Idaho and Wyoming).
44. Wyo. Farm Bureau Fed'n v. Babbitt, 987 F. Supp. 1349, 1355-58 (D. Wyo.
1997) (discussing challenge against reintroduction of gray wolves). The National
Audubon Society filed a second complaint, alleging that the demotion of the natu-
rally occurring wolves in the experimental population area from endangered to
threatened violated the ESA. Id. The Urbigkits, a couple who studied Yellowstone
wolves, filed a third complaint, asserting that the Environmental Impact Statement
failed to discuss the impacts of reintroduction on the naturally occurring subspe-
cies of wolves in Yellowstone, canis lupus irremotus. Id.
45. Id. at 1376 (holding "blanket treatment of all wolves" in area unlawful).
46. Wyo. Farm Bureau Fed'n v. Babbitt, 199 F.3d 1224, 1236 (10th Cir. 2000)
(upholding gray wolf reintroduction as lawful under ESA).
8
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 25, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol25/iss2/1
CONGRESS BEHAVING BADLY
cally" from the natural population and released outside "the cur-
rent range" of the natural population was upheld.4 7 The Tenth
Circuit also found that the Secretary could treat all wolves in the
experimental population area as part of the experimental popula-
tion.4 8 Wolves in the Northern Rockies have exceeded recovery
goals. 4 9
B. Defenders of Wildlife v. Secretary of Interior
The gray wolf also prospered in the Western Great Lakes re-
gion and exceeded recovery goals there.50 Gray wolves from Min-
nesota migrated into northern Wisconsin and northern Michigan
to form a Great Lakes metapopulation. 51 The existence and iden-
tity of the wolves in the Northeast was unknown.5 2
Mexican wolves were reintroduced into the Blue Range Wolf
Recovery Area in New Mexico and Arizona in 1998 as a nonessen-
tial experimental population.5 3 The New Mexico Cattle Growers
Association (NMCGA) brought suit challenging the reintroduction
of the Mexican wolf.54 The United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of New Mexico upheld the FWS decision.55 The court rejected
the NMCGA allegations regarding the livestock depredation rates,
the hybridization of the reintroduced population, the existence of a
naturally occurring Mexican wolf population, the impact on other
47. Id. at 1235-36 (agreeing with FWS's interpretation of "wholly separate
geographically").
48. Id. at 1236-37 (finding all wolves could be treated as experimental popula-
tion); see generally Edward A. Fitzgerald, Wyoming Farm Bureau Fed'n v. Babbitt: The
Children of the Night Return to the Northern Rocky Mountains, 16J. NAT. RESOURCES &
ENvrL. L. 79 (2002) [hereinafter Fitzgerald, Wyoming].
49. See 2003 Final Rule, supra note 33, at 15805 (discussing Northern Rocky
Mountain Wolf Recovery Plan); Defenders of Wildlife v. Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Inte-
rior, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1156, 1162 (D. Or. 2005) (analyzing Northern Rocky Moun-
tain Wolf Recovery Plan). The NRM DPS contains approximately 1,639 wolves
(491 in Montana; 846 in Idaho; 302 in Wyoming) in 95 breeding pairs (34 in Mon-
tana; 39 in Idaho; 22 in Wyoming). 2009 Final Rule, supra note 3, at 15123 (revis-
ing list of endangered and threatened wildlife).
50. See Defenders of Wildlife, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 1164 (discussing Secretary's as-
sessment of gray wolf within certain geographical ranges); 2003 Final Rule, supra
note 33, at 15805.
51. 2003 Final Rule, supra note 33, at 15810 (discussing formation and bene-
fits of metapopulations).
52. Id. (noting lack of evidence regarding another wolf population east of
Michigan).
53. Id. at 15808 (discussing Mexican wolf reintroduction).
54. N.M. Cattle Growers Ass'n v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., 1999 U.S. Dist.
Lexis 19096, at *2 (D.N.M. 1999) (discussing NMCGA's challenges to Mexican
wolf reintroduction into Arizona).
55. Id. at *5 (noting that FWS's determination satisfied rational basis test).
2014] 359
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endangered and threatened species, federal consultation with state
and local governments, and the need for a Supplemental Environ-
mental Impact Statement.56 The Mexican wolf population contin-
ues to struggle in the face of numerous obstacles.57
In 2000, the FWS proposed the establishment of four DPSs in
the Western Great Lakes, Northeast, West, and Southwest and the
downlisting of the gray wolf from an endangered species to a
threatened species throughout most of its historic range, except the
Southwest.58 The Final Rule issued in 2003 established only three
DPSs in the East, West, and Southwest. Gray wolves were down-
listed to threatened species in the Eastern and Western DPS,59 but
the regulation regarding the nonessential experimental popula-
tions in Wyoming and Idaho remained in place.60 The downlisting
permitted their taking pursuant to Section 4(d) regulations and
moved the gray wolf one step closer to delisting.61 The gray wolf
56. Id. at *58, *66, *69, *74-75, *78, *80 (discussing Plaintiffs' challenges to
Mexican wolf reintroduction).
57. See generally The Mexican Gray Wolf Recovery Program, U.S. FISH & WILDIFE
SERV., www.fws.gov/southwest/es/mexicanwolf (last visitedJan. 24, 2013) (contain-
ing various resources including statistics regarding Mexican gray wolf Recovery
Program). There were approximately fifty-eight Mexican wolves in the southwest
as ofJanuary 2012. Id. Environmental groups want the DOI to release more Mexi-
can wolves. Press Release, Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Interior Secretary Salazar
Urged to Restart Mexican Wolf Releases Into Wild (Mar. 29, 2012), available at
http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/news/press_releases/2012/mexican-gray-
wolves-03-29-2012.html (noting several conservation groups advocating for Mexi-
can wolves' release from captive breeding). See also Defenders of Wildlife v. Sec'y,
U.S. Dep't of Interior, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1156, 1162 (D. Or. 2005) (providing histori-
cal information on gray wolf introduction into United States); see also 2003 Final
Rule, supra note 33, at 15818 (providing recovery progress of Mexican gray wolf);
Fitzgerald, Lobo, supra note 32, at 17 (providing history of Mexican gray wolf).
58. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Proposal To Reclassify
and Remove the gray wolf From the List of Endangered and Threatened Wildlife
in Portions of the Conterminous United States; Proposal To Establish Three Spe-
cial Regulations for Threatened Gray Wolves, 65 Fed. Reg. 43450 (July 13, 2000)
(to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17) (proposing reclassification of gray wolf under
ESA). SOI Bruce Babbitt declared:
Wolves are a living symbol of the regard Americans have for things
wild . . . We as a people have made the choice to do the right thing and
bring these animals back from the brink of extinction. We have weighed
the cost of saving an irreplaceable part of our world and found it to be
worth our effort.
Press Release, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., Gray Wolves Rebound; U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service Proposes to Reclassify, Delist Wolves in Much of U.S. (July 11,
2000), available at http://www.fws.gov/mountain-prairie/pressrel/00-18.htm.
59. 2003 Final Rule, supra note 33, at 15804 (noting reclassification of gray
wolves in eastern and western DPS).
60. Id. at 15809 (noting that Final Rule will not affect existing nonessential
experimental populations for gray wolves).
61. Id. at 15826 (explaining effects of proposal as removing regulatory
burden).
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was delisted in fourteen southeastern states because the region was
not part of the gray wolf's historic range. 62 Gray wolves in the
Southwest DPS retained their endangered species status.63 The
FWS also announced its intention to pursue the delisting of the
gray wolf in the Eastern and Western DPS and the removal of all
nonessential population designations in the NRM. 64
The Defenders of Wildlife (DOW) brought suit challenging
the downlisting of gray wolf across much of its historic range in the
Eastern and Western DPS. 65 The United States District Court for
the District of Oregon in Defenders of Wildlife v. Secretary of Interio66
rejected the Interior's action. The court determined that the SOI's
interpretation of "significant portion" of the gray wolf's range was
contrary to the ESA and case law.67 The SOI's implementation of
the DPS policy violated the Interior's own regulation and the
ESA.68 Because the SOI's analysis was limited to gray wolf s current
range, her conclusions regarding the five downlisting factors set
forth in Section 4(a) of the ESA were invalid.69 Nevertheless, the
court did find the Interior's analysis sufficient to support the crea-
tion of two DPS encompassing the current range of the gray wolf in
the Western Great Lakes and NRM and downlisting the gray wolf in
62. Id. at 15804 (noting classification of gray wolf in fourteen states).
63. See id. (providing summary of rule).
64. 2003 Final Rule, supra note 33, at 15876 (noting FWS's intent to delist
gray wolf in eastern and western DPS). The FWS issued a proposal to delist the
eastern DPS. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Removing the
Eastern Distinct Population Segment of the gray wolf From the List of Endangered
and Threatened Wildlife, 69 Fed. Reg. 43664, 43664 (July 21, 2004). Secretary
Norton stated, "Thirty years ago, the future of the gray wolf in the United States
outside of Alaska was anything but certain . . . Today we celebrate not only the
remarkable comeback of the gray wolf, but the partnerships, dedicated efforts and
spirit of conservation that have made this success story possible." Elizabeth
Shogren, Gray WolfMay Be Removed From Endangered List in East, L.A. TIMES (July 17,
2004), http://articles.latimes.com/2004/jul/17/nation/na-wolfl7; see also Press
Release, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., Norton Announces Proposal to Remove East-
ern Population of Gray Wolves from Endangered Species List (July 16, 2004),
available at http://www.doi.gov/news/archive/06_NewsReleases/060316.htm
(commenting on SOI's proposal to remove gray wolf from endangered and
threatened species list).
65. Defenders of Wildlife v. Sec'y, U.S. Dept. of Interior, 354 F. Supp. 2d
1156, 1158, 1162 (D. Or. 2005) (noting challenges brought against SOI's final
rule). See also, Edward A. Fitzgerald, Dysfunctional Downlisting Defeated, 34 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 1 (2007) [hereinafter Fitzgerald, Dysfunctional] (commentating
on Defenders of Wildlife).
66. 354 F. Supp. 2d 1156 (D. Or. 2005).
67. Id. at 1168 (finding SOl's interpretation as contrary to Ninth Circuit pre-
cedent and ESA).
68. Id. at 1170-71 (noting challenges to SOI's rule as against DOI's policy).
69. Id. at 1172 (noting SOI should apply mandated listing factors).
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these two core areas to a threatened species. 70 As a result, the gray
wolf remained an endangered species in the continental United
States, except in Minnesota and the experimental population areas
located in Wyoming, Montana, Idaho, Arizona, New Mexico, and
Texas where it was classified as a threatened species.71 In National
Wildlife Federation v. Norton,72 the United States District Court for
the District of Vermont, employing similar reasoning, also found
fault with the FWS proposal, particularly the abandonment of wolf
recovery efforts in the Northeast.
C. Defenders of Wildlife v. Hall
In January 2005, the FWS promulgated a new Section 10(j)
rule that granted western states and tribes with approved wolf man-
agement plans, specifically Montana and Idaho,73 expanded au-
thority over the nonessential experimental population of wolves
within their boundaries. 74 States and tribes with wolf management
plans were allowed to enter into cooperative agreements for the
management of experimental populations on public land.75
Wyoming was not granted expanded authority because its wolf
management plan was inadequate.76 The FWS instructed Wyoming
70. Id. at 1162 (determining legal sufficiency of DOI's analysis).
71. See 2003 Final Rule, supra note 33, at 15818 (noting current listing status
of gray wolf); see also Press Release, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., Oregon Federal
District Court Ruling Classifies Wolf in the Northwestern U.S. as Endangered, Ex-
cept in Experimental Population Areas in Montana, Idaho, and Wyoming (Feb. 10,
2005), available at http://www.fws.gov/mountain-prairie/pressrel/05-12.htm (not-
ing agency's reaction to 2005 District Court ruling).
72. 386 F. Supp. 2d 553 (D. Vt. 2005).
73. Nonessential Experimental Populations, supra note 28, at 1286 (respond-
ing to wolf population concerns). In January 2004, the FWS approved Idaho and
Montana's wolf management plans, which ensure that population goals remain
above the recovery goals. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. ROCKY MOUNTAIN WoLF RE-
COVERY, 2004 ANNUAL REPORT 37-40 (2005) [hereinafter FWS 2004 Annual Re-
port]; see also, Martin Nie, State Wildlife Governance and Carnivore Conservation, in
PEOPLE AND PREDATORS: FROM CONFLICT TO COEXISTENCE 197, 210-15 (Nina Fac-
sione et al. eds., 2004).
74. Nonessential Experimental Populations, supra note 28, at 1296-97 (outlin-
ing expanded authority). The new rule permits the following: the taking of wolves
attacking livestock, guardian animals, and dogs on private land without authoriza-
tion; the taking of wolves attacking the aforementioned by permittees on public
land grazing allotments without prior authorization; the taking of wolves deter-
mined to have an adverse impact on wildlife by state and tribal officials after public
and scientific review. Id.
75. Id. at 1298-99 (revising rule to allow cooperation to manage wolf
populations).
76. Id. (detailing inadequacy of Wyoming wolf management plan); see also 90-
day Finding, supra note 20, at 61774 (determining whether removal of gray wolf
from endangered species protection is appropriate); see also FWS 2004 Annual Re-
port, supra note 73, at 37-40 (stating that Wyoming's plan was unsatisfactory).
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to change the wolf's status as a predator throughout most of the
state.7 7 Designating wolves as "trophy game" statewide would per-
mit the state to implement a management scheme that provided a
self-sustaining population above the recovery goals and regulated
the taking of wolves.78 Wyoming also had to commit by law to man-
age at least fifteen packs in the state.79 Finally, Wyoming's defini-
tion of pack had to be biologically based and consistent with the
Montana and Idaho definition.s0
Wyoming brought suit, alleging that its program was rejected
because of politics, not science.81 The case was dismissed by the
United States District Court for the District of Wyoming in 2005.82
The Tenth Circuit upheld the dismissal in 2006.83
Wyoming petitioned the FWS to delist wolves in the NRM DPS
in 2005.84 The FWS rejected Wyoming's petition in 2006, citing
continued problems with the Wyoming wolf management plan.8 5
Wyoming again brought suit, which was rejected by federal district
77. Press Release, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., FWS Identifies Steps to Delist
gray wolf: Wyoming Needs Changes to State Law and Management Plan (Jan. 13,
2004) (identifying steps that should be taken before gray wolf is delisted); see also
90-day Finding, supra note 20, at 61774 (gathering information before deciding
whether to delist gray wolf); Nie, supra note 73, at 211-13.
78. Press Release, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., FWS Identifies Steps to Delist
gray wolf: Wyoming Needs Changes to State Law and Management Plan (Jan. 13,
2004) (explaining how gray wolves would be classified after delisting).
79. Id. (explaining Wyoming's commitment to managing fifteen wolf packs).
80. Id. (defining "pack"); see also 90-day Finding, supra note 20, at 61774
(describing gray wolf activity in other states).
81. Wyoming v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 360 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1214 (D. Wyo.
2005); see also Robert W. Black, Another Suit to Be Filed Against Wyoming Wolf Manage-
ment, CASPER STAR TIUB. (July 6, 2004), http://trib.com/news/state-and-regional/
another-suit-to-be-filed-against-wyoming-wolf-management/article_6e0a277e-85dd-
5c6e-97ec-72ddef704082.html (reporting on Wyoming's law suit); State, Feds Squab-
ble over Testimony on Wolf Plan, BILLINos GAZETrE (Jan. 1, 2005), http://billing-
sgazette.com/news/state-and-regional/wyoming/state-feds-squabble-over-
testimony-on-wolf-plan/article_12e6602c-176e-552e-bl26-33efd4b0c668.html (re-
porting on disagreement surrounding Deputy Assistant Secretary for Fish and
Wildlife and Park's testimony in front of Wyoming legislature); Kirk Johnson, Fu-
ture in Wyoming as Predator or Fragile Species, Is in Court's Hands, N.Y. TIMEs (Feb. 5,
2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/05/national/05wolves.html?fta=y&_r=0
(opining that Wyoming's government stands in way of removing protections under
ESA).
82. Wyoming, 360 F. Supp. 2d at 1244-45 (dismissing suit against DOI).
83. See generally Wyoming v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 442 F.3d 1262 (10th Cir.
2006) (upholding dismissal of suit against DOI).
84. 2009 Final Rule, supra note 3, at 15124 (discussing Wyoming's petition to
delist gray wolves in NRM DPS).
85. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants: 12-Month Finding on
Petition To Establish the Northern Rocky Mountain gray wolf Population (Canis
Lupus) as a Distinct Population Segment To Remove the Northern Rocky Moun-
tain gray wolf Distinct Population From the List of Endangered and Threatened
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court.86 Montana and Idaho, frustrated with Wyoming's intransi-
gence, asked for the delisting of their wolves, but the FWS refused
to consider state-by-state delisting.87 Former Idaho Governor Dirk
Kempthorne became Secretary of the Interior in 2006. Negotia-
tions with Wyoming continued.88
Wyoming enacted a statute that outlined state wolf manage-
ment in 2007.89 The wolf was listed as a predator throughout most
of state, except in northwest Wyoming where it was designated as
trophy game. Wyoming pledged to manage one hundred wolves in
the state. 90 The FWS approved the Wyoming wolf management
plan in December 2007.91
The FWS issued the final regulation designating the NRM DPS
and removing it from the list of endangered and threatened species
in February 2008.92 The DPS included all of Montana, Idaho, and
Species, 71 Fed. Reg. 43,410 (Aug. 1, 2006) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17)
(rejecting Wyoming petition).
86. 2009 Final Rule, supra note 3, at 15124 (citing Wyoming U.S. District
Court Case Number 2-06-CV-00245 (Feb. 27, 2008)) (dismissing Wyoming's fed-
eral suit).
87. Mike Stark, Montana, Idaho Still Seek Delisting of Wolves, BILLINGs GAZETrE
(July 27, 2006), http://billingsgazette.com/news/state-and-regional/montana/
montana-idaho-still-seek-delisting-of-wolves/articlebb200d55-d35a-50f4-9bd7-f47f
812548b2.html (reporting why Montana and Idaho are pursuing delisting of
wolves).
88. Whitney Royster, Freudenthal Outlines Plan for Wolf Bill, CASPAR STAR TIUB.
(Feb. 16, 2007), http://trib.com/news/state-and-regional/freudenthal-outlines-
plan-for-wolf-bill/article_cff3e79c-8fed-5c65-86d2-87364cc69fb6.html (detailing
Wyoming's attempt to get approval to kill wolves that affect "big game herd");
Whitney Royster, State-Fed Wolf Talks Could Revive, CASPAR STAR TRIB. (Feb. 20,
2007), http://trib.com/news/topstory/state-fed-wolf-talks-could-revive/arti-
cle_71fd5a08-5bl9-50f4-871a-c007215fd379.html (reporting on delisting negotia-
tions between Wyoming and federal government officials).
89. 2009 Final Rule, supra note 3, at 15124 (explaining Wyoming's wolf man-
agement plan).
90. Id.
91. Id. (noting Interior's later claim about being too optimistic). Further, the
Interior declared that "in hindsight, we were probably too optimistic about what
the law really committed Wyoming to and what could be accomplished by regula-
tions alone. We also should have evaluated the potential for genetic connectivity
more closely, when we determined the 2007 plan was sufficient." Id. at 15149. See
also State, Feds Note Wolf Concessions, CASPAR STAR TRus. (May 25, 2007), http://
trib.com/news/state-and-regional/state-feds-note-wolf-concessions/articleb939bc
c7-9e2d-5f9b-9110-7d03d733d2f4.html (detailing state and federal officials' conces-
sions); Ben Neary, State, Feds Strike Wolf Deal, CASPAR STAR TRIB. (May 25, 2007),
http://trib.com/news/top-story/state-feds-strike-wolf-deal/articleOccbff53-bbc1-
5487-864a-83c35aa3efde.html (detailing agreement between state and federal
officials).
92. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants: Final Rule Designating
the Northern Rocky Mountain Population of gray wolf as a Distinct Population
Segment and Removing This Distinct Population Segment From the Federal List
of Endangered and Threatened Wildlife, 73 Fed. Reg. 10514 (Feb. 27, 2008) (to be
14
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Wyoming, eastern Washington, eastern Oregon, and north-central
Utah.9 3  Only northwestern Montana, central Idaho, and the
Greater Yellowstone Area were known to have wolf packs.94 The
DOW, representing environmental groups, 95 brought suit against
the FWS, 96 challenging the regulation.
Judge Molloy issued a preliminary injunction, which restored
ESA protections to the wolves in NRM DPS in July 2008.97 The
court held that the FWS acted arbitrarily and capriciously because
there was no genetic connectivity between the three wolf popula-
tions in the DPS area, which the FWS determined was necessary for
the maintenance of a viable wolf population.98 The court also
found that the FWS was arbitrary and capricious when it approved
the 2007 Wyoming wolf management plan, which suffered from the
same defects as the Wyoming plan rejected by the FWS in 2003.99
At least thirty-seven wolves were killed in the six month interim be-
tween the issuance of the regulation and the court's decision.100
Wyoming submitted a revised Gray Wolf Management plan,
which maintained the dual classification of trophy game in north-
west Wyoming and predator in the remainder of state in October
codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17) (delisting gray wolves from endangered and
threatened wildlife list in some locations).
93. Id. at 10518 (stating in what locations gray wolves were delisted from en-
dangered and threatened wildlife lists).
94. Id. (giving known locations of wolf packs).
95. Defenders of Wildlife v. Hall, 565 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1160 (D. Mont. 2008)
(indicating plaintiffs were Natural Resources Defense Council, Sierra Club, Hu-
mane Society of US, Center for Biological Diversity, Jackson Hole Conservation
Alliance, Friends of the Clearwater, Alliance for the Wild Rockies, Oregon Wild,
Cascadia Wildlands Project, Western Watersheds Project, and Wildlands Project).
96. Id. (indicating defendants included Secretary of Interior Kempthorne and
FWS Director Hall and defendant intervenors included Safari Club International,
Safari Club International Federation, National Rifle Assoc., Montana Dept. of Fish,
Wildlife, and Parks, Governor C.L. Otter, Idaho Fish and Game Commission,
Idaho Dept. of Fish and Game, Idaho Office of Species Conservation, Sportsmen
for Fish and Wildlife, Montana Stockgrowers Assoc., Montana Farm Bureau Feder-
ation, Western Montana Fish and Game Assoc., Montana Shooting Sports Assoc.,
Friends of the Northern Yellowstone Elk Herd, and Wyoming Stock Growers
Assoc.).
97. See generally id.
98. Id. at 1168-73.
99. Id. at 1173-76.
100. Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support for Motion Preliminary Injunction at
16-17, Defenders of Wildlife v. Hall, 565 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (Apr. 28, 2008) (explain-
ing wolves died in interim between issuance of regulation and court's decision).
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2008.101 The FWS rejected the plan in January 2009.102 The FWS
determined that Wyoming's regulatory framework did not guaran-
tee that the state would be able to manage its share of the wolf
population in the NRM DPS. 0 3 Wyoming must commit to manag-
ing 150 wolves in fifteen breeding pairs in mid-winter inside the
national parks and seventy wolves in seven breeding pairs in mid-
winter outside the national parks. The FWS instructed Wyoming to
manage its wolf population to maintain high levels of genetic diver-
sity and to facilitate genetic exchange. 104 The FWS found the cur-
rent framework limited natural genetic connectivity. Genetic
exchange between the three wolf populations in the NRM DPS
would be more likely if dispersers have safe passage through the
entire state, which would be promoted by a statewide trophy game
designation. The statewide trophy designation would help Wyo-
ming to devise more flexible management strategies.105 Further-
more, the FWS suggested that Wyoming revise its regulations
regarding the taking of wolves in defense of property in a manner
similar to the 10(j) regulation and consider all sources of mortality,
including hunting and defense of property, in its total state wide
mortality limits.10 6 Wolf management in Wyoming remained sub-
ject to the 1994 experimental population regulations.107
D. Defenders of Wildlife v. Salazar
The Bush administration attempted an eleventh-hour delisting
of the wolves in Montana and Idaho, but retained threatened spe-
101. Wyo. GAME & FISH COMM'N, 2008 Dimer REVISION WYOMING GRAY WOLF
MANAGEMENT PLAN, 1-3 (Oct. 28, 2008), available at http://www.wyomingoutdoor
council.org/html/what-we do/wildlife/pdfs/Draft-2008 Wolf MgmtPlan.pdf
(attempting to manage fifteen breeding pairs consisting of at least 150 wolves).
Seven breeding pairs will be maintained outside national parks and public lands in
Northwest Wyoming. Id. at 1. If there are less than eight breeding pairs inside
national parks for two consecutive years, the Wyoming Game and Fish Commission
(WGFC) will manage additional breeding pairs to meet fifteen breeding pairs and
150 wolf population goal. Id. Property owners in Northwest Wyoming can still
take wolves "doing damage to private property." Id. at 2 (internal quotation marks
omitted). The WGFC promises to manage wolves "so that genetic diversity and
connectivity issues do not threaten the gray wolf population." Id. at 3. Such ac-
tions include "encouraging the incorporation of effective migrants into the gray
wolf population" and "working with other states to promote natural dispersal ...
and, if necessary, by relocation or translocation." Id.
102. 2009 Final Rule, supra note 3, at 15125, 15149, 15172.
103. Id. at 15179 (explaining rejection of revised plan)
104. Id.
105. Id. at 15182-83 (discussing effects of state trophy system).
106. Id. at 15179 (listing how Wyoming could improve its management plan).
107. 2009 Final Rule, supra note 3, at 15125 (citing 50 C.F.R. 17.84 (i)) (ex-
plaining what regulations Wyoming must follow).
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cies status for the wolves in Wyoming in January of 2009. The in-
coming Obama administration put a freeze on all pending
regulations, including the NRM wolf delisting.108 Secretary Salazar
resurrected the FWS regulation delisting wolves in the NRM DPS in
April of 2009.109 The DOW, representing numerous environmental
groups, 110 brought suit challenging the action.'
After the April delisting, the states and Indian tribe planned
wolf hunts to manage their wolf populations and raise revenue.
Planned hunts allowed the killing of 75 wolves in Montana (fifteen
percent of the state population), 220 wolves in Idaho (twenty-five
percent of the state population), and 35 wolves on Nez Pearce
lands." 2 Environmental groups sought a preliminary injunction to
halt the wolf hunts."13 Judge Molloy refused to issue an injunction
halting the hunt in September 2009.114 The court held that there
was no showing of irreparable harm. Experts asserted that a thirty
percent reduction of the wolf population in the region would not
jeopardize the wolf population. The maximum projected killing of
330 wolves in the hunts would only reduce the wolf population by
108. Eric Barker, Officials Hope Wolf Delisting Can Proceed: Obama Has Delayed
Rules to Transfer Wolf Management to the States, LEWISTON MORNING TRIB. Jan. 22,
2009), http://Imtribune.com/northwest/article-e25la32a-21f'0-52db-bc51-4b3138
4e5fbl.html (discussing Obama administration's delay in allowing states to control
wolf management).
109. See 2009 Final Rule, supra note 3, at 15123 (resurrecting northern rocky
mountain wolf delisting regulation).
110. Defenders of Wildlife v. Salazar, 812 F. Supp. 2d 1205 (D. Mont. 2009)
(Defenders 1) (listing defendants as including NRDC, Sierra Club, Humane Society
of U.S., Center for Biological Diversity, Jackson Hole Conservation Alliance,
Friends of the Clearwater, Alliance for the Wild Rockies, Oregon Wild, Cascadia
Wildlands, Western Watersheds Project, Wildlands Network, and Hells Canyon
Preservation Council).
111. Complaint, Defenders of Wildlife v. Salazar, 812 F. Supp. 2d 1205 (D.
Mont. 2009) (challenging delisting regulation).
112. Eric Barker, Wolf Hunting Heads Back to Court, LEWISTON MORNING TRIB.
(Aug. 21, 2009), http://Imtribune.com/northwest/article 63f22991-d366-55cl-
a026-323e58766780.html (giving facts and figures of planned hunt). The Interior
supports wolf hunting as a state wildlife management tool. 2009 Final Rule, supra
note 3, at 15147. The Interior contends that the wolf population can be sustained
even with a thirty to fifty percent annual mortality rate. Id. at 15162.
113. Defenders I, 812 F. Supp. 2d at 1206 (citing Winter v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)) (outlining preliminary injunction require-
ments). To qualify for the granting of a preliminary injunction, the "plaintiffs
must establish (1) that they are 'likely to succeed on the merits,' (2) that they are
'likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief,' (3) that the
'balance of equities tips' in their favor, and (4) that such an injunction is in the
'public interest.'" Id. at 1207 (citing Winter, 555 U.S. at 20).
114. See generally id. (refusing to issue an injunction).
3672014]
17
Fitzgerald: Alliance for Wild Rockies v. Salazar: Congress Behaving Badly
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2014
368 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAw JouRNAL [Vol. XXV: p. 351
twenty percent, which was well within acceptable limits. 11 5 The
court did, however, find that the environmental plaintiffs were
likely to prevail in the full trial on the merits because the SOI could
not subdivide the NRM DPS by retaining endangered species status
for wolves in Wyoming. 116
At the end of the 2010 season, Montana hunters killed 72
wolves and wildlife agents killed 145 wolves for depredation.
Hunters in Idaho killed 134 wolves and wildlife agents killed 93
wolves. Wildlife agents in Wyoming killed 32 wolves. In the spring
of 2010, the remaining wolves were 525 wolves in Montana, 843
wolves in Idaho, 320 wolves in Wyoming, 5 wolves in Washington,
and 14 wolves in Oregon.117
An environmental group pursued another strategy: the Center
for Biological Diversity (CBD) petitioned the FWS to establish a na-
tional recovery plan for wolves. A similar effort by the NRDC in
2008 had been rejected.118
Judge Molloy rejected the Obama administration's proposal to
delist the wolf because the NRM DPS could not be subdivided on
state-by-state basis in August 2010. The court found the text of the
ESA defines the units for listing and delisting as species, subspecies,
or DPS. The NRM DPS must be treated as a single unit. The "sig-
nificant portion of the range" language could not be utilized to
change the definition of an endangered or threatened species. Be-
cause Wyoming constituted "a significant portion of the range" of
the NRM DPS, wolves in the DPS could not be delisted until Wyo-
ming developed an adequate state management plan.1 19
115. Id. at 1209-10 (describing acceptable limits). The projected impact on
the area is that by the end of March 31, Idaho will have approximately 765 wolves,
or 85 fewer than at the end of 2008; Montana's wolf population will increase by 32
for a total of 529; and Wyoming will add 70 wolves to its population of 302. Re-
turning Wyoming's One-Finger Salute, LEWISTON MORNING TRIB. (Sept. 13, 2009).
116. Defenders 1, 812 F. Supp. 2d at 1207-09 (finding plaintiffs would probably
succeed on full trial on merits).
117. Report: Wolf Population Rose Last Year in Northern Rockies, But at Slower Rate,
LEWISTON MORNING TRIB. (Mar. 12, 2010), http://Imtribune.com/northwest/arti-
cle f462466f-25f4-5033-90d4-8a5b4098b40b.html (describing wolf population pat-
tern in northern Rockies).
118. Matthew Brown, Wolves: Biologists File Petition Seeking Nation Wide Recovery,
LEWISTON MORNING TRIB. (July 21, 2010), http://Imtribune.com/northwest/arti-
clec6b2fa2e-c733-55al-84d8-a5bc4e327034.html (reporting on petition to return
wolves to various areas in United States).
119. Defenders, 729 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1207 (D. Mont. 2010) (stating when
wolves could be delisted in Wyoming); see also Fitzgerald, Defenders, supra note 4, at
1 (detailing controversy over delisting wolves in NRM).
18




There were several developments that called into question the
2010 Montana federal district court decision. In 2010, Judge Alan
Johnson in the United States District Court for the District of Wyo-
ming found the FWS rejection of the Wyoming wolf management
plan in 2009 arbitrary and capricious. The court held that the FWS
offered no new scientific evidence to support its insistence on a
statewide trophy game designation. The malleable trophy game
area in the state plan did not pose any risk to the genetic connectiv-
ity and dispersal in the near future. The court was confident that
Wyoming would not reduce the trophy game area to keep its wolf
population at a minimum because the state was committed to meet-
ing its recovery obligations. The court conceded that state predator
control was more stringent than the 10(j) rule, but its impact must
be analyzed in terms of a larger trophy game area, not state wide. 120
The FWS was mandated to reconsider the Wyoming plan and deter-
mine if a larger trophy game area, not the entire state, would
achieve genetic connectivity. The Obama administration decided
not to appeal the decision, but to negotiate with Wyoming.121
A study by Bridgett von Holdt in 2010 demonstrated that there
was genetic connectivity between the three populations. 2 2 The
study concluded that the high genetic diversity evidenced during
the first decade of reintroduction was sufficient to avoid any genetic
problems. The study cautioned that successful conservation would
depend on management decisions that promote natural dispersal,
such as adequate dispersal corridors, and minimize factors that re-
duce genetic connectivity, such as hunting and predator control.123
This study contradicted an earlier study by the same authors, which
120. Wyoming v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 09-CV-118J, 2010 WL 4814950 (D. Wy.
2010) (determining how impacts of state predator control should be analyzed).
121. Feds to Negotiate with Wyoming over Gray Wolves, BILLINGs GAZETTE (Mar. 15,
2011, 8:57 AM), http://billingsgazette.com/news/state-and-regional/wyoming/
feds-to-negotiate-with-wyoming-over-gray-wolves/article b93f6264-4fl4-1 1eO-a757-
001cc4c03286.html (reporting on debate surrounding giving Wyoming control of
management of endangered gray wolves).
122. Bridgett M. von Holdt et al., A Novel Assessment of Population Structure and
Gene Flow in the Grey Wolf Populations of the Northern Rocky Mountains of the United
States, 19 MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 4412, 4412 (2010) (analyzing DNA samples from
northern rocky mountain wolves); see also Mark Hebblewhite, Marco Musiani & L.
Scott Mills, Restoration of Genetic Connectivity Mmong Northern Rockies WolfPopulations,
19 MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 4383 (2010) (discussing whether gray wolves in northern
Rocky Mountains have "recovered to genetically effective levels").
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had been relied upon by the Montana federal district court in its
2008 decision.124
F. Wolf Hysteria
Wolf hysteria broke out in the region and the controversy
moved over to Congress. 125 Following the Montana federal court
decision, bills were introduced by western senators and congress-
men that delisted the wolf in Montana and Idaho, but retained pro-
tection in the remainder of the NRM DPS; delisted the wolf in the
NRM DPS, except in Wyoming; and delisted the wolf nationally.126
The bills arrived late in the session, so there were no hearings in
the Democratic Congress. In addition, no action was taken in the
House. There was an effort to move the national delisting bill in
the Senate by unanimous consent. Democratic Senator Cardin of
Maryland objected, however, so the bill died.127
Wolf opponents renewed their efforts in 2011. Similar bills
were introduced with bipartisan support, but there were major
changes in Congress.128 Republicans gained majority control in the
House and the Democrat's majority in the Senate was reduced.
Wolf opponents pursed another tactic. A provision reviving
the 2009 regulation and precluding its judicial review was attached
to the Continuing Resolution (CR) to keep the government funded
through FY 2011. The provision was included in both the House
passed version and proposed Senate version of the CR.129 Senator
124. See Defenders of Wildlife v. Hall, 565 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1168-69 (citing
Bridgett von Holdt et al., The Genealogy and Genetic Variability of Reintroduced Yellow-
stone Wolves, 17 MoLEcuAIu ECOLOGY 252 (2007)) (relying on 2007 genetics study).
125. See Fitzgerald, Delisting Wolves, supra note 5, at 10840.
126. H.R. 6028, 111th Cong. § 3825, § 3919, § 3864 (2d Sess. 2010) (discuss-
ing various delisting bills); see also Eve Byron, Wolf Management Hot Topic in D.C.,
INDEP. REc. (Dec. 3, 2010, 12:12 AM), http://helenair.com/news/article-ce55b7
d8-feac-1ldf-892a-001cc4cOO2e.html (highlighting debate to bring state control
back to wolf management).
127. Laura Lundquist, Utah Bill to Delist the Wolves Fails in Senate, TIMES-NEWS
(Dec. 22, 2010, 1:30 AM), http://magicvalley.com/news/local/state-and-regional/
utah-bill-to-delist-wolves-fails-in-senate/article_cfb4ed02-d9c-11 e0-bld2-001cc4cO
3286.html (reporting on state bill to allow for unenforceability of federal endan-
gered species wolf listing).
128. Eric Barker, Idaho Congressmen Co-Sponsor Bills to Change Status of Wolves,
LEWISTON MORNING TRIB. (Jan. 27, 2011), http://Imtribune.com/northwest/arti-
cleecac0354-a5b2-5a74-a705-d64d3a087b6c.html (reporting on legislation that
would remove wolves from protection from federal laws).
129. Rehberg Statement on Inclusion of Wolf Language in House Continuing Resolu-
tion, STATES NEWS SERv. (Feb. 14, 2011), http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-
249092318.html; Senate Includes Delisting Bill in Must Pass Funding Package, STATES
NEWS SERV. (Mar. 4, 2011), http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-250686287.html
(reporting on information released by Defenders of Wildlife).
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Cardin opposed the provision.130 An effort by Republican Repre-
sentative Lummis of Wyoming to include Wyoming was defeated on
the grounds that a substantive change in legislation was not permit-
ted in an appropriation measure.131 This defeated effort indicated
Congressional skepticism regarding Wyoming's plan. 32
Fear of Congressional action generated a settlement propo-
sal, 33 which was rejected by Judge Molloy in April 2011. The court
determined that the proposed settlement would place wolves in
Montana and Idaho at greater risk. The court could not use its
equitable powers to allow a substantive violation of the ESA. Earlier
the parties argued that state management was inadequate, the num-
bers were too low for delisting, and the DPS could not be subdi-
vided. If the stay was granted, many of these issues would not be
resolved. The court was particularly concerned that the proposal
130. 157 Cong. Rec. 35, S1477 (2011) (including Senator Cardin's statements
regarding de-listing gray wolf). Senator Cardin stated:
The Senate bill, however, does include a provision that would legislatively
de-list the gray wolf from the endangered species list. I continue to op-
pose legislative efforts to delist endangered species. We have a regulatory
process that is based on scientific data, and we should use it. All that is
needed is for the States in the Northern Rockies to submit appropriate
management plans to the Department of Interior so that the law can
work the way Congress intended.
Id.
131. House Denies Bid to Lift Wolf Protections in Wyoming, BILLINGs GAZEFrE
(Feb. 17, 2011, 11:30 AM), http://billingsgazette.com/news/state-and-regional/
wyoming/u-s-house-denies-bid-to-lift-wolf-protections-in/articlea5b3e4e-3ac4-11
e0-9c67-001cc4c002e0.html (discussing failure to include Wyoming in bill to ease
wolf protections).
132. William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621, 638-
39 (1990) [hereinafter Eskridge, Textualism] (noting rejected proposals are rele-
vant as "direct evidence that Congress considered an issue and agreed not to adopt
a specified policy").
133. Press Release, Dept. of Interior, Interior Announces Proposed Settle-
ment of gray wolf Lawsuit (Mar. 18, 2011) (stating various provisions of settle-
ment). The proposal provided for the following: (1) ESA protections from wolves
in Montana and Idaho would be removed. (2) Negotiations with Wyoming would
continue and a new delisting regulation would be promulgated. (3) ESA protec-
tions for wolves in Washington, Oregon, and Utah would be retained. (4) The
Interior would withdraw the 2007 Solicitor's Memo on the meaning of significant
portion of the range. (5) A scientific panel would reexamine recovery goals ac-
cording the best available science. (6) The Interior would monitor the wolves in
the region for four years. (7) Environmental groups promised that there would be
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would adversely affect the interests of non-settling parties, 3 4 so the
stay was denied. 3 5
After the proposed settlement was rejected, Congress agreed to
language proposed by Democratic Senator Tester of Montana and
Republican Representative Simpson of Idaho that delisted the wolf
in the NRM DPS, except for Wyoming, and precluded its judicial
review. The FWS was also ordered to reconsider Wyoming's man-
agement plan in light ofJudge Johnson's decision and determine if
a statewide trophy game designation was warranted. Senator Car-
din continued to object.136 This language was inserted into Section
1713 of the Department of Defense and Full Year Continuing Ap-
propriations Act of 2011.137
G. Wild Rockies II
Environmental groups brought suit challenging the Congres-
sional delisting of the NRM DPS as a violation of the Constitutional
separation of powers.138 The United States District Court for the
District of Montana and the United States Court of Appeals for the
134. See Deal Reached to Lift Protections in 2 States, BoZEMAN DAILY CHRON. (Mar.
18, 2011, 1:14 PM), http://www.bozemandailychronicle.com/news/article_34508
eca-5194-1leO-88ef-001cc4cOO2e.html (noting several environmental plaintiffs
agreed to settlement, but others opposed it). EarthJustice, which represented the
environmental plaintiffs, was forced to withdraw from the suit because the split
created a conflict of interest. Id.
135. Defenders of Wildlife v. Salazar, 776 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1186-91 (D. Mont.
2011) (explaining denial of stay.
136. 157 Cong. Rec. 54, S2421 (2011) (including Senator Cardin's com-
ments). On April 13, 2011, Senator Cardin stated:
There is a rider that was attached that did survive that deals with the
delisting of the great wolf under the Endangered Species Act. That is not
how we should be acting. There is a remedy for dealing with delisting.
There is a process we go through. We shouldn't go down a dangerous
precedent that starts congressional or political action on delisting species
that are included under the Endangered Species Act.
Id. Senator Cardin repeated his criticism the following day, stating, "I pointed out
yesterday that on the environmental front regarding the Endangered Species Act,
there is a provision that delists the great wolf. That shouldn't be targeted for con-
gressional action. That is a dangerous precedent for us to set." 157 Cong. Rec.,
55, H2720 (2011); see also Plaintiffs' Statement of Undisputed Facts in Support of
their Motion for Summary Judgment, Wild Rockies I, 800 F. Supp. 2d 1123 (D.
Mont. 2011).
137. Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act,
Pub. L. 112-110, 125 Stat. 38 (2011) (providing information regarding wolf delist-
ing). Byron, Budget, supra note 6 (including delisting of wolves in Idaho and Mon-
tana in budget bill).
138. Wild Rockies II, 672 F.3d 1170, 1174 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting plaintiffs
included AWR, Friends of Clearwater, WildEarth Guardians, Center for Biological
Diversity, and Cascadia Wildlands).
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Tenth Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the appropriation
rider. Reactions to the decision varied.139
During the winter of 2012, Montana hunters killed 166 wolves
out of the 220 quota. Yet, Montana's wolf population increased by
fifteen percent to 653 wolves. 140 In Idaho, 255 wolves were shot and
124 wolves were trapped, leaving a wolf population of 746.141
III. ANALYsis: WILD RoCKIES 11
The Wild Rockies I litigation raised several major questions.
Can Congress change the law to affect pending litigation? Can
Congress bypass the conventional lawmaking process and attach
substantive statutory changes to an appropriation bill? Can Con-
gress remove federal court jurisdiction over the issue? The answer
to each of these questions reflects either the republican or public
choice model of Congress.
A. Changing the Statutory Framework
Environmental groups, relying on United States v. Klein, 14 2 al-
leged that Section 1713 violated the separation of powers. Section
1713 did not amend the ESA, but was an attempt to affect the out-
come of pending litigation regarding the subdivision of the NRM
139. Press Release, Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Appeals Court Denies Chal-
lenge to Congressional Rider (Mar. 14, 2012), available at http://www.biological
diversity.org/news/pressreleases/2012/wolves-03-14-2012.html (discussing back-
door rider). The CBD further declared, "Congress set a terrible precedent by pass-
ing this backdoor rider that took away protection from wolves. Scientists, not
politicians, need to decide which species need protection." Id. (quoting Michael
Robinson, a wolf expert at Center for Biological Diversity). Representative Simp-
son stated, "This case has made it clear that those who persist in trying to manage
wildlife through the courts, in spite of all scientific evidence that this species has
recovered, no longer have a defensible position." Press Release, U.S. Congressman
Mike Simpson, Simpson Issues Statement on Court Decision Upholding Wolf De-
listing Language (Mar. 14, 2012), available at http://simpson.house.gov/news/
documentsingle.aspx?DocumentlD=286860. Senator Tester (D-MT.) who was in a
tough reelection battle against Representative Rehberg (R-MT.) explained, "This
decision is right for Montana because Montana's wolves are recovered, and they
must be managed like other wildlife." Press Release, Jon Tester, Tester: Court Rul-
ing on Wolves 'Right for Montana' (Mar. 14, 2012), available at http://www.tester.
senate.gov/?p=press release&id=896.
140. Matt Volz, Montana Gives Initial OK To Plans For Wolf Hunt, Trapping, LEw-
IsrON MORNINc TRIB. (May 11, 2012) (reporting Montana's increase in wolf popu-
lation despite wolf hunts).
141. Rob Chaney, Idaho Wolf Season Ends, But Hunts Continue On Private Land
In Panhandle, MISSOULAN (July 5, 2012, 6:15 AM), http://missoulian.com/news/
local/idaho-wolf-season-ends-but-hunts-continue-on-private-land/article_952b62
48-c631-11el-8ff9-0019bb2963f4.html (reporting on hunts reducing wolf popula-
tion to 746).
142. 80 U.S. 128 (1871).
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DPS. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
held that Congress did not violate separation of powers with the
enactment of Section 1713. Congress did not interfere with pend-
ing litigation, but still amended the ESA. Congress instructed the
FWS to restore the federal regulation "without regard to any other
provision of statute or regulation that applies to issuance of such
rule." 143 Congress replaced preexisting standards with new stan-
dards, which the court must folloW. 1 4 4
The Ninth Circuit correctly determined that Section 1713 did
not violate the separation of powers. Klein is the only case in which
the Supreme Court found Congressional action affecting pending
litigation to be unconstitutional. 14 5 Klein has been implicitly over-
ruled by Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society (Robertson II). 146 Further,
recent cases demonstrate that Congress has virtually unlimited
power to affect pending litigation by amending or repealing any
law, creating exceptions to existing law, or establishing new law
bridges that avoid compliance with existing legal requirements.
Section 1713 repealed by implication other statutory requirements.
Even if Section 1713 did pose a problem with the separation of pow-
ers, the Ninth Circuit was required to adopt an interpretation that
upheld its constitutionality. Judicial abandonment of Klein, how-
ever, reinforces interest group influence in Congress and reflects
public choice theory.
1. Separation of Powers
The United States Constitution separates power among the
three branches of the federal government and provides each
branch with authority to check and balance the exercise of power
by other branches. Congress enacts the law; the executive branch
implements the law; and the judiciary interprets the law and de-
cides cases. 147 The Constitutional separation of powers and checks
143. Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act,
Pub. L. No. 112-10, 125 Stat. 38 (2011) (including rider requirement that SOI
reissue final rule).
144. Wild Rockies II, 672 F.3d 1170, 1174 (9th Cir. 2012) (forcing courts to
discard preexisting standards in favor of new standards).
145. Id. at 1173 (demonstrating rarity of Klein ruling).
146. 503 U.S. 429 (1992).
147. Wild Rockies I, 800 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1127 (D. Mont. 2011) (citing Way-
man v. Southard, 23 U.S. 1 (1825)) (discussing roles of each branch of federal
government); see also, Linda D. Jellum, Which Is to Be Master," the Judiciary or the
Legislature? When Statutory Directives Violate Separation ofPowers, 56 UCLA L. REv. 837,
854-78 (2009) (analyzing separation of powers).
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and balances prevent the tyranny of one branch with respect to the
others and over individuals. 1 4 8
Congress can repeal or amend the law to affect the outcome of
pending litigation. The court must utilize the new law in the litiga-
tion. For example, in Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge,149
(Wheeling Bridge) the Court initially determined that the bridge was
a navigational obstruction. Congress responded by enacting a stat-
ute that changed the status of the bridge to a postal road and re-
quired that navigation not interfere with the bridge. Subsequently,
the Court concluded that Congress had changed the law and the
bridge ceased to be a nuisance.150
Congress cannot however instruct the court on how to decide a
particular case. The Supreme Court in Klein invalidated a Congres-
sional act for violating the separation of powers. The administrator
of the deceased owner of property sold to the federal government
during the Civil War brought suit pursuant to a federal statute al-
lowing noncombatant confederate landowners, who had demon-
strated loyalty to the federal government, to recover the proceeds
from such sales. In an earlier case, the Court held that a presiden-
tial pardon constituted sufficient proof of loyalty under this law. 15
Because the deceased owner had received a pardon, the Court of
Claims awarded recovery. While the appeal was pending, Congress
enacted a statute that declared that a presidential pardon did not
constitute proof of loyalty, but could be evidence of disloyalty. Fed-
eral courts were ordered to find that a claimant, who had accepted
a presidential pardon without previously disclaiming disloyalty, was
not entitled to land sale proceeds under the statute. Federal courts
were instructed to dismiss any case in which a claimant had pre-
148. FEDERALIST No. 47, at 324 U. Cooke ed. 1961) (James Madison) (describ-
ing separation of powers necessity). James Madison in the Federalist Papers de-
scribed the separation of powers as essential to free government: "The
accumulation of all powers legislative, executive and judiciary in the same hands,
whether of one, a few or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointive, or elective,
may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny." Id. The Supreme Court
has "consistently given voice to, and has reaffirmed, the central judgment of the
Framers of the Constitution that, within our political scheme, the separation of
governmental powers into three coordinate Branches is essential to the preserva-
tion of liberty." Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380 (1989).
149. 59 U.S. 421 (1855).
150. Id. at 429-30 (indicating new laws require new interpretations by courts
during litigation).
151. United States v. Padelford, 76 U.S. 531 (1870) (observing that presiden-
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vailed in the Court of Claims on an assertion of proof of loyalty by
presidential pardon.'5 2
The Supreme Court held that the statute was not a valid exer-
cise of the "exceptions and regulations" clause, but was simply an
unconstitutional Congressional instruction to the courts on how to
rule in particular cases. Congress had exceeded "the limit which
separate[d] the legislative from the judicial power."' 53 The Court
distinguished the earlier Wheeling Bridge decision on the grounds
that "no arbitrary rule of [law] was prescribed in [Wheeling Bridge],
but the court was left to apply its ordinary rules to the new circum-
stances created by the act."154 No law had been changed in Klein.
The Supreme Court implicitly overruled Klein in Robertson II.
Several timber sales in the Pacific Northwest old growth forests were
challenged on the grounds that they posed a risk to the threatened
northern spotted owl. The Ninth Circuit temporarily halted the
sales for alleged violations of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act
(MBTA), National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), Federal Land
Policy and Management Act (FLMPA), and Oregon-California Rail-
road Land Grant Act (OCRLGA).155 Congress responded by enact-
ing Section 318 of the DOI Appropriation Act of 1990, popularly
known as Northwest Timber Compromise, which established the
rules for temporary timber harvesting within designated geographi-
cal areas in "the thirteen national forests in Oregon and Washing-
ton and Bureau of Land Management lands in western Oregon
known to contain northern spotted owls."15 6 The rule expired on
September 30, 1990, except that sales during that time remained
subject to Section 318. The National Forest Service (NFS) and the
Bureau of Land Management (BLM) were required to offer speci-
fied quantities of lumber in the area during the year. Section
(b) (3) identified areas in the national forests and Section (b) (5)
identified areas on BLM lands where sales were prohibited. The
litigation focused on Section (b) (6), noting "the Congress hereby
determines and directs that management of areas according to sub-
152. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128, 146-47 (1871) (dismissing any cases
in which proof of loyalty by presidential pardon was established); see also Seattle
Audubon Soc'y v. Robertson (Robertson 1), 914 F.2d 1311, 1314 (9th Cir. 1990)
(finding idea of separation of powers has "consistently" been upheld).
153. Klein, 80 U.S. at 147 (maintaining wall of separating between branches).
154. Id. at 146-47 (distinguishing Wheeler Bridge decision).
155. See Robertson I, 914 F.2d at 1311 (discussing how sales violated various
acts).
156. Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act for
Fiscal Year 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-121, 103 Stat. 701, 745-50 (1989) (explaining
Northwest Timber Compromise).
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sections (b) (3) and (b) (5) of this section on the thirteen national
forests in Oregon and Washington and Bureau of Land Manage-
ment lands in western Oregon known to contain northern spotted
owls is adequate consideration for the purposes of meeting the stat-
utory requirements that are the basis for the consolidated cases cap-
tioned Robertson II, Washington Contract Loggers Assoc. v. Robertson,
and Portland Audubon v. Lujan."15 7
The federal government sought dismissal of the suit, arguing
that the Section 318 superseded all statutes on which plaintiffs'
challenges were based. Environmental groups asserted that Section
318 violated the separation of powers doctrine because it ordered
the outcome in pending litigation, which was prohibited by Klein.
The federal district court dismissed the case on the grounds
that Section (b) (6) "can and must be read as a temporary modifica-
tion of the environmental laws" in the cases. 158 The Ninth Circuit
reversed and found Section (b) (6) "does not, by its plain language,
repeal or amend the environmental laws underlying this litigation,"
but rather "directs the court to reach a specific result and make
certain factual findings under existing law in connection with two
[pending] cases."15 9 This violated Klein, which prohibits Congress
from "'prescrib[ing] a rule for a decision of a cause in a certain
way' where 'no new circumstances have been created by
legislation.' "160
The Supreme Court reversed and found that Section 318 did
not command a result in pending litigation, but amended the un-
derlying statutes to provide an alternative means for the timber
sales to proceed.16 1 The Court found the tone of the language, that
Congress "determined and directed" compliance with Section 318
remedied the five statutory violations, did not alter its view that Sec-
tion 318 changed the law.1 62 The specific reference to the cases
being reversed was dismissed as a shorthand method of identifying
157. Id. (highlighting litigation over Section (b) (6)).
158. Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y (Robertson 1l), 503 U.S. 429, 436
(1992) (quoting Seattle Audubon Soc. v. Robertson, No. 89-160 (W.D. Wash.
1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (explaining why case was dismissed).
159. Robertson I, 914 F.2d at 1316 (reversing district court's reading of Section
(b) (6)).
160. Id. at 1315 (citing United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128, 147 (1871)) (stat-
ing that appeals court ruling violated principles of Klein ruling).
161. Robertson II, 503 U.S. at 438-39 (pointing out that Section 318 did not
command a result by courts).
162. Id. at 439-40 (maintaining that Section 318 changed law).
3772014]
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the statutory provisions that Section 318 replaced.163 The enact-
ment of Section 318 through an appropriation rider did not pose
any problem. The Court noted that repeals by implication were not
favored, but were allowed if the language was explicit as Section
318. Even if Section 318 posed a Constitutional problem, the Court
was required to adopt a statutory interpretation that upheld its
constitutionality.1 6 4
Klein is based on several premises: (1) Congress cannot inter-
fere with executive pardon power, (2) Congress cannot preclude
suits against the federal government, (3) Congress cannot force the
courts to validate unconstitutional acts, and (4) Congress cannot
dictate the outcome in a judicial proceeding. 165 Robertson Hunder-
mined several of these rationales. Congress dictated the result in
pending litigation. Section 318(b) (3) and (b) (5) excluded certain
areas from leasing within the threatened northern spotted owl's
habitat. Congress declared that timber sales in the remaining areas
complied with statutory requirements without changing any of the
provisions of the statutes allegedly being violated. Judicial review of
sales in the remaining areas was explicitly precluded. Section 318
specifically identified the litigation that was being reversed and per-
mitted timber sales that directly benefited the federal government.
Robertson Ilindicates a high degree ofjudicial respect for an act
of Congress that is intended to affect litigation, as long as it changes
the underlying substantive law in any detectable way. The Ninth
Circuit in Wild Rockies II, noting its unsuccessful attempt to invoke
Klein in Robertson II, acknowledged that the "Supreme Court. . . told
us the error of our ways."' 66 Section 1713, like Section 318,
amended preexisting law and directed FWS to restore the federal
regulation "without regard to any other provision of statute or regu-
lation that applies to issuance of such rule."' 6 7 Because Congress
changed the preexisting law, there was no violation of the separa-
tion of powers doctrine.
163. Id. at 440-41 (allowing mention of specific cases as shorthand to identify
statutory provisions being replaced).
164. Id. at 441-42 (articulating that court was required to find statutory inter-
pretation to uphold Section 318).
165. Amy D. Ronner, judicial Self-Demise: The Test When Congress Impermissibly
Intrudes on judicial Powers After Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society and the Federal Ap-
pellate Courts' Rejection of the Separation of Powers Challenges to the New Protection of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 35 Az. L. REv. 1037, 1045-48 (1993) (outlining
four premises of Klein).
166. Wild Rockies II, 672 F.3d 1170, 1174 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting failure of
Ninth Circuit to invoke Klein).
167. Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act,
Pub. L. No. 112-10, 125 Stat. 38 (2011) (ordering FWS to restore law).
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2. Congressional Action: Revising the Statutory Law
Both before and after Robertson II, Congress pursued various
means to affect ongoing litigation. Congress changed the underly-
ing statutory law to affect pending litigation, as mandated by Klein.
Federal courts utilized the changes and allowed the projects to pro-
ceed as in Wheeling Bridge.16 8
The United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit halted
the construction of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline from the North Slope
to Valdez in Wilderness Society v. Morton.169 The court found the
SOI's grant of special use permits for easements that exceeded fifty
feet violated the Mineral Leasing Act (MLA).1 70 Congress enacted
the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Act (TAPA), which amended the MLA to
grant the SOI authority to permit broader easements to complete
the pipeline. TAPA also exempted the project from NEPA compli-
ance and precluded judicial review of the project.' 7 '
In Ecology Center v. Castaneda,17 2 the United States District
Court for the District of Montana halted several timber sales for
violating the National Forest Management Act (NFMA) because the
NFS did not show that a minimum of ten percent of old growth
forest would remain below 5,500 feet, as required by Kootenai For-
est Plan. While the litigation was pending, Congress enacted the
168. See United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. 103, 170 (1801) (describing
powers of appellate courts). Justice Marshall further stated:
It is in the general true that the province of an appellate court is only to
enquire whether ajudgment when rendered was erroneous or not. But if
subsequent to the judgment and before the decision of an appellate
court, a law intervenes and positively changes the rule which governs, the
law must be obeyed, or its obligations denied. If the law be constitu-
tional, and of that no doubt in the present case has been expressed, I
know of no court which can contest its obligation.
Id.
169. 479 F.2d 845 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
170. Id. (stating granting of special easements violated MLA).
171. 43 U.S.C. § 1652(d) (2012) (noting pipeline's exemption). Section
1652(d) outlines the pipeline exemption:
The actions taken pursuant to this chapter which relate to the construc-
tion and completion of the pipeline system, and to the applications filed
in connection therewith necessary to the pipeline's operation at full ca-
pacity, as described in the [FEIS] of the Department of the Interior, shall
be taken without further action under [NEPA] of 1969 [42 U.S.C. § 4321
et seq.]; and the actions of the Federal officers concerning the issuance
of the necessary rights-of-way, permits, leases, and other authorizations
for construction and initial operation at full capacity of said pipeline sys-
tem shall not be subject to judicial review under any law except that
claims alleging the invalidity of this section may be brought within sixty
days following November 16, 1973.
Id.
172. 426 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2005).
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Flathead and Kootenai National Forest Rehabilitation Act as a rider
to the DOI Appropriation Act of 2004 and changed the law so that
only ten percent of the old growth forest had to remain in the sale
area. The NFS completed its review and proceeded with the sales.
The Ninth Circuit upheld the decision stating "the fact that Con-
gress directed [Section] 407 at a specific case does not render it an
abuse of the separation of powers because it modified existing law
relating to the old growth standards." 73
3. Congressional Action: Creating Exemptions to Existing Law
Congress exempted projects from the requirements of existing
law to allow them to proceed. Congress utilized particular lan-
guage to accomplish this goal.
Following Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill,174 Congress enacted
a rider on the Energy and Water Development Appropriation Bill,
which instructed the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) to com-
plete the construction of the Tellico dam "notwithstanding provi-
sions of 16 U.S.C., Chapter 35 [of the ESA] or any other law."' 7 5 As
a result, several bands of Cherokee Indians brought suit to stop the
dam because it would flood sacred lands. The United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee in Sequoyah v. Ten-
nessee Valley Authority17 6 dismissed the suit, stating "Congress has the
power to make exceptions to rights either it or state legislatures
have created by statute, as long as such exceptions are not invidi-
ously discriminatory."'7 7 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit concurred, declaring that it was not empowered to
act contrary to congressional will, unless the law in question would
violate the Constitution.1 78
173. Id. at 1150; see also Cook Inlet Treaty Tribes v. Shalala, 166 F.3d 986 (9th
Cir. 1999) (finding no violations of separation of powers doctrine). Alaska Native
Village unsuccessfully challenged the award of a health service compact to Alaska
Native Regional Corporation (ANRC). While the case was under appeal, Congress
enacted a statute authorizing ANRC to enter contracts without village approval.
The Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeal stating that legislation enacted by Con-
gress while appeal was pending, "even if directed at this litigation, does not violate
the separation of powers doctrine because it changes the underlying substantive
law." Id. at 991.
174. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
175. Sequoyah v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 480 F. Supp. 608, 610 (E.D. Tenn.
1979).
176. 480 F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Tenn. 1979).
177. Id. at 611 (discussing Congressional power to make exemptions).
178. Sequoyah v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 1159,1161 (6th Cir. 1980) (in-
dicating court will not act contrary to Congressional will).
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Congress exempted a presidential report on the MX missile
system from NEPA requirements through an amendment in the De-
fense Department Appropriation Act of 1983. 17 The United States
District Court for the District of Columbia in Fiends of the Earth v.
Weinberger'80 held that Congress can "through the passage of legisla-
tion which governs the lawsuit ... effectively moot a controversy[,]
notwithstanding its pendency before the courts."181 The court spe-
cifically noted that "when Congress desires to suspend or repeal a
statute in force, '[t]here can be no doubt that . .. it could accom-
plish its purpose by an amendment to an appropriation bill, or
otherwise.' "182
The construction of Highway 3 in Hawaii had been halted by
federal courts on various grounds. Congress then enacted a provi-
sion in the Continuing Appropriation Bill for Fiscal Year 1987 that
exempted the project from environmental legislation. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Stop H-3 v. Dole'83
upheld the exemption in the face of several Constitutional chal-
lenges. Regarding Equal Protection Clause violations, the Ninth
Circuit found that Congress could make exceptions to rights it or
state legislatures have created by statute, as long as such exceptions
were not invidiously discriminatory. Congress could moot a pend-
ing controversy by enacting new legislation.' 8 4 Regarding separa-
tion of powers violations, the Ninth Circuit held that Congress
could change its mind regarding power delegated to the executive
as long as it complied with the Constitution. Congress could not
interfere with the judiciary's Constitutional function. But exempt-
ing one project from statutory requirements did not interfere with
the "essential attributes of judicial power."' 8 5
The Bureau of Reclamation's construction of a concrete lined
canal to replace an unlined portion of the All-American Canal was
halted by the federal courts. While the appeal was pending, Con-
gress enacted a provision in the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of
2006, which declared "notwithstanding any other provision of law,
179. See generally Friends of Earth, Inc. v. Weinberger, 562 F. Supp. 265
(D.D.C. 1983) (exempting MX missile system from NEPA requirements).
180. 562 F. Supp. 265 (D.D.C. 1983).
181. Id. at 270 (noting power of Congress).
182. Id. at 271 (citing United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 222 (1980)) (utiliz-
ing economic measures to repeal statutes in force effectively).
183. 870 F.2d 1419 (9th Cir. 1989).
184. Id. at 1429 (demonstrating ability of Congress to sidestep pending con-
troversy by passing new legislation).
185. Id. at 1433-38 (limiting number of exemptions does not allow Congress
to interfere with essential attributes of judicial power).
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go forward with canal lining project." The United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit dismissed the complaint in Consejo de
Desarrollo Economico v. United States, 86 explaining that "if legislation
passing Constitutional muster is enacted while a case is pending on
appeal that makes it impossible for the court to grant any effectual
relief, the appeal must be dismissed as moot."' 8 7
4. Congressional Action: Building Bridges over Existing
Legislation
Congress enacted new legislation providing a bridge over ex-
isting law that allows for the completion of a project, as evidenced
in Robertson II.
The construction of a telescope by the University of Arizona on
Mt. Graham had been halted because of threats to the endangered
red squirrel. Congress enacted a provision to the Arizona-Idaho
Act, which approved the NFS an alternative for the location of the
telescope and instructed the Secretary of Agriculture to approve
the project. The provision specified that ESA and NEPA require-
ments were satisfied. Subsequent controversy halted the project.
Congress then enacted a rider to the Omnibus Consolidated Rescis-
sions and Appropriations Act of 1996, which authorized the NFS
alternative and determined it was consistent with Arizona-Idaho
Act. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in
Mount Graham Coalition v. Thomas'88 found the new law changed the
existing law and was not constitutionally suspect because it altered a
single project.
5. Repeals by Implication
Section 1713 resurrected the April 2009 regulation "without re-
gard to any other provision of statute or regulation that applies to
issuance of such rule." 189 Environmental groups argued that Sec-
tion 1713 did not repeal the ESA. Repeals by implication are not
allowed, particularly in appropriation bills. The United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Montana' 90 and the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that Section 1713
amended the underlying law. 191 The courts were correct that Sec-
186. 482 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2007).
187. Id. at 1168.
188. 89 F.3d 554 (9th Cir. 1996).
189. Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act,
Pub. L. No. 112-10, 125 Stat. 38 (2011) (reinstating April 2009 regulation).
190. Wild Rockies I, 800 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1131 (D. Mont. 2011).
191. Wild Rockies II, 672 F.3d 1170, 1175 (9th Cir. 2012).
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tion 1713 repealed by implication any statute that interfered with
federal delisting of the wolves.
Repeals by implication are not favored, particularly in appro-
priation bills. The Supreme Court in Tennessee Valley Authority held
that the doctrine of disfavoring repeals by implication "applies with
full vigor when the subsequent legislation is an appropriations mea-
sure."19 2 However, repeals by implication are not prohibited if
Congressional intent is explicit. Congress employed similar lan-
guage, such as "notwithstanding" and "without regard to," in other
statutes to exempt projects from the application of environmental
laws. The Supreme Court held that the use such language over-
rides conflicting provisions in the law. The Court stated that "the
use of . . . a 'notwithstanding' clause clearly signals the drafter's
intention that the provisions of the 'notwithstanding' section over-
ride conflicting provisions of any other section." 193
The Ninth Circuit Court adopted a similar position, 194 but
stressed that such language must be assessed in the context of Con-
gressional intent.195 The Ninth Circuit in several cases found such
language repealed by implication statutes that prevented the
projects from going forward. The Ninth Circuit in Stop H-3 deter-
mined that the "notwithstanding" language meant no other statute
can interfere with the project going forward. The court stated that
"by exempting the H-3 project from further 4(f) compliance, Con-
gress clearly eliminates future delays in H-3's construction."' 9 6 The
192. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 190 (1978) (discussing doctrine
of disfavoring repeals by implication).
193. Cisnerous v. Alpine Ridge Grp., 508 U.S. 10, 18 (1993) (notwithstanding
clause overrides any conflicting section).
194. Envtl. Defense Ctr. v. Babbitt, 73 F.3d 867, 871 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting
In re Glacier Bay, 944 F.2d 577, 581 (9th Cir. 1991)) (adopting similar position to
Cisnerous). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that repeal by
implication only occurs if "the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one
and is clearly intended as a substitute [for it]" and the "intention of the legislature
to repeal must be clear and manifest." In re Glacier Bay, 944 F.2d at 581 (quoting
Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 154 (1976)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Further, "only a 'clear repugnance' between the previous legisla-
tion and the appropriations bill warrants a finding that Congress intended to re-
peal the previous legislation." Envtl. Defense Cir., 73 F.3d at 871 (quoting In re
Glacier Bay, 944 F.2d at 581).
195. Consejo De Desarrollo Economico De Mexicali, A.C. v. United States,
482 F.3d 1157, 1168-69 (9th Cir. 2007) (stressing context of Congressional intent).
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit also stated it has not "always ac-
corded universal effect to the 'notwithstanding' language, standing alone," but will
determine its scope "by taking into account the whole of the statutory context in
which it appears." United States v. Novak, 476 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 2007).
196. Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Dole, 870 F.2d 1419, 1432 (9th Cir. 1989) (exempting
Highway 3 construction from further compliance with Section 4(f)).
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Ninth Circuit made the same determination in Consejo, stating
"when Congress has directed immediate implementation 'notwith-
standing any other provision of law,' we have construed the legisla-
tion to exempt the affected project from the reach of
environmental statutes which would delay implementation."' 97
Even if there were problems regarding the separation of pow-
ers or repeal by implication, the Ninth Circuit was required to
adopt an interpretation of Section 1713 that upheld its constitu-
tionality. The Supreme Court in Robertson H1 maintained its previ-
ous position that "as between two possible interpretations of a
statute, by one of which it would be unconstitutional and by the
other valid, our plain duty is to adopt that which will save the
act."198
6. Implications
Judicial failure to invoke Klein allows Congress to enact exemp-
tions to and bridges over existing law, like Section 1713, and rein-
forces public choice theory. Congress is a legislative market place
in which congresspersons parcel out public goods to private inter-
ests to enhance their opportunity for reelection. Organized eco-
nomic interests utilize their influence to have Congress establish
exceptions and bridges around environmental laws.1 99 This allows
projects to go forward that benefit particular interest groups. 200
Environmental laws that protect the public interest are sacrificed
on the legislative altar to special interests.
Judicial abandonment of Klein also poses problems for demo-
cratic theory. Professors Martin H. Redish and Christopher R.
Pudelski assert that adherence to Klein is important for democratic
197. Consejo, 482 F.3d at 1168-69 (construing legislation to exempt projects
from delays due to compliance).
198. Robertson II, 503 U.S. 429, 441 (1992) (quoting NLRB v.Jones & Laugh-
lin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937)) (internal quotation marks removed) (noting
Supreme Court will apply a saving interpretation); see also Commc'ns Workers v.
Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 762 (1988) (finding that statutes should be interpreted to
"avoid serious doubts as to their constitutionality").
199. Eskridge, Politics, supra note 10, at 286 (describing utilization of eco-
nomic influence to gain Congressional exemptions); see also Michael A. Fitts, The
Vices of Virtue: A Political Party Perspective on Civic Virtue Reforns of the Legislative Pro-
cess, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1567, 1579-84 (1988) (analyzing potentially problematic
relationship between legislatures and special interest groups).
200. Eskridge, Politics, supra note 10, at 286 (noting allowance of certain
projects that benefit interest groups to proceed by granting exemptions).
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theory.201 Klein requires the courts to ensure that Congress has not
deceived the electorate by leaving the law in place while directing
an outcome that contradicts or undermines the law. In such cases,
voters are deceived about the position of their representatives and
denied the opportunity to hold their representatives accountable.
This is why Klein mandates an explicit change in the underlying
law.202
Section 1713 did not change the ESA. Congress was very clear
about its motives for enacting Section 1713. Sponsors of the bill
explicitly stated that their intent was to reverse the United States
District Court for the District of Montana's decision in Defenders,
not to change the ESA.2 0 3 Even the DOI Solicitor acknowledged
that Section 1713 did not change the ESA.2 0 4 Yet, the Ninth Circuit
201. Martin H. Redish & Christopher R. Pudelski, Legislative Deception, Separa-
tion of Powers, and the Democratic Process: Harnessing the Political Theory of United States
v. Klein, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 437 (2006).
202. Id. at 439-40.
203. See Press Release, Sens. Baucus & Tester, Baucus, Tester Introduce Legis-
lation to Put Montana Back in Control of Wolves (Feb. 10, 2011), available at http:/
/www.baucus.senate.gov/?p=press-release&id=337 (stating positions of Senators
Baucus and Tester regarding wolf management practices). Further, Senator Tes-
ter posted an entry on his Facebook page, announcing the filing of his bill, S. 321,
with Senator Baucus, stating: "The Baucus-Tester bill would restore management
practices as they were before the 2010 court ruling that resulted in the return of
the gray wolf to Federal management under the Endangered Species Act." Id. On
February 15, 2011, Representative Simpson issued a press release stating he was
"spearheading an effort to undo the August 2010 ruling by judge Molloy that put
wolves back on the endangered species list." Press Release, Representative Mike
Simpson, Simpson Leads Effort to Overturn Court Ruling on Wolves (Feb. 15,
2011), available at http://simpson.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?Docu-
mentlD=225284. On March 18, 2011, Representative Simpson issued a press re-
lease stating he included language in H.R. 1 "to overturn Judge Molloy's decision
and return management of wolf populations in the region to states with approved
management plans." Press Release, Representative Mike Simpson, Simpson Issues
Statement on Wolf Delisting Proposal (Mar. 15, 2011), available at http://simpson.
house.gov/news/documentprint.aspx?DocumentlD=229982. On April 12, 2011,
the Associated Press, citing Senator Tester, wrote that "[I]awmakers said they in-
serted the rider to circumvent a federal judge who repeatedly blocked proposals to
hunt [wolves]." Wolf Protections Expected to be Lifted by Congress, KMVT (Apr. 12,
2011), http://www.kmvt.com/news/regional/Wolf-protections-expected-to-be-
lifted-by-Congress-119706194.html?m=y&smobile=y. On April 13, 2011, the New
York Times quoted Senator Tester as saying "we didn't amend the ESA." Phil Tay-
lor, Budget's Wolf Delisting Opens Pandora's Box of Species Attacks, Enviro Groups Warn,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/04/13/13
greenwire-budgets-wolf-delisting-opens-pandoras-box-of-s-99159.html. On April
14, 2011, a Senator Tester press release stated: "After ajudge's ruling against Mon-
tana's wolf management plan last year, Tester has fought hard to put wolves back
under the management of the state." Press Release, Senator Tester, Tester Suc-
cessfully Delists Wolves in Montana, Returns Management to the State (Apr. 14,
2011), available at http://www.tester.senate.gov/?p=press-release&id=2443.
204. Memorandum from Hilary C. Tompkins, Solicitor, U.S. Dep't. of Inte-
rior, to Sec'y, Assistant Sec'y for Fish and Wildlife and Parks, and Dir., U.S. Fish
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held that Section 1713 directly amended the ESA and repealed by
implication any legal impediments to the reenactment of the flawed
2009 federal regulation.205 This amendment permitted Congress to
act in a duplicitous manner.
B. Policymaking Through Appropriation Riders
Section 1713, like most of the other exemptions and bridges,
was enacted through a rider on an appropriation bill. After a stat-
ute is enacted with authorized expenditures, funds must be allo-
cated. Congress is required to enact thirteen appropriation bills
that fund the federal government. House and Senate Appropria-
tions Committees are primarily responsible for allocating annual
funding.206 House and Senate rules prohibit the attachment of sub-
stantive legislation to appropriation bills,207 but Congress often ig-
nores this rule. 2 0 8 If the relevant appropriation bill is not passed,
funding can be sustained through a continuing resolution, which
does not prohibit the attachment of unrelated legislation.209 Ap-
propriation riders provide a legal means to enact statutory amend-
and Wildlife Service, M-37024: Withdrawal of M-37013 - The Meaning of "In Dan-
ger of Extinction Throughout All or a Significant Portion of its Range" (May 4,
2011), available at http://www.doi.gov/solicitor/opinions/M-37024.pdf (acknowl-
edging that Section 1713 did not alter ESA). On May 4, 2011, the Solicitor issued a
Memo, M-37024, withdrawing her predecessor's March 16, 2007, Opinion, M-
37013, on the meaning of "In Danger of Extinction Throughout All or Significant
Portion of its Range" previously rejected by the federal district court in Defenders.
The Solicitor's Memo stated:
Sec. 1713 of P.L. 112-10 directed the reissuance of the 2009 Northern
Rock Mountain wolf rule. Nothing in that section affects my authority to
withdraw Opinion M-37013. The statute is applicable only to the issuance
of this single rule; it makes no reference to Opinion M-37913 nor does it
amend the Endangered Species Act generally.
Id. at n.4.
205. Wild Rockies II, 672 F.3d 1170, 1174-75 (9th Cir. 2012).
206. See generally CONG. RES. SERV., OVERVIEW OF THE AUTHORIZATION-APPRO-
PRIATION PROCESS (2010), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RS20371
20101129.pdf (naming committees responsible for allocating budgets).
207. Id. (stating prohibition of attaching substantial legislation to appropria-
tion bills); see also RULES OF THE SENATE §16.2, available at http://www.rules.sen-
ate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=RuleXVI ("the Committee on Appropriations shall
not report an Appropriation bill containing amendments to such bill proposing
new or general legislation."); RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES § 1038(b),
available at http://rules.house.gov/resources ("A provision changing existing law
may not be reported in a general appropriation bill.").
208. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Judicial Review and the Power of the Purse, 12 INT'L
REv. L. & EcoN. 191, 192-98 (1992) (claiming Congress ignores their own rules
regarding appropriation bills).
209. CHRISTOPHER J. DEERING & STEVEN S. SMITH, COMMITTEES IN CONGRESS
198-202 (3d ed. 1997) (funding can be sustained even without appropriate bill).
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ments.210 The Supreme Court has never invalidated a law because
it was enacted by an appropriation bill.21 1
The enactment of legislation through appropriation riders vio-
lates Congressional rules that no substantive legislation can be at-
tached to an appropriation bill. This rule rests on the recognition
that the appropriation process is dominated by well-organized in-
terests and lacks visibility. 212 Legislating through the appropriation
process supports public choice theory and contradicts the republi-
can view that the political outcomes should be arrived at through
open deliberative process. Political actors are not supposed to be-
gin the process with preselected interests whose satisfaction is the
goal of the process. Politics is not designed to satisfy private inter-
ests or achieve a balance among competing interest groups. 213 The
republican view advises politicians to view with skepticism and sub-
ject interest group demands to examination through an open delib-
erative process.214 Republican theories "require public-regarding
justifications offered after multiple points of view have been con-
sulted and (to the extent possible) genuinely understood."2 1 5
C. Removal of Federal Court Jurisdiction
Section 1713 not only resurrected the flawed regulation delist-
ing wolves in the NRM DPS, but also deprived the federal courts of
jurisdiction to determine its validity. Congress controls federal
court jurisdiction over statutory questions. The Ninth Circuit cor-
rectly dismissed the case, finding "that preclusion of judicial review
indicates Congressional intent to change the law applicable to the
project."216 The removal of federal court jurisdiction, however, un-
dermines separation of powers, threatens the legitimacy of the ad-
ministrative action, severs the partnership between courts and
administrative agencies to further public interest, and weakens the
foundation of the administrative state. Depriving the federal courts
of jurisdiction patently supports public choice theory.
210. United States v. Dickerson, 310 U.S. 554, 555 (1940) (holding there was
"no doubt" that Congress could use appropriation process to amend underlying
statute).
211. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 208, at 192-98 (describing Supreme Court's
reluctance to invalidate law by appropriations bills).
212. Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L. J. 1539, 1582
(1988) [hereinafter Sunstein, Beyond] (discussing cannons of statutory
construction).
213. Id. at 1548-49 (discussing republican tenet in deliberation).
214. Id. (acknowledging republican belief in skepticism).
215. Id. at 1575 (clarifying republican principle of universalism).
216. Wild Rockies II, 672 F.3d 1170, 1175 (9th Cir. 2012).
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1. Congressional Control of Federal Court Jurisdiction
Article III of the United States Constitution allows for, but does
not mandate, the creation of lower federal courts. 217 Debates at the
Constitutional Convention demonstrate that the establishment of
the lower federal courts was left to the discretion of Congress.218
Access to the federal courts was not a Constitutional right, but was
subject to political and legislative judgment.219 Because Congress
created the lower federal courts, Congress can abolish them. This
means that Congress can define their jurisdiction. The greater au-
thority includes the lesser power, so Congress can adjust or with-
draw lower federal court jurisdiction over issues. 220 The Supreme
Court declared that the power to establish lower federal courts in-
cludes "the power 'of investing them with jurisdiction either lim-
ited, concurrent, or exclusive, and of withholding jurisdiction from
them in the exact degrees and character which to Congress may
seem proper for the public good."' 221
There is a long line of Supreme Court precedents that support
Congressional power to remove lower federal court jurisdiction
over statutory questions.222 Furthermore, the Administrative Proce-
dure Act acknowledges that Congress can preclude judicial review
of agency action.223 There is a strong presumption against such re-
217. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (granting judicial power to Supreme Court and
Congressionally established lower courts).
218. Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An
Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REv. 895, 912-14 (1984) (dis-
cussing Framers' intent to leave power over federal court jurisdiction to Congress).
219. Id. (discussing access to federal jurisdiction).
220. Martin H. Redish & Curtis E. Woods, Congressional Power to Control the
Jurisdiction of Lower Federal Courts: A Critical Review and a New Synthesis, 124 U. PA. L.
REv. 45, 46-47 (1975).
221. Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 187 (1943) (quoting Cary v. Curtis, 44
U.S. 236 (1845)) (explaining power that comes with ability to create lower courts).
The Supreme Court stated:
Only the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is derived directly from the
Constitution. Every other court created by the general government de-
rives its jurisdiction wholly from the authority of Congress. That body
may give, withhold or restrict such jurisdiction at its discretion, provided
it be not extended beyond the boundaries fixed by the Constitution.
Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 234 (1922).
222. See Glidden v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 551 (1962) (holding United States
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and United States Court of Claims are article
III courts); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944); Lockerty v. Phillips, 319
U.S. 182 (1943); Bors v. Preston, 111 U.S. 252 (1884); United States v. Union Pac.
R.R., 98 U.S. 569 (1878); Case of Sewing Mach. Co., 85 U.S. 553 (1873); United
States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128 (1872); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. 441 (1850); United
States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. 32 (1812).
223. 5 U.S.C. § 701 (2012) (stating applicability of Administration Procedure
Act); see also Kathleen M. Vanderziel, The Hatfield Riders & Environmental Preserva-
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moval, but this can be overcome by clear and convincing
evidence.224
2. Problems Presented by Removal ofJurisdiction
Professor Gerald Gunther astutely points out that just because
Congress has the power to limit federal court jurisdiction, this does
not mean that it is wise policy. 225 Removing federal court jurisdic-
tion frustrates the Constitutional separation of powers, which is de-
signed to avoid the concentration of power in any single branch.226
In the absence of judicial review, the legislative and executive
branches can exercise their power without limit.2 27 Congress as-
sumes the role left to the courts2 28 and determines that executive
action complies with the law. 229 This undermines judicial authority
and frustrates the uniform application of federal law.23 0 The public
is not able to question federal government action.231 This deni-
tion: What Process Is Due?, 19 B.C. ENVTL. Ave. L. REv. 431, 444-45 (1991), available at
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1453&context=ealr
(discussing Administrative Procedure Act and judicial review).
224. 5 U.S.C. § 701 (providing standard for overcoming presumption); see also
Vanderziel, supra note 223, at 445-46 (discussing presumption against removal); see
also Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670 (1986)
(discussing how to beat presumption against removal).
225. Gunther, supra note 218, at 898 (debating if Congressional limitation on
lower federal courts is wise).
226. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 966 (1982) (discussing removal of federal
court jurisdiction).
227. Louis JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE AcTION 321 (1965)
(expounding on judicial power). Jaffe stated that "there is in our society a
profound, tradition-taught reliance on the courts as the ultimate guardian and
assurance of the limits set upon executive power by the constitutions and legisla-
tures." Id.
228. Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 202 (1927) (distinguishing
between legislative and judicial powers); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 138-41
(1976) (discussing powers of Congressional commissions).
229. William D. Araiza, The Trouble with Robertson: Equal Protection, the Separa-
tion of Powers, and the Line Between Statutory Amendment and Statutory Interpretation, 48
CATH. U. L. REv. 1055, 1099-1102 (1999) (describing how safeguards are missing
in appropriation bills); see also Chadha, 462 U.S. at 964-66 (analyzing appropriation
bill).
230. Victor M. Sher & Carol Sue Hunting, Eroding the Landscape, Eroding the
Laws: Congressional Exemptions from judicial Review of Environmental Laws, 15 HARY.
ENvrTL. L. REv. 435, 482 (1991) (discussing problem with removal of jurisdiction).
231. Gordon G. Young, Congressional Regulation of Federal Courts' Jurisdiction
and Processes: U.S. v. Klein Revisited, 1981 Wisc. L. REv. 1189, 1248 (1981), available
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grates the value of citizen suit provisions in environmental laws, like
the ESA, 2 3 2 and the idea of the government being limited by law.23 3
Depriving the federal courts ofjurisdiction threatens the legiti-
macy of administrative action. Judicial review promotes the legiti-
macy of administrative actions, which can be defined as the
"ensurance of legality, protection against arbitrariness and selectiv-
ity, promotion of procedural regularity, and ensurance against the
twin evils of factional tyranny and self-interested representation."2 3 4
The courts maintain the integrity of the process. Louis Jaffe stated,
"The availability of judicial review is a necessary condition, psycho-
logically if not logically, of a system of administrative power which
purports to be legitimate, or legally valid."2 3 5 The courts serve as "a
constant reminder to the administrator and a constant source of
assurance and security to the citizen." 236
Precluding judicial review undermines the foundation of a
modem administrative state. Congress delegates broad power to
administrative agencies to implement the law with the assurance
that the courts will keep federal agencies in check.237 Courts review
administrative action to ensure conformance with the law. Judge
Harold Leventhal observed that agencies and courts together con-
stitute a "partnership in furtherance of the public interest" and the
"court is in a real sense part of the total administrative process, and
not a hostile stranger to the office of first instance." 238 Removing
232. 16 U.S.C. § 1 54 0(g) (2012) (providing for citizen suits).
233. JAFFE, supra note 227, at 324 (discussing judicial power). Jaffe stated,
"The guarantee of legality by an organ independent of the executive is one of the
profoundest, most pervasive premise of our system . . . it is the very condition
which makes possible ... the wide freedom of our administrative system, and gives
it its remarkable vitality and flexibility." Id. See also Sher & Hunting, supra note
230, at 482 (explaining how government is limited by law).
234. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, On the Costs and Benefits of Aggressive Review
ofJudicialAction, 1989 DuKE L.J. 522 (1989) [hereinafter Sunstein, Costs] (defining
administrative action).
235. JAFFE, supra note 227, at 320 (positing judicial review's role as legitimiz-
ing administrative power).
236. Id. at 325 (describing role of courts).
237. Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the
Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 452 (defining judicial and administrative
roles); Linda M. Bolduan, Comment, The Hatfield Riders: Eliminating the Role of
Courts in Environmental Decision Making, 20 ENvrL. L. 329, 372-75 (1990) (discussing
separation of powers).
238. Harold Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts,
122 U. PA. L. REv. 509, 511-12 (1974) (citing Greater Boston Television v. FCC, 444
F.2d 841, 850-51 (D.C. Cir. 1970)) (explaining role of judiciary in environmental
law rulings). Justice Frankfurter stated, "Courts no less than administrative bodies
are agencies of government. Both are instruments for realizing public purposes."
Scripps-Howard Radio v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 15 (1942).
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the court's jurisdiction terminates this partnership. It also frus-
trates the dialogue between Congress, the executive, and the judici-
ary over the formulation and implementation of public policy.239
Judicial review advances the republican ideal of honest disinter-
ested deliberation about the public interest.240
IV. ALTERNATIVE THEORIES
A. Violation of Congressional Rules
The enactment of Section 1713 violated House and Senate
rules prohibiting the attachment of substantive legislation to appro-
priation bills.2 4 1 The Supreme Court has invalidated legislative ac-
tions that violated Congressional rules and recognized the unique
nature and limitations of appropriation bills. Lawmaking through
appropriations subverts the legislative process and results in the en-
actment of special interest legislation. Prominent scholars and ju-
rists have urged the courts to remand back to Congress any
legislation impinging on important values that was enacted through
dubious legislative procedures. The Supreme Court has examined
the legislative process and invalidated laws not supported by ade-
quate fact-finding. Judicial enforcement of Congressional rules,
which is less intrusive, will move Congress towards "due process"
lawmaking.
239. Dan T. Coenen, A Constitution of Collaboration: Protecting Fundamental Val-
ues with Second-Look Rules of Interbranch Dialogue, 42 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 1575, 1835-
36 (2001) [hereinafter Coenen, Collaboration] (noting problems associated with
removing jurisdiction).
240. Cass Sunstein, Forward: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARv. L. REv. 4,
101 (1996) [hereinafter Sunstein, Forward] (setting forth catalytic court view
point). Professor Sunstein further stated:
Courts do best by proceeding in a way that is catalytic rather than preclu-
sive, and that is closely attuned to the fact that courts are participants in
the system of democratic deliberation. It is both inevitable and proper
that the lasting solutions to the great questions of political morality will
come from democratic politics, not the judiciary. But the Court can cer-
tainly increase the likelihood that those solutions will be good ones.
Id. See also, Cass Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REv. 29
(1985) [hereinafter Sunstein, Interest Groups] (analyzing interest groups and their
influence on political process in United States).
241. See generally Sunstein, Forward, supra note 240 (encouraging democratic
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1. Supreme Court Precedent
The Constitution grants Congress the right to establish its own
procedural rules. 2 4 2 The Supreme Court also recognized that Con-
gressional rules are legally enforceable and has invalidated Con-
gressional acts that violated Congressional rules.2 4 3
The Supreme Court in United States v. Ballin244 upheld a House
action pursuant to a rule that required a quorum to enact house
business and specified how the quorum would be determined. The
Court stated that it was not concerned with the "wisdom or folly, of
such a rule."24 5 The Constitution provided that "each house may
determine the rules of its proceedings." 246 Congressional rules
could not violate Constitutional rights and the means employed
must be rationally related to the ends to be achieved. Within these
parameters, Congress was free to determine its own rules without
judicial interference. The Court found that "the presence of that
quorum was determined in accordance with a valid rule theretofore
adopted by the house."24 7
In Cristoffel v. United States,248 the Supreme Court reversed a
perjury conviction on the grounds that a quorum was not present in
the House committee at the time of the perjury. The central issue
was "what rules the House ha[d] established and whether they have
been followed."249 House rules required a quorum to conduct any
business. The Court held that the absence of quorum as required
by rules precluded the conviction of perjury before a "competent
tribunal."250
The Supreme Court in Yellin v. United States251 overturned a
conviction for failing to testify before a Congressional committee.
The Court held that legislative rules are 'judicially cognizable."25 2
Legislative committees must observe their own rules. The Court
found the committee violated its own rule by failing to consider
whether public interrogation would jeopardize Yellin's reputation
242. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (providing that "[e]ach House may deter-
mine the Rules of its Proceedings").
243. Vanderziel, supra note 223, at 440-445 (discussing Congressional rules).
244. 144 U.S. 1 (1892).
245. Id. at 5 (explaining why rule was upheld).
246. Id.
247. Id. at 9.
248. 338 U.S. 84 (1949).
249. Id. at 88-89.
250. Id. at 90.
251. 374 U.S. 109 (1963) (reversing conviction for contempt).
252. Id. at 114 (describing legislative rules).
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and refusing to act on Yellin's request to be questioned in an execu-
tive session.253
In Gojack v. United States,254 the Supreme Court reversed a Con-
tempt of Congress conviction for a failure to testify before a sub-
committee. House rules mandated that investigations must be
authorized, but there was no evidence that the subcommittee inves-
tigation was authorized. The Court stated, "when a committee rule
relates to a matter of such importance, it must be strictly
observed." 255
The Supreme Court implicitly acknowledged the validity of the
Congressional rule that precludes the amendment of laws through
the appropriation process. The Court recognized important differ-
ences between authorizations and appropriations and limitations
regarding the latter with respect to the former.256
The Supreme Court in Andrus v. Sierra Club25 7 determined that
an Environmental Impact Statement was not required for appropri-
ation bills because there was a clear distinction between authoriza-
tions and appropriations. House and Senate rules required a
"previous choice of policy . . . before any item of appropriations
might be included in a general appropriations bill."258 Appropria-
tion bills "have the limited and specific purpose of providing funds
for authorized programs."259 This division of labor allowed the ap-
propriation committees to focus on financial issues and precluded
them from trespassing on the authority of the authorizing commit-
tees.260 The Court stressed that "appropriation bills are not propos-
als for legislation." 26 1
The Supreme Court emphasized the difference between au-
thorization and appropriations in Tennessee Valley Authority. The
Court noted that appropriation bills "have the limited and specific
purpose of providing funds for authorized programs." If appropria-
253. Id. at 123.
254. 384 U.S. 702 (1966).
255. Id. at 708 (determining when committee rule must be followed).
256. Vanderziel, supra note 223, at 436, 440 (discussing appropriations bills);
see also Sher & Hunting, supra note 230, at 469-70 (explaining difference between
environmental laws and appropriations bills).
257. 442 U.S. 347 (1979).
258. Id. at 361 (quoting U.S. ex rel. Chapman v. FPC, 345 U.S. 153, 164 n.5
(1953)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (explaining when appropriations
items may appear in a general appropriations bill).
259. Id. (quoting Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 190 (1978)) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).
260. Id. (explaining benefits of distinguishing between authorizations and
appropriations).
261. Id. at 364-65.
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tion bills were used for substantive changes in legislation, it would
"lead to the absurd result of requiring Congress to review exhaus-
tively the background of every authorization before voting on an
appropriation." Furthermore, the Court noted that repeals by im-
plication were not favored, especially "with even greater force when
the claimed repeal rests solely on an Appropriation Act." 2 6 2
2. Flaws in Policymaking Through Appropriation Riders
Policymaking through appropriation riders not only violates
Congressional rules, but undermines deliberative lawmaking, which
requires legislators to (1) make explicit policy choices, (2) employ
procedures that limit arbitrary action, and (3) produce a record
that is subject to meaningful judicial review.263 This is particularly
egregious when Congress enacts appropriations through continu-
ing resolutions, which have to be enacted and are veto-proof.264
Theoretically, the normal legislative process encourages ra-
tional consideration of policy issues through discussion, participa-
tion, negotiation, and public scrutiny. Bills are introduced and
moved to the committees with subject matter expertise. Hearings
are held, which allow interest groups to voice their concerns. The
bill can be amended in committee, which explains the details of the
bill in the committee report. Often there are committees with over-
lapping jurisdiction, which provide for greater public access, discus-
sion, and accountability. Congresspersons get the opportunity to
change the bill through floor amendments. Legislation must be
passed by both houses of Congress. Differences are generally nego-
tiated in a conference committee with a subsequent report explain-
ing the compromises. The President, who is generally an active
participant in the process, must sign the bill or let it remain on his
desk for ten days while Congress is in session before it becomes law.
The President can veto the bill, but a two-thirds vote in both houses
can override the veto. 265
262. Tenn. Valley Auth., 437 U.S. at 190 (explaining why repeals by implication
are disfavored).
263. Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REv. 197, 223-24
(1976) (explaining negatives of policymaking through appropriations bills).
264. Sandra Beth Zellmer, Sacrificing Legislative Integrity at the Altar ofAppropria-
tions Riders: A Constitutional Crisis, 21 HARv. ENvrt. L. REv. 457, 510-13 (1997) (dis-
cussing constitutionality of appropriations riders).
265. Id. at 500-04 (outlining normal legislative process); see also WILLAO N.
ESKRIDGE & PHILIP P. FRIcKEY, CASES AND MATERIAL ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND
THE CREATION OF PuBLIc POLIcY 26-34 (West, 4th ed. 2007) (describing typical leg-
islative process).
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The enactment of legislation through appropriation riders
poses many problems. First, substantive changes in legislation
through appropriation riders do not receive adequate considera-
tion. They are generally introduced late in the process, with little
debate, often in the dark of night. Congresspersons and their staffs
have little opportunity to examine the riders. Appropriation riders
bypass the legislative process and exclude the public from the
debate. 266
Second, policymaking through the appropriation process al-
ters the balance of power in Congress. The authorizing committees
with subject matter expertise do not review appropriation riders.267
Existing legislation is amended by the Appropriation Committee,
which subverts the authority of the authorizing committee. These
amendments undermine the substantive legislation, which was
often the product of long-term interest group bargains and legisla-
tive negotiation and compromise. 2 68 The Supreme Court noted
that the Congressional committees with authority and expertise
"would be somewhat surprised to learn that their careful work on
the substantive legislation had been undone by the simple-and
brief-insertion of some inconsistent language in a [proposed appro-
priation measure]. "269 These amendments can create conflict be-
tween the authorizing and appropriating committees in both
houses and between the Senate and the House.270
Third, appropriation riders enact legislation that cannot get
through the front door of the conventional legislative process or
266. See Neal E. Devins, Regulation of Government Agencies Through Limitation
Riders, 1987 DuKE L.J. 456, 465 (1987) [hereinafter Devins, Regulation] (explaining
regulation of administrative agencies through appropriations riders); see also Jac-
ques B. LeBoeuf, Limitations on the Use of Appropriation Riders by Congress to Effectuate
Substantive Policy Changes, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 457, 474 (1992) (discussing
limits on use of appropriations riders); see also Sher & Hunting, supra note 230, at
478-79 (describing misuse of appropriations measures); see also Zellmer, supra note
264, at 500-05 (explaining how appropriations riders can be effective).
267. See Devins, Regulation, supra note 266, at 464-65 (listing negatives of ap-
propriations-based policies); see also Neal E. Devins, Appropriations Redux: A Critical
Look at the Fiscal Year 1988 Continuing Resolution, 1988 DuKE L. J. 389, 399-400
(April/June 1998) [hereinafter Devins, Appropriations] (outlining economic im-
pacts of fiscal year 1988's continuing resolution); see also Zellmer, supra note 264,
at 500-01 (explaining how appropriations-based policymaking hurts integrity of
democracy).
268. See Sher & Hunting, supra note 230, at 478 (examining misuse of appro-
priations bills).
269. See id. (quoting Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 191 (1978) (dis-
cussing how quiet and hidden appropriations measures are).
270. See Devins, Regulation, supra note 266, at 464 (examining controversy sur-
rounding appropriations riders); see also. DEERING & SMITH, supra note 209, 199-
202 (outlining how Congressional committees work).
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through the back door of the appropriation process. 271 This en-
courages logrolling, which is the "practice of jumbling together in
one act inconsistent subjects in order to force passage by uniting
minorities with different interests when the particular provision
could not pass on their separate merits."272 These amendments
generally promote narrow local interests over broader national
public interests. Interest groups pursue this path because there is
little public scrutiny or accountability regarding such proposals. 273
This is very typical of western public land policy.2 74
Fourth, appropriation riders interfere with the President's abil-
ity to veto bad legislation. 275 Appropriation riders also frustrate the
President's authority to implement the law properly.276 The Consti-
tution does not distinguish between authorizations and
appropriations. 277
Section 1713 manifested most of these flaws. First, Section
1713 was a standalone provision that was never debated. Second,
Section 1713 bypassed the Senate Environment and Public Works
and House Resources Committees that have jurisdiction over the
ESA. Third, Section 1713 was attached to an unrelated appropria-
tion bill that had to be enacted. The Obama administration, how-
ever, supported Section 1713, so there was no interference with the
executive's duty to implement the law.
Policymaking through appropriation riders enhances interest
group influence in Congress. Congress distributes public benefits
to special interest groups at the expense of the general public.
271. See LeBoeuf, supra note 266, at 474 (listing problems with appropriations
riders); see also Devins, Regulation, supra note 266, at 464 (stating that appropria-
tions must abide by Constitutional requirements).
272. Martin v. Zimmerman, 289 N.W. 662, 664 (1940) (discussing potential
"evils" in lawmaking); accord PHILLIP P. FRiCKEY, WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE & ELIZABETH
GARRErr, LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 250 (2006) (explaining
why logrolling is encouraged).
273. See Alyson C. Flournoy, Beyond the "Spotted Owl": Learning from the Old-
Growth Controversy, 17 HARv. ENvrL. L. REv. 261, 304-05 (1993) (examining when
environmental groups were able to get lobbying pressure); see also Zellmer, supra
note 264, at 486 (discussing dangers of appropriations process).
274. See Michael C. Blumm, Ancient Forests and the Supreme Court: Issuing a
Blank Check for Appropriation Riders, 43 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 35, 51-57
(1993), available at http://digitalcommons.aw.wustl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?arti-
cle=1161&context=urbanlaw (relating to western public land policy).
275. See Devins, Regulation, supra note 266, at 471-74 (explaining connection
between riders and Executive duty); see also Zellmer, supra note 264, at 510 (ex-
plaining how appropriations riders are inconsistent with bicameralism).
276. See LeBoeuf, supra note 266, at 472-78 (discussing how appropriations
riders conflict with President's authority).
277. See id. at 474-75 (noting difference between appropriations and
authorizations).
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Congresspersons seeking reelection defer to other congresspersons
on local issues with the expectation of a corresponding quid pro
quo.2 78 Congresspersons are not required to take controversial
stands and are able to avoid resolving conflicts over public values.279
There is little accountability for such action, which deceives the
public.280 Laws enacted to further the public interest, such as the
ESA, are undermined through an appropriation rider like Section
1713.281
Policymaking through appropriation riders not only contra-
dicts the republican view of a deliberative representative process,
but poses a dilemma for public choice theory. William Landes and
Richard Posner point out that in the Congressional marketplace,
interest groups are willing to pay more for deals that are long last-
ing. 282 The enactment of special interest legislation through an ap-
propriation rider helps congresspersons get reelected, but
diminishes the value of the interest group deals negotiated when
the legislation was enacted and make future deals more difficult. 28 3
Judge Frank Easterbrook noted, "If courts become instruments by
which packages are undone, laws will be harder to pass. Bargains
must be kept to be believed."284
Even Judge Molloy in Wild Rockies I recognized problems with
the enactment of legislation through appropriation riders like Sec-
tion 1713. Judge Molloy declared, "Inserting environmental policy
changes into appropriations bills may be politically expedient, but
it transgresses the process envisioned by the Constitution by avoid-
ing the very debate on issues of political importance said to provide
278. See Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory justify More Intrusive judi-
cial Review?, 101 YALE L. J. 31, 41 (1991) (explaining relationships amongst
congresspersons).
279. See Zellmer, supra note 264, at 510 (discussing how congresspersons are
able to avoid conflicts over public values).
280. See generally Redish & Pudelski, supra note 201 (finding lack of accounta-
bility in use of some appropriations riders).
281. See Zellmer, supra note 264, at 510 (describing how riders undermine
other laws).
282. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent judiciary in
an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875 (1975) (explaining characteristics
of interest groups).
283. See id. at 877-79, 894 (discussing problems with special interest
legislation).
284. Frank H. Easterbrook, Stability and Reliability in Judicial Decisions, 73 CoR-
NELL L. REv. 422, 429 (1988) (describing legislation as compromise not to be un-
done by courts); accord Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword: The Supreme Court and the
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legitimacy."2 8 5 Policy changes that cannot be enacted through a
normal legislative process "can be forced using insider tactics with-
out debate by attaching riders to legislation that must be passed."286
3. Due Process Lawmaking/Structural Review
The Supreme Court expressed concern with circumstances
that "curtail the operation of . . . political processes."287 Prominent
scholars have argued that federal courts should review legislative
procedures. 288 When laws are enacted that impinge on important
public values, federal courts should examine the procedures Con-
gress followed. If the process is defective, federal courts should re-
mand the legislation back to Congress. The courts would not be
telling Congress that its goals could not be achieved, but that the
process followed was defective. 28 9
Judge Hans A. Linde proposed the "due process" model of law-
making, which views policy making as a rational process of establish-
ing the means to achieve articulated ends. 290 This is accomplished
through a transparent process that enables the public to hold legis-
lators accountable. The entire process is governed by rules. 291 The
court's role is not to question the substance of the legislation, 292
285. Wild Rockies I, 800 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1125 (D. Mont. 2011) (explaining
positives and negatives of putting environmental regulations into appropriations
bills).
286. Id. (discussing policy enactments).
287. United States. v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938)
(providing for levels of judicial scrutiny).
288. See generally Coenen, Collaboration, supra note 239 (listing scholars who
have argued for judicial review of legislative process).
289. See Laurence Gene Sager, Insular Minorities Unabated: Warth v. Seldin and
City of EastLake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 91 HARV. L. REV. 1373, 1412 (1978)
(highlighting justifications for judicial deference). Sager noted:
[W]hile lauding elected bodies as capable of reflecting the public will, we
have clearly charged them with the responsibility of mediating majority
sentiment with judgments of reasonability and fairness. From this pre-
mise, there follows an argument of considerable force that, at least as
regards some species of legislative decisions, it is constitutionally imper-
missible that they be confided to an electoral mechanism, where the pub-
lic will cannot enjoy the requisite deliberative mediation.
Id.
290. Linde, supra note 263, at 222-24 (discussing rational behavior in lawmak-
ing process).
291. See id. at 242 (detailing strict guidelines established to control process of
lawmaking).
292. See id. at 227 (arguing there is no constitutional requirement for rational
legislative action).
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but to ensure that Congress followed proper procedures when en-
acting the law.2 93
Judge Linde's "due process" model is consistent with Professor
Lawrence H. Tribe's concept of structural review. 294 Professor
Tribe argued that federal courts can provide structural justice.2 9 5
Professor Tribe pointed out that "the processes and rules that con-
stitute the enterprise and define the roles of its participants matter
quite apart from any identifiable 'end state' that is ultimately pro-
duced."29 6 Federal courts should examine the "structures through
which policies are both formed and applied, and formed in the very
process of being applied" to ensure consistency with due process of
law. 297
Professor John Hart Ely stressed that the Constitution is con-
cerned "with procedural fairness in the resolution of individual dis-
putes" and "with ensuring broad participation in the processes and
distributions of government."298 When the political system mal-
functions, the court's role is to police "the mechanisms by which
the system seeks to ensure that our elected representatives will actu-
ally represent."299 This representation-reinforcing function fo-
cuses on political processes rather than legislative outcomes.300
Judges are "conspicuously well suited to fill" this role because they
are experts on "the processes by which issues of public policy are
293. See id. at 238-54 (explaining limitations to court's role in due process
model of lawmaking).
294. See Dan T. Coenen, The Rehnquist Court, Structural Due Process, and Semis-
ubstantive Constitutional Review, 75 S. CAL. L. REv. 1281, 1282 (2002) [hereinafter
Coenen, The Rehnquist Court] (comparing Tribe & Linde's works).
295. Laurence H. Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 269
(1975) [hereinafter Tribe, Structural] (defending idea of structural justice through
court system).
296. Laurence H. Tribe, Policy Science: Analysis or Ideology?, 2 PHIL. & PUB. Anes.
66, 83 (1972).
297. Tribe, Structural, supra note 295, at 269. Tribe stated that judicial review
of due process lawmaking focuses on "who promulgated the provision, to what
ends, and in what manner." LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
1682 (Foundation Press, 2d ed. 1988) [hereinafter TRIBE, AMERICAN]. Mark V.
Tushnet stated, "Structural review, in all the areas in which it appears, involves
paying attention to the decisionmaker rather than the decision." Mark V. Tushnet,
Legal Realism, Structural Review, and Prophecy, 8 U. DAYTON L. REV. 809, 816 (1983).
298. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
87 (1980) (emphasizing role of Constitution in individual disputes and govern-
mental distribution).
299. Id. at 102-03 (championing role of court when political system fails).
300. See Coenen, Collaboration, supra note 239, at 1690 (claiming focus should
be on process rather than outcomes in political system).
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fairly determined."301 Professor Ely supports the "second look" ap-
proach that underlies due process lawmaking and structural
review.302
Building on the aforementioned work, Professor Dan T.
Coenen's semisubstantive review directs the courts to focus on legis-
lative procedures rather than substance.303 When important sub-
stantive values are being impinged by questionable legislative
procedures, the court should remand the matter back to Congress
for greater clarification. 304
Professors Philip P. Frickey and Daniel A. Farber urge the
courts to examine the legislative "structure and process." Courts
should pay attention to when laws "were passed, by whom, or
how."30 5 Courts should "require legislatures to adhere to estab-
lished procedures."3 0 6 This will check interest group influence and
promote "democratic deliberation without imposing ajudicial value
judgment on the public."307
Henry Hart and Louis Sacks stress the "vitally important rela-
tionship between procedure and substance. A procedure that is
soundly adapted to the type of power to be exercised is conducive
301. ELY, supra note 298, at 102 (highlighting judges' position to make
decisions).
302. Id. at 169 (calling for "second look" approach to judicial review).
303. See Coenen, The Rehnquist Court, supra note 294, at 1281 (highlighting
position on semisubstantive review); see also generally Coenen, Collaboration, supra
note 239 (theorizing on structural doctrines); Mark V. Tushnet, Alternative Forms of
judicial Reasoning, 101 MICH. L. REv. 2781 (2003) [hereinafter Tushnet, Alternative]
(analyzing substantive rights' doctrines in constitutional law).
304. See Coenen, The Rehnquist Court, supra note 294, at 1283 (discussing how
courts should request congress cure statutory ambiguities). Tushnet, summarizing
typical language from Supreme Court cases, stated:
You can do what you seem to want to do, but you haven't gone about it in
the right way. If you really care about this, go back and try again. If you
follow our directions about who has to make the decision, and how it
must be expressed, we'll uphold it against a renewed challenge.
Tushnet, Alternative, supra note 303, at 2794.
305. DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRIcKEY, LAw AND PUBLIC CHOICE 9 (Univ.
of Chicago Press, 1991) [hereinafter FARBER & FRICKEY, LAw] (analyzing the princi-
ples of public choice). Farber and Frickey argued: "[C]ourts need to be more
sensitive to considerations of legislative structure and process." Id. Generally
courts pay "little regard to when they [laws] were passed, by whom, or how." Id. If
courts focused on the "importance of structure and process," it would "further[ ]
democratic deliberation without imposing judicial value judgment on the public."
Id.
306. Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65
Tx. L. REv. 873, 920-21 (1987) [hereinafter Farber & Frickey, Jurisprudence] (dem-
onstrating importance of procedures when dealing with courts and lawmaking
bodies).
307. FARBER & FRicKEY, LAw, supra note 305, 9 (discussing ways to decrease
influence of special interests in lawmaking process).
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to well-informed and wise decision. An unsound procedure invites
ill-informed and unwise ones."308 Hart and Sacks asserted that "the
best criterion of sound legislation is . .. whether it is the product of
a sound process of enactment," namely, a process that is informed,
deliberative, and efficient.309
4. judicial Review of Congressional Procedures
Judicial enforcement of Congressional rules will promote due
process lawmaking.310 The courts must be aware of potential Con-
gressional backlash generated by perceived judicial interference.
Congress does control the federal courts' jurisdiction, budget, and
future appointments. Positive political theory assumes that institu-
tions are rational actors, which compete to advance their policy
preferences.311 Judge Linde, however, asserts judicial review of leg-
islative adherence to its own procedures will not generate legislative
resentment. Legislative hostility is more likely when the courts "in-
validate the substance of a policy that the politically accountable
branches and their constituents support than to invalidate a law-
making procedure that can be repeated correctly."312 Professor
Coenen argues that structural rules will reduce the "friction be-
tween the court and Congress."313
The Supreme Court has promoted due process lawmaking.314
The Court in several cases examined the internal workings of Con-
gress and found there was an insufficient factual basis to justify the
308. HENRY M. HART JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAw 694-95 (10th ed. 1958) (discuss-
ing soundly adopted procedures); see also WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE AND PHILIP P.
FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIAL ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF
PUBLIC POLICY 397 (2d ed. 1994) (stressing importance of correctly-adapted proce-
dural decisions).
309. HART & SACKS, supra note 308, at 715 (describing criterion for sound
legislation).
310. See Coenen, Collaboration, supra note 239, at 1844 n.1075 (detailing im-
portance of judiciary in due process lawmaking procedures).
311. See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Positive Political Theory
in the Nineties, 80 CEo. L. J. 457 (1992) [hereinafter Farber & Frickey, Positive Politi-
cal Theory] (discussing positive political theory); see also generally FARBER & FRICKEY,
LAw, supra note 305 (explaining tension between judiciary giving orders to Con-
gress when Congress controls many aspects of federal judiciary).
312. Linde, supra note 263, at 243 (dismissing idea that judicial review will
cause problems between judicial and legislative branches).
313. Coenen, Collaboration, supra note 239, at 1840 (claiming rules will ease
communication between two branches).
314. See FARBER & FRICKEY, LAw, supra note 303, at 118-31 (citing Supreme
Court's support for due process lawmaking).
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enactment of legislation.315 Justice Stevens wrote that when Con-
gress impinges on important public values, the courts should ex-
amine the legislative procedures involved in the enactment of the
statute.316 Because the Court is willing to examine Congressional
procedures and question Congressional judgment regarding fact
finding,317 less intrusive judicial enforcement of Congressional
315. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (examining internal
workings of Congress); see also Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (hold-
ing Congress had no authority under Indian commerce clause to repeal Eleventh
amendment immunity for states); see also Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)
(holding Religious Freedom Reformation Act was beyond Congress' powers); see
also Kimel v. Fl. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (holding Age Discrimination
Employment Act did not forbid private individuals from states' Eleventh amend-
ment immunity); see also Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S.
356 (2001) (holding legislative record did not support abrogation of states' Elev-
enth amendment immunity from money damages suits). For a complete list, see
Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REv. 80, 81 n.3-5
(2001) (listing several cases in which Supreme Court struck down legislation for
lack of factual basis).
316. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 549-52 (1980) (stating courts
should analyze legislative procedures when Congress impinges on public values);
see alsojonathan C. Carlson & Alan D. Smith, Emerging Constitutionaljurisprudence of
justice Stevens, 46 U. CHICAGo L. REV. 157, 417-32 (1978) (quoting Justice Stevens
on judicial responsibility in cases like this). In Fullilove, Justice Stevens dissented:
Although it is traditional for judges to accord the same presumption of
regularity to the legislative process no matter how obvious it may be that a
busy Congress has acted precipitately, I see no reason why the character
of their procedures may not be considered relevant to the decision
whether the legislative product has caused a deprivation of liberty or
property without due process of law. Whenever Congress creates a classi-
fication that would be subject to strict scrutiny under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if it had been fashioned by a
state legislature, it seems to me thatjudicial review should include a con-
sideration of the procedural character of the decisionmaking process. A
holding that the classification was not adequately preceded by a consider-
ation of a less drastic alternative or adequately explained by a statement
of legislative purpose would be far less intrusive than a final determina-
tion [of unconstitutionality] . . . [T]here can be no separation-of-powers
objection to a more tentative holding of unconstitutionality based on a
failure to follow procedures that guarantee the kind of deliberation that a
fundamental constitutional issue of this kind obviously merits.
Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 551-52 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
317. See Philip P. Frickey, The Fool on the Hill: Congressional Findings, Constitu-
tional Adjudication, and US. v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 695, 728-29 (1996)
(discussing interplay between court and legislature concerning Congressional val-
ues). Frickey stated that in noneconomic cases "heightened concern about con-
gressional fact-development and factfinding . .. could be a plausible technique for
curbing legislative excess." Id. at 728. Frickey further stated that heightened con-
cern "could promote a meaningful dialogue between judiciary and legislature con-
cerning just where the difficult-to-draw lines should exist concerning important
constitutional values." Id. at 729. See also Coenen, Collaboration, supra note 239, at
1688-89 (discussing merits of proper finding-and study-rules). Coenen pointed
out that "proper-findings-and study-rules" can provide "thoughtful reevaluation
and reshaping of policy proposals." Id. at 1688. This is accomplished by "slowing
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rules should not pose any difficulty. The D.C. Circuit in VanderJagt
v. O'Nei 18 noted that there is no reason to "treat congressional
rules with 'special care,' or with more than the customary deference
we show other legislative enactments. " 1
Supporters ofjudicial review of Congressional processes argue
that Congress should be required to produce a record of evidence
or "clear statement" that demonstrates that it acted reasonably in
concluding that federal legislation is necessary and proper to exer-
cise its enumerated powers. Courts should police "Congress's delib-
erative processes and its reasons for regulating" to ensure that
Congress seriously considered federal concerns and adequately jus-
tified federal government action.320 Supporters suggest that federal
courts should conduct a "hard look review" of Congressional ac-
tion.3 21 A hard look review of Congress would promote procedural
regularity, provide Equal Protection, protect Due Process, generate
institutional dialogue, encourage deliberation, and ensure that the
political process is open and fair. 32 2
Professor Cass Sunstein urges the courts to strictly scrutinize
legislation enacted through appropriation riders.323 Stricter scru-
tiny of appropriation riders will improve the performance of gov-
ernmental institutions and counteract defects in their procedures.
It will also discourage special interest legislation and "promote[ ]
the primacy of ordinary lawmaking, in which the constellation of
down the policymaking process and by bringing into sharper focus the potential
costs of legislative action." Id. at 1688-89.
318. 699 F.2d 1166 (1983).
319. Id. at 1173 (declining to treat Congressional rules like other legislative
acts).
320. Stephen Gardbaum, Rethinking Constitutional Federalism, 74 TEX. L. REv.
795, 799 (1996) (summarizing arguments made by supporters of judicial review).
321. Id. at 800, 826 (suggesting courts should use "hard look review" of Con-
gressional action); see also William W. Buzbee & Robert A. Schapiro, Legislative Re-
cord Review, 54 STAN. L. REv. 87, 119-31 (2001) (advocating more stringent
standard for judicial review); Coenen, Collaboration, supra note 239, at 1586 (pro-
moting more stringent standard for judicial review).
322. See Gardbaum, supra note 320, at 825-26. See also Vicki L. Jackson, Federal-
ism and the Uses and Limits ofLaw: Printz and Principle?, 111 HARv. L. REv. 2180, 2240
(1998) (listing benefits of strict judicial review of legislative rulemaking process);
see also Frickey, supra note 317, at 695 (listing benefits of strict judicial review of
legislative rulemaking process); see also Harold J. Krent, Turning Congress Into an
Agency: The Propriety of Requiring Legislative Findings, 46 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 731,
743-46 (1966) (listing benefits of strict judicial review of legislative rulemaking pro-
cess); see also Coenen, Collaboration, supra note 239, 1835 n.1037 (listing benefits of
strict judicial review of legislative rulemaking process).
323. Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARv. L.
REv. 405, 476-77 (1989) [hereinafter Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes] (proposing
strict scrutiny of appropriation riders).
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interests is quite different and the likelihood of deliberation
higher."324 Professor Susan Rose-Ackerman goes further and ar-
gues "courts should prohibit Congress from waiving its own rules
governing appropriations."3 2 5 Congress should not be allowed to
include "substantive provisions in spending bills."326
Other scholars raise various objections to judicial review of
Congressional procedures.327 First, critics argue that courts cannot
treat Congress like an administrative agency. The uncertain consti-
tutional position of administrative agencies and their tendency to
be captured require rigorous judicial review. Congress, which is a
co-equal branch of government, is not plagued by the same
problems. 328 Public choice theory, however, suggests a different
conclusion regarding interest group capture of Congress.329
Second, critics argue that judicial interference with Congres-
sional procedures violates the separation of powers. Courts should
not get involved with the internal workings of Congress. The Con-
stitution grants each house of Congress the authority to develop its
own rules of procedure. Judicial review of Congressional proce-
dures presents a non-justiciable political question, which lacks judi-
cially manageable standards.330
Third, critics point out that Congress has a unique way of do-
ing business. Requiring Congress to follow its own rules, engage in
an open deliberative process, and justify its positions undermines
the efficacy of the institutional process. Congress receives informa-
tion from various sources. The legislative process consists of bar-
gains and compromises amongst members, interest groups, and the
general public. Ambiguity and deception are part of the process.33'
324. Id. at 458. But see Zellmer, supra note 264, at 528-34 (disagreeing that
strictjudicial review is sufficient). Further, Zellmer also believes a process oriented
constitutional amendment to be necessary. Id. See also Devins, Appropriations, supra
note 267, at 405 (disfavoring heightened judicial scrutiny).
325. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 208, at 192, 197.
326. Id. (discussing Congress' role).
327. Coenen, Collaboration, supra note 239, at 1845-51 (criticizing courts'
method of review for Congressional procedures).
328. See A. Christopher Bryant & Timothy J. Simeone, Remanding to Congress:
The Supreme Court's New "on the Record" Constitutional Review of Federal Statutes, 86
CORNELL L. REv. 328, 370-73 (2001) (differentiating Congress from administrative
agencies).
329. See Neal E. Devins, Congressional Fact Finding and Scope ofJudicial Review,
50 DuKE L. J. 1169, 1182-83 (2001) [hereinafter Devins, Congressional] (analyzing
public choice theory as applied to interest group capture of Congress).
330. See Bryant & Simeone, supra note 328, at 376-83 (criticizing judicial re-
view of Congressional procedures).
331. See id. at 383-89 (explaining inherent nature of Congress); see also Devins,
Congressional, supra note 329, at 1180 (overviewing legislative process).
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Professor Mark V. Tushnet asserts judicial review of the legislative
process might "destroy the legislative process as we know it."332
Fourth, critics assert that imposing new procedural require-
ments is post-hoc. Congress did not know it was required to de-
velop an adequate record or sufficient evidence to support
legislation.3 3 3
If Section 1713 had been remanded to Congress for violating
Congressional rules, none of these concerns would have been real-
ized. The court would not have developed rules for Congress, in-
terfered with the legislative process, or established post-hoc
requirements. The court would simply have enforced long stand-
ing Congressional rules that prohibit the attachment of a substan-
tive rider to an appropriation bill. This would help "to limit 'rent
seeking' in the budgetary process."33 4
B. Public Trust Doctrine
Section 1713 also violated the public trust doctrine,335 which
posits that certain natural resources are common property held in
trust by the government for the benefit of its citizens.3 3 6 The fed-
eral government holds public lands and resources in trust for citi-
zens.3 37 The Supreme Court has recognized federal public trust
332. Tushnet, supra note 297, at 826 (contemplating effects of judicial review
on Congress).
333. See Philip P. Frickey & Steven S. Smith, judicial Review, the Congressional
Process, and Federalism Cases: An Interdisciplinary Critique, 111 YALE L. J. 1707, 1723
(2002) (discussing shortcomings of imposing new procedural requirements on
Congress).
334. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 208, at 197 (postulating Congressional ef-
fects without judicial interference in legislative process).
335. See Comment, The Role of the judiciary in the Confrontation with the Problems
of Environmental Quality, 17 UCLA L. REv. 1070, 1080-81 (1970) [hereinafter The
Role of the Judiciary] (describing violation of public trust doctrine); see also Ronald
E. Klipsch, Aspects of a Constitutional Right to a Habitable Environment: Towards an
Environmental Due Process, 49 IND. L. J. 203, 216-19 (1974), available at http://
www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol49/iss2/1/ (showing how Section 1713 vio-
lated public trust doctrine).
336. SeeJan S. Stevens, The Public Trust: A Sovereign's Ancient Prerogative Becomes
the People's Environmental Right, 14 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 195 (1980) (maintaining cer-
tain resources are for public); see also David Takas, The Pubic Trust Doctrine, Environ-
mental Human rights, the Future of Private Property, 16 N.Y.U. ENvrL. L.J. 711 (2008)
(detailing public trust doctrine and private property); Anna R.C. Caspersen, The
Public Trust Doctrine and the Impossibility of "Takings" by Wildlife, 23 ENv. AFF. 357,
358-62 (1996) (scrutinizing Section 1713 under public trust doctrine).
337. For a contrary view, see Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Prop-
erty and Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA
L. REv. 631 (1986) (examining public trust doctrine); Eric Pearson, The Public
Trust Doctrine in Federal Law, 24 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENvrL. L. 173 (2004) (ex-
plaining discrepancies in state and federal public trust doctrine); James L.
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responsibilities. 3 3  The classic public trust doctrine, which prohib-
its the disposition of the trust resources, is not applicable to federal
lands. The public trust doctrine has, however, evolved with changes
in the philosophy of public land management.339 From 1888
through 1970, in the era of federal retention and management, the
public trust doctrine was invoked to justify federal protection of
public lands from private interests. In the environmental protec-
tion era, beginning in 1970, the public trust doctrine has been uti-
lized to constrain federal management of public lands. 340
The public trust doctrine is an implied right. Professor
Charles F. Wilkinson asserted that environmental statutes in total
"set a tone, a context, a milieu. When read together they require a
trustee's care."3 4 1 The public trust doctrine constrains Congres-
sional action and protects "public expectations against destabilizing
changes."3 42 The United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Virginia stated that " [u]nder the public trust doctrine, ....
the United States ha[s] the right and the duty to protect and pre-
serve the public's interest in natural wildlife resources. Such a right
does not derive from ownership of the resources but from a duty
owing to the people."3 4 3
Professor Zygmunt Platter pointed out the similarity between
the public trust doctrine and private trusts, which rests on four ele-
ments: First, there must be a "res," the object of the trust, which
involves a resource that cannot be owned individually, such as the
wolf. Second, there must be a trustee, who administers the trust to
further the interest of the trustee, which is the federal government.
Huffman, A Fish Out of Water: the Public Trust in a Constitutional Democracy, 19 ENrL.
L. 527 (1989) (arguing for public trust doctrine to be analyzed under property
law).
338. See Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 537 (1911) (explaining Congress
has public trust responsibilities); see also Ruddy v. Rossi, 248 U.S. 104 (1918) (find-
ing Congress had discretion to dispose of public lands); United States v. City of
S.F., 310 U.S. 16 (1940) (holding federal government has public trust responsibili-
ties); Charles F. Wilkinson, The Public Trust Doctrine in Public Land Law, 14 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 269, 277 n.32 (1980) (discussing Supreme Court's recognition of
public trust responsibilities).
339. See Wilkinson, supra note 338, at 273-74, 280-84 (explaining evolution of
public trust doctrine).
340. See id. at 280-84 (characterizing new treatment of public trust doctrine).
341. Id. at 299 (describing environmental statutes' effects on public trust
doctrine).
342. Joseph L. Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine from Its Historical Shackles,
14 U.C. DAvIs L. REv. 185, 188 (1980) [hereinafter Sax, Liberating] (reviewing ef-
fects of public trust doctrine on Congressional action).
343. In re Steuart Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp. 38, 40 (E.D. Va. 1980) (discussing
public trust doctrine).
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Third, there must be a beneficiary to whom the trustee is obligated,
which is the public. Finally, there must be a settler, who creates the
trust, whose identity "depends on your theological inclinations."3 44
One commentator noted that "the public trust doctrine's protec-
tion of wildlife may mean that government has not only a right to
protect wolves or other endangered wildlife, but a duty to preserve
them."3 45
Several commentators envision the public trust doctrine as ve-
hicle for protection of ecosystems. Professor Harry R. Bader argues
"the public trust doctrine must be used to maintain the general
health of natural systems."3 4 6 Professor Alison Rieser argues the
public trust doctrine should protect functioning ecosystems, which
are "public goods." Ecosystems containing endangered species "are
irreproducible products of nature that must remain intact in order
to provide benefits."347 Conserving natural resources is a collective
or public good, which will not be accomplished by the market and
individuals.34 8 The role of the court is to "determine whether a
particular activity would be likely to impair substantially the health
of a local ecological system." 3 49 This inquiry requires the court to
assess "the impact of the activity in question upon the diversity and
stability of the resident biotic community."35 0
The public trust doctrine, like structural review, focuses on
process.3 5 1 Judicial involvement occurs when organized interest
344. ZYGMUNTJ. B. PLATrER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAw AND POLICY: NATURE,
LAw, AND SocIETY 994 (2d ed. 1998) (describing need for settler in trusts); see also
Caspersen, supra note 336, at 361-62 (comparing public trust doctrine to private
trusts).
345. Caspersen, supra note 336, at 390 (elaborating on duty public duty doc-
trine imposes).
346. Harry R. Bader, Antaeus and the Public Trust Doctrine: A New Approach to
Substantive Environmental Protection in the Common Law, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv.
749, 756 (1992) (advocating public trust doctrine as essential to protection of eco-
systems). Bader noted, "Biotic systems are too complex, and our scientific under-
standing too rudimentary, to attempt to isolate individual components as essential.
Instead, the public trust doctrine must be used to maintain the general health of
natural systems." Id.
347. Alison Rieser, Ecological Preservation as a Public Property Right: An Emerging
Doctrine In Search of A Theory, 15 HARv. ENvrL. L. REv. 393, 422 (1991) (describing
species' benefits outside ecosystem).
348. See id. at 422-26 (advocating for necessity of treating ecosystems as public
goods).
349. Bader, supra note 346, at 757 (explaining courts' role in protecting
ecosystems).
350. Id. (discussing what is required of courts to protect ecosystems and char-
acterizing public trust doctrine).
351. See Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effec-
tive judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REv. 471, 558 (1970) (analyzing public trust
doctrine and its focus on process).
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groups use their power in the legislative arena to affect public re-
sources adversely.352 Such resources are important to a free society,
are the product of nature's bounty, and "have a peculiar public na-
ture."3 53 The court examines government decisions that are "calcu-
lated either to reallocate that resource to more restricted uses or to
subject public uses to the self-interest of private parties." 354 Judicial
skepticism is particularly acute when a decision regarding public
resources has been made in a closed political process dominated by
particular interest groups; judicial skepticism questions "the usual
presumption that all relevant issues have been adequately consid-
ered and resolved by routine statutory and administrative
processes."355
The court subjects the trustee's decision to a hard look review,
which requires: (1) detailed explanations of decisions, (2) ratio-
nales for departures from past practice, (3) effective participation
in process, and (4) a consideration alternatives. 3 56 The court fo-
cuses on "process fairness and 'reasoned decision-making' . . .
rather than particular substantive rights."357 The hard look review
ensures "diligence, fairness, and faithfulness" regarding the protec-
tion of the public resource.358 If problems are discovered, the
court remands the issue back to the legislature to be resolved in
open deliberate political process.35 9 The legislature, not the court,
must make policy through the proper means. 360 The public trust
doctrine has no intrinsic content, but is "a technique by which
courts may mend perceived imperfections in the legislative and ad-
ministrative processes . . . a medium for democratization."3 6 1
352. See id. at 556 (explaining when judicial conduct is necessary).
353. Id. at 484-85 (detailing importance of public resources).
354. Id. at 490 (discussing court's role in examining decisions that impact
public resources).
355. Id. at 561 (finding judicial skepticism necessary in closed political pro-
cess decisions).
356. See Michael C. Blumm, Public Property and the Democratization of Western
Water Law: A Modern View of the Public Trust Doctrine, 19 ENrrL. L. 573, 589-95
(1989) (detailing application of heightened scrutiny); see also Gary D. Meyers, Vari-
ation on a Theme: Expanding the Public Trust Doctrine to Include Protection of Wildlife, 19
ENVTL. L. 723, 735 (1989) (analyzing courts' treatment of trustee's decision).
357. Blumm, supra note 356, at 590 (stating what court focuses on).
358. WILLIAM H. RODGERs, ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 177 (West, 1st ed. 1986) (ex-
plaining outcome of court's hard look).
359. See id. at 558 (overviewing procedural process).
360. See id. at 559-61 (determining who makes policy).
361. Id. at 509 (explaining public trust doctrine); see also Klipsch, supra note
335, at 217-18 (characterizing public trust doctrine).
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The Constitution grants Congress plenary power over public
property,3 62 but the disposition and use of such property must serve
a public purpose.3 63 The public trust doctrine is based on the com-
mon law, so can be trumped by statute.3 64 Congress controls public
resources, but must exercise that authority through an open delib-
erative political process, 3 65 not by backroom deals attached to an
appropriation bill like Section 1713, which violate Congressional
rules.
C. Due Process Violations
Section 1713 also violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment because it infringed on the public's limited property
rights in species preservation and management of public lands.
Property rights are legally protected interests with respect to a
thing, tangible or intangible.3 66 The public's limited property
rights include the protection of environmentally critical resources.
Federal decisions regarding public resources should not be made
exclusively on basis of development, but should recognize their eco-
logical values. The public has a right to the ecological integrity of
the resources on which its survival depends.3 6 7 Professor Mark
Sagoff argued that preserving nature "is an obligation to our cul-
tural tradition." 3 68 Citizens have a right "to their history, to the
signs and symbols of their culture, and therefore to some means of
362. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3 (defining Congress's power to make regulations
regarding property belonging to United States).
363. See Klipsch, supra note 335, at 218-19 (noting disposition of property
must serve public purpose); see also Rodgers, supra note 358, at 177-80 (explaining
scope of Congressional power under Article IV, Section 3 of United States
Constitution).
364. See Proprietary Duties of the Federal Government Under the Public Trust Doctrine,
75 MICH. L. REv. 586, 592-96 (1977) [hereinafter Proprietary Duties] (determining
that statute can undermine public trust doctrine).
365. See Klipsch, supra note 335, at 218-19 (noting importance of open delib-
erative process); see also Proprietary Duties, supra note 364, at 592-96 (discussing
open deliberative process); Rodgers, supra note 358, at 170-80 (defining scope of
Congressional control over public resources).
366. See Charles Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 739 (1964) (discuss-
ing property rights). Further, Sax stated, "The essence of property law is respect
for reasonable expectations." Sax, Liberating, supra note 342, at 186-87.
367. See David B. Hunter, An Ecological Perspective on Property: A Call for judicial
Protection of the Public's Interest in Environmentally Critical Resources, 12 HARv. ENvr..
L. REv. 311, 312-13 (1988) (describing three insights as to why courts should con-
sider ecological factors in takings cases due to public benefits from implementing
ecological perspectives).
368. Mark Sagoff, On Preserving the Natural Environment, 84 YALE L.J. 205, 265
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protecting and using their surroundings in a way consistent with
their values."3 69
The federal government can create property rights by its ac-
tions. Property rights constitute an entitlement.370 Such rights can-
not be taken be taken away without procedural due process.371 The
federal statutory scheme regarding environmental protection and
public land management in total establishes a limited public prop-
erty right that complements the public trust doctrine. One com-
mentator characterized several environmental statutes as "trustee
statutes," which seek to stop the destruction of natural resources
and provide for "the restoration of natural resources."372 For exam-
ple, NEPA states that "it is the continuing policy of Federal Govern-
ment, . . . to use all practicable means and measures, . . . to create
and maintain conditions under which man and nature can coexist
in productive harmony[ ] . . . [for] present and future generations
of Americans."373 The ESA declares that endangered and
threatened "species of fish, wildlife, and plants are of esthetic, eco-
logical, educational, historical, recreational, and scientific value to
the Nation and its people."37 4 FLMPA mandates that:
public lands be managed in a manner that will protect the
quality of scientific, scenic, historical, ecological, environ-
mental, air and atmospheric, water resource, and archeo-
logical values; that, where appropriate, will preserve and
protect certain public lands in their natural condition;
that will provide food and habitat for fish and wildlife and
369. Id. at 267 (describing importance of right to preserve environments
which derives from citizens' right to cultural integrity).
370. Vanderziel, supra note 223, at 454 (describing property interests
generally).
371. See id. at 453-61 (noting necessity of procedural Due Process). The Su-
preme Court established a balancing test, which defines the requirements of pro-
cedural Due Process. See id. at 459. Courts must weigh the individual interest at
stake, risk to individual interest under current procedures, and burden of provid-
ing alternative procedures. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976) (set-
ting forth three factors to be considered by lower courts for determining Due
Process requirements).
372. Thomas A. Campbell, The Public Trust, What's It Worth?, 34 NAT. RE-
SOURCES. J. 73, 74-75 (1994) (describing Congressional acts evidencing Congress's
intent to protect natural resources against harmful costs of resource destruction).
373. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 101, 42 U.S.C. § 4331
(2012) (describing Congressional declaration of national environmental policy).
374. 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (2012) (identifying Congressional findings with respect
to endangered species).
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domestic animals; and that will provide for outdoor recre-
ation and human occupancy and use.37 5
Citizen suit provisions in these and other environmental and
public land management statutes recognize the public's interest in
proper public land management.376 Section 1713 infringed on the
public's limited property right by interfering with the proper man-
agement of public lands. Few statutory goals regarding public lands
can be accomplished in the absence of proper management.
Generally, due process protections are not afforded when the
government impinges on a public right. Individuals, who are part
of a large class adversely affected by government action, are ex-
pected to seek redress in the legislative arena.3 7 7 Due process pro-
tections are afforded by the courts when individuals suffer unique
personal injuries that make it impractical to seek legislative re-
dress.378 Because the public must rely on the political process to
protect its interests, the courts should examine the political process
375. Federal Land and Policy Management Act § 102, 43 U.S.C. § 1701
(2012) (describing policies behind FLPMA).
376. See Vanderziel, supra note 223, at 453-61 (describing due process for pro-
tected interests). NEPA review is conducted pursuant to the Administrative Proce-
dures Act. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012). The Supreme Court recognized that users of
environmental resources such as parks have legally protected interests in those
resources to establish standing to challenge governmental activity affecting them.
See United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 686-89 (1973) (noting appellees sought
to uphold preliminary injunction against enforcement of Interstate Commerce
Commission's rate increases for failure to comply with NEPA's requirements and
appellants challenged appellees standing to sue).
377. See Araiza, supra note 229, at 1102-07 (discussing right to participate in
political process); see also Vanderziel, supra note 223, at 460-61 (describing intrica-
cies of Due Process analysis when protected interests have been deprived).
378. See Araiza, supra note 229, at 1102-07 (identifying Supreme Court prece-
dent that defines whether infringement has occurred for Due Process purposes).
This distinction was clarified by Justice Holmes in Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State
Board of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915), which distinguished an earlier deci-
sion in Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908). In Bi-Metallic, Justice Holmes
stated:
Where a rule of conduct applies to more than a few people it is impracti-
cable that every one should have a direct voice in its adoption ... Their
rights are protected in the only way that they can be in a complex society,
by their power, immediate or remote, over those who make the rule ...
[In Londoner v. Denver, a] relatively small number of persons was con-
cerned, who were exceptionally affected, in each case upon individual
grounds, and it was held that they had a right to a hearing.
Bi-Metallic, 239 U.S. at 445-46; see also O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Ctr., 447
U.S. 773, 800-01 (1980) (finding nursing home residents had no constitutional
right to a hearing at government's expense).
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to that the public rights are only curtailed through an open and
deliberative political process.379
Section 1713 was not enacted through an open deliberate po-
litical process, but was attached to an appropriation bill, in violation
of Congressional rules.380 Environmental groups were not afforded
"environmental due process," which entails the right to participate
in the political decision.381 The public owns the resources and the
federal government derives its authority from the public, so public
interest groups have a right to participate in the process.382 Profes-
sor Philip Soper noted "the protection of procedural due process in
the environmental context [entails] a minimum requirement that
government action give adequate consideration to environmental
values."383 Section 1713 should have been remanded to Congress
for reconsideration in an open deliberative legislative process. Pro-
fessor Sunstein argues that federal courts should remand issues
back to Congress "for reconsideration . . . when deliberation ap-
pears to have been absent.38 4
D. Equal Protection Violation
Section 1713 should have been subject to heightened judicial
scrutiny for violating the Equal Protection component and Due
379. See Araiza, supra note 229, at 1103-04 (indicating when judicial scrutiny
of political processes may be appropriate to ensure fairness).
380. Sher & Hunting, supra note 230, at 476-85 (noting Section 1713 was en-
acted through an "appropriations rider," whereby Congress passes an appropria-
tions bill which is not subject to public review). When Congress bypasses the
legislative process by attaching exemptions to an appropriations bill, it violates
both the House and the Senate's Rules. See id. at 477 (citing Standing Rules of the
U.S. Senate, Rule 16(4); Rules of the House of Representatives, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess., Rule XXI(2) (1979); 7 C. CANNON, PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENT-
ATIVES §§ 1172-1179 (1936)).
381. Klipsch, supra note 335, at 226-30 (describing "environmental due pro-
cess" as principles lacking analytical constraints of traditional Due Process analysis
to guarantee responses to environmental issues without comparison of competing
interests or creation of substantive environmental rights).
382. See The Role of the judiciary, supra note 335, at 1079-80 (detailing public
interest groups' right to participate in process). One commentator noted that
constitutional Due Process requires "minimal procedural safeguards" generally re-
quired of governmental institutions, but are often "denied to those who would
represent a point of view to which a decision-maker is unreceptive." Id.
383. E. Philip Soper, The Constitutional Framework ofEnvironmental Law, in FED-
ERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 20, 119 (Erica L. Dolgin & Thomas G.P. Guilbert eds.,
1974).
384. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes, supra note 323, at 471 (discussing constitu-
tional system's hostility to Congressional measures passed due to political power of
private groups, suggesting such norms encourage judiciaries to implement inter-
pretive strategies to encourage legislative deliberation).
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Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.385 The rationale that sup-
ports less rigorous review and the non-recognition of Due Process
rights is not applicable. Section 1713 is special interest legislation
that undermines important public values. The federal government
should have been required to articulate the substantial government
interests being served by Section 1713.
Section 1713 violated the Equal Protection component of the
Fifth Amendment by providing unique treatment for wolves in the
NRM. Generally, distinctions in environmental statutes, like eco-
nomic and social legislation, are reviewed by the courts under the
deferential rational basis standard. The plaintiff must show distinc-
tions in the law are not rationally related to the public interest.
Courts are generally deferential to distinctions made by Con-
gress.38 6 Judicial deference is accorded because environmental val-
ues are less important than the protection of individual rights,
which are essential to the proper functioning of the political pro-
cess. Legislatures are more competent than courts to deal with
these policy matters.3 8 7
These rationales do not support the deferential review of Sec-
tion 1713, which provided unique treatment for the NRM wolves.388
The Ninth Circuit recognizes that environmental protection is an
important public value.389 Endangered species like the wolf are im-
portant components in a balanced ecosystem. 390 Disruptions in the
ecosystem cause environmental instabilities that diminish nature's
385. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (indicating Fifth Amend-
ment includes Equal Protection guarantee).
386. See Araiza, supra note 229, at 1096-98 (describing tension between judi-
cial deference to legislative decisionmaking and Congress's intentional unfavora-
ble classifications).
387. See Soper, supra note 383, at 110-13 (advocating for legislatures, not
courts, to deal with environmental matters).
388. See Araiza, supra note 229, 1089-1101 (providing history of legislative
specificity analysis).
389. Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Dole, 870 F.2d 1419, 1430 (9th Cir. 1989) (recognizing
importance of healthy environments yet declining to determine whether such rises
to constitutional right). The Dole court stated:
We agree that it is difficult to conceive of a more absolute and enduring
concern than the preservation and, increasingly, the restoration of a de-
cent and livable environment. Human life, itself a fundamental right, will
vanish if we continue our heedless exploitation of this planet's natural
resources. The centrality of the environment to all of our undertakings
gives individuals a vital stake in maintaining its integrity.
Id. See also Sher & Hunting, supra note 230, at 482-85 (discussing whether environ-
mental legislation should be subject to heightened scrutiny); see also Vanderziel,
supra note 223, at 461-65 (identifying individual attempts to secure environmental
preservation as constitutional right).
390. See 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (stating ESA's purposes).
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ability to establish food chains, cycle nutrients, sustain atmospheric
quality, control the climate, regulate the fresh water supply, main-
tain the soil, dispose of wastes, pollinate crops, and control pests
and disease. Robert Costanza estimated the value of services de-
rived from ecosystems to be in the range of sixteen to fifty-four tril-
lion dollars per year.391 With an estimated value of thirty-three
trillion dollars per year, ecosystems provide services that cost almost
twice the gross domestic product of the all the nations in the world
combined.392 Section 1713 was not enacted through an open delib-
erative political process, but was attached to an appropriation bill.
This specifically violated Congressional rules that prohibit the en-
actment of substantive legislation in appropriation bills.393
Section 1713 is special interest legislation with concentrated
benefits and dispersed costs.3 9 4 Section 1713 specifically advances
the interest of the livestock producers, hunters, and certain state
governments. Democratic Senator Jon Tester of Montana, one of
the sponsors of the Bill, was in a tough reelection battle against
Republican Representative Denny Rehberg of Montana.395 Section
1713 undermines the ESA, which declares the protection of endan-
391. Robert Costanza et al., The Value of World's Ecosystem Service and National
Capital, 387 NATURE 253, 259 (1987) (assigning monetary value to ecosystems not
adequately represented by commercial markets).
392. Id. (describing value of world's ecosystems). Costanza noted:
Because ecosystem services are not fully 'captured' in commercial mar-
kets or adequately quantified in terms comparable with economic services
and manufactured capital, they are often given too little weight in policy
decisions. This neglect may ultimately compromise the sustainability of
humans in the biosphere. The economies of the Earth would grind to a
halt without the services of ecological life-support systems, so in one sense
their total value to the economy is infinite.
Id. at 253.
393. For Senate and House rules relating to appropriation bills, see supra
note 206.
394. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 55 (2d ed. 1994)
(maintaining Section 1713 has concentrated benefits and dispersed costs).
395. Taylor, supra note 203 (discussing speculation that wolf rider was in-
cluded in appropriations bill by Senate leadership to increase Tester's election
prospects). One of Tester's critics declared that "[t]his gave Jon Tester a powerful
political pelt to hang on his wall." Id. (quoting Jeff Ruch) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Senator Tester and Representative Rehberg argued over who de-
served credit for the delisting rider. Rehberg Lies About His Record on Wolves, STATES
NEWS SERv. (Aug. 26, 2011), http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-265346282.
html (comparing Rehberg's statements regarding involvement in wolf rider to ac-
tual events); see also Mike Dennison, Rehberg Tester Spar Over Credit for Wolf Legisla-
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gered and threatened species to be in the national interest.3 96 It
also deprives the public of ecologically balanced public land
management.397
Professor Tribe asserts that lawmaking is a dialogue in which
"laws, unlike naked commands, be explained to those they touch."398
Individuals are entitled to know why the law is being applied. Such
an explanation entails reasons that rationally fit the rule being de-
fended.3 99 Professor Sunstein argues that Congress should not re-
spond to the naked preferences of politically powerful interest
groups, but should select public values through a process of delib-
eration and debate. 400 Federal courts should ensure that govern-
ment actions promote public values by subjecting special interest
legislation to heightened scrutiny.401 Professor Rose-Ackerman as-
serts that " [t] he courts should invalidate spending provisions in ap-
propriations acts that clearly benefit a narrower range of interests
than those contemplated in the original substantive act."402
Justice Stevens supported heightened judicial scrutiny of stat-
utes that contain discriminatory classifications or impinge on liberty
or Due Process. Such statutes must be enacted by a rational purpo-
sive legislative process. 403 Justice Stevens in Hampton v. Mow Sun
Wong404 held that when a statute contains a "questionable" classifi-
cation "due process require [s] that there be a legitimate basis for
396. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a) (3) (2012) (describing animal and plant life's value
as "esthetic, ecological, educational, historical, recreational, and scientific").
397. See generally ROBERT B. KEITER, KEEPING FAITH WITH NATURE: ECOSYSTEMS,
DEMOCRACY, AND AMERICA'S PUBLIC LANDS (2003).
398. Laurence H. Tribe, From Environmental Foundations to Constitutional Struc-
tures: Learning from Nature's Future, 84 YALE L.J. 545, 554 (1975) [hereinafter Tribe,
Environmental Foundations] (noting laws should be understandable to those
affected).
399. Id. (providing mechanism to help reader understand political process).
400. Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
1689, 1693-1704 (1984) [hereinafter Sunstein, Naked Preferences] (contrasting na-
ked preferences - treating particular groups differently solely in exercise of raw
political power - and political processes in which differential treatment serves
some other public value).
401. See id. at 1699-1700 (describing when and why heightened scrutiny
should be applied to naked preferences); see also Eskridge, Politics, supra note 10, at
279, 298-99, 303-09, 324-25. For a contrary view, see Elhauge, supra note 278, and
Farber & Frickey, Jurisprudence, supra note 306, at 908-12.
402. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 208, at 192 (proposing how courts could "en-
courage Congress to develop straightforward and realistic connections between
budget appropriations and substantive statutory policy").
403. See Carlson & Smith, supra note 316, at 218-19 (indicating that justice
Stevens was instrumental in developing "rationally purposive legislative process"
doctrine, requiring decisionmaking body to be sufficiently competent to make ra-
tional decisions and thus allowing courts to perform legislative purpose analysis).
404. 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
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presuming that the rule was actually intended to serve [the] inter-
est."405 The court must examine the legislative process to discover
which government interests were considered as part of the legisla-
tive purpose.406
Given the important interests at stake and the procedure uti-
lized, Section 1713 should have received heightened scrutiny. 407
Section 1713 should have been subjected to intermediate scrutiny,
which requires the federal government to show that the legislative
distinction furthers a substantial government interest and the
means chosen are rationally related to achieving the substantial
government interest.408 Alternatively, Section 1713 should have
been subject to rigorous rational basis scrutiny, which shifts the bur-
den of proof to the government to demonstrate the reason for the
legislative distinction.409
The federal government should have been required to explain
how Section 1713 was consistent with public purposes of the ESA, 410
or why the NRM wolf delisting was being exempted from legal re-
quirements of the ESA.411 An explanation was particularly war-
405. Id. at 103 (describing interest necessary for discriminatory rules).
406. See Carlson & Smith, supra note 316, at 225-26 (describing judicial in-
quiry necessary).
407. See Araiza, supra note 229, at 1089-1101 (discussing singling out
jurisprudence).
408. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210-24 (1982) (applying intermediate
scrutiny to statute discriminating against children of undocumented aliens).
409. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 629, 631-36 (1996) (applying deferential
review to Colorado referendum); see alsoJerald W. Rogers, Romer v. Evans: Height-
ened Scrutiny Has Found a Rational Basis-Is the Court Tacitly Recognizing Quasi-Suspect
Status for Gays, Lesbians, and Bisexuals, 45 U. KAN. L. REv. 953 (1997) (discussing
rational basis review versus rational basis applied by Romer court); see also Sunstein,
Forward, supra note 240, at 69 (maintaining that courts should proceed catalytically
rather than preclusively); see also Araiza, supra note 229, at 1097 (describing how
safeguards are missing in appropriation bills); see also Brenda Swierenga, Still Newer
Equal Protection: Impermissible Purpose Review in the 1984 Term, 53 U. CHI. L. REV.
1454, 1461-68 (1986) (discussing four Supreme Court cases during 1984 term
where court strengthened rational basis review for Equal Protection Clause
violations).
410. See TRIBE, AMERICAN, supra note 297, at 1440. Professor Tribe "assumes
that all legislation must have a legitimate public purpose or set of purposes based
on some conception of the public good." Id. Equal protection analysis requires:
[S]ome rationality in the nature of the class singled out, with "rationality"
tested by the classifications ability to serve the purposes intended by the
legislative or administrative rule: "The courts must reach and determine
the question whether the classification drawn in a statute are reasonable
in light of its purpose . . ."
Id. (quoting McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964)).
411. See Sunstein, Naked Preferences, supra note 400, at 1699-1700 (describing
when heightened scrutiny is appropriate); see also Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting
Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest-Group Model, 86
COLUM. L. REv. 223 (1986) (hypothesizing that Constitution was designed to pro-
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ranted because the federal regulation delisting the NRM wolves had
been adjudicated as violating the ESA. 4 12 In the absence of such an
explanation, there was no way tojustify the unique treatment of the
NRM wolves. 4 13 Such a requirement would have increased the in-
terest groups transactional costs;41 4 encouraged greater delibera-
tion and explanation on part of Congress;415 made the public aware
of the Congressional action; facilitated judicial review; and en-
hanced "due process" lawmaking.416
E. Removal of Federal Court Jurisdiction
Congress would not be able to remove federal court jurisdic-
tion over Equal Protection and Due Process violations. There is a
debate among scholars regarding Congressional power to remove
federal court jurisdiction over Constitutional questions. Justice
Story asserted that Article III mandated Congress to create the fed-
eral courts and grant them authority over all cases in which the
Supreme Court lacks original jurisdiction. Lower federal courts are
essential to establish national judicial power.4 17 Professor Hart ar-
gued that Congress cannot remove jurisdiction that interferes with
the Court's essential functions.418 Professor Lawrence Sager as-
serted that some federal judicial forum is necessary to protect fed-
mote public interest over private interests and discusses legislative interpretation as
means to promote public interests).
412. See Sunstein, Forward, supra note 240, at 65 (noting an explanation would
ensure that "relevant officials engaged in genuine attempt to discern the public
interest").
413. See Araiza, supra note 229, at 1063-64 (indicating legislative interpreta-
tions and definitions can indicate statutory meaning as part of ongoing conversa-
tion to determine statutory purpose).
414. See Eskridge, Politics, supra note 10, at 310 (discussing public choice the-
ory by addressing three predominate political consequences if courts switched to
dynamic interpretive approach).
415. See Sunstein, Forward, supra note 240, at 78 (noting required explanation
would have encouraged greater deliberation and explanation on part of
Congress).
416. See TRIBE, AMERICAN, supra note 297, at 657. Tribe stated that requiring
"the legislature to expose its purposes for observation the political processes are
given a fuller opportunity to react to it." Id. Further, the judiciary "is better able
to judge the validity of the purpose and to assure that it violates no constitutional
restrictions. Id.
417. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 328-31 (1816) (discussing
constitutional power of federal courts); see also Redish & Woods, supra note 220, at
56-59 (discussing language of Article III of United States Constitution).
418. Henry M. Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal
Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARv. L. REv. 1362, 1365 (1953) (discussing limi-
tations on constitutional power of federal courts); see also Redish & Woods, supra
note 220, at 66 (criticizing Prof. Hart's analysis).
4172014]
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eral constitutional rights. 419 Professor Gunther pointed out that
Congress cannot "require a court to decide cases in disregard of the
Constitution."4 2 0 Professors Redish and Woods acknowledged that
Congress "has the power to prevent the adjudication of claims
based upon statutorily created rights."421 The Fifth Amendment,
however, grants a litigant a "right to an independent judicial hear-
ing, state or federal, of a constitutional claim." 4 2 2
Professor Theodore Eisenberg expressed the point most
clearly. Eisenberg argued "because of changing circumstances, the
framers' aspirations for the national judiciary cannot be fulfilled
today without lower federal courts."423 Federal courts are essential
to check other branches, provide uniformity, and counteract local
bias.424 The Supreme Court cannot do the job alone. Lower fed-
eral courts are necessary to protect constitutional rights and imple-
ment Supreme Court decisions.425 Federal courts "must be
invested with jurisdiction to hear federal issues."4 26 Eisenberg
noted that "it is clear that jurisdictional statutes are subject to con-
stitutional limitations . .. When their effect is to abrogate constitu-
tional rights, they are no more valid than any other statute violating
419. Lawrence Gene Sager, Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Authority to
Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARv. L. REv. 17, 61-68 (1981) (dis-
cussing need for judicial independence based on language of Article III of
Constitution).
420. Gunther, supra note 218, at 910 (discussing United States v. Klein, 80 U.S.
128 (1871)).
421. Redish & Woods, supra note 220, at 76 n.142 (arguing Due Process
Clause of Fifth Amendment acts as limitation to Congressional power to determine
jurisdiction of federal courts). Redish and Woods declared:
Unlike rights emanating from the Constitution, statutory rights exist at
the discretion of Congress. Since Congress need not have created such
rights, one can argue that it completely controls those rights, and may
determine whether they can be vindicated in an independent judicial fo-
rum. Though this argument seems to make sense, its applicability is less-
ened by the developing judicial doctrine that significant statutory rights
may not be denied without due process of law.
Id.
422. See id. at 76 (discussing Due Process).
423. See Theodore Eisenberg, Congressional Authority to Restrict Lower Federal
Court Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L. J. 498, 504 (1974) (discussing competing views on
powers of judiciary branch).
424. Id. at 505-06 (discussing intended roles of judiciary branch); see also Red-
ish & Woods, supra note 220, at 68-75 (comparing and contrasting arguments of
Professors Hart and Eisenberg as to role of federal courts).
425. See Eisenberg, supra note 423, at 511-13 (describing increasingly impor-
tant role of lower federal courts as caseloads increase and Supreme Court becomes
more selective).
426. Id. at 514 (describing implication of conclusion that Congress simply
cannot abolish lower federal courts).
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the Constitution."4 2 7 Congress has the authority to "withdraw juris-
diction from all cases except those in which a particular outcome is
mandated by the Constitution."4 2 8 Jurisdictional statutes "which
have substantive impact must be subjected to constitutional scru-
tiny. The conclusion is also inescapable that Congress cannot with-
draw federal jurisdiction to hear cases in which constitutional rights
are at stake." 4 2 9
V. IMPACT ON OTHER STATES IN THE NRM DPS
The April 2009 regulation also removed ESA protection from
wolves in eastern Washington, eastern Oregon, and north-central
Utah. Wolves in these areas are subject to state law. None of these
states have a federally approved state management plan because the
FWS did not establish recovery criteria for these areas. The regula-
tion did not delist wolves in Wyoming. A negotiated settlement in
which the federal government capitulated to almost all of the state's
demands resulted in the delisting of the Wyoming wolves.
A. Washington/Oregon/Utah
Wolves in Western Washington are federally protected as en-
dangered species. There are currently eight packs and four sus-
pected packs in the state.430 After federal delisting, the wolf will
remain an endangered species under state law until statewide con-
servation objectives are met. 43 1 The Washington state Wolf Man-
agement Plan permits fifteen breeding pairs throughout the state.
The hunting and livestock industry oppose the plan, arguing that
too many breeding packs are permitted.432 Hunters and cattlemen
have petitioned the Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife to
427. Id. at 527 (describing jurisdictional limitations based on statutes'
substance).
428. Id. at 527-28 (discussing when federal jurisdiction may be removed by
Congress).
429. Id. at 532-33 (describing necessity of federal jurisdiction over constitu-
tional rights issues).
430. Shannon Dininny, State to Kill 8 Wolves Tied to Loss Of Livestock, SEATTLE
TIMES (Sept. 22, 2012), http://seattletimes.com/avantgo/2019227455.html (dis-
cussing official announcement to eliminate wolves that acts as roadblock to wolf
recovery efforts).
431. See 2009 Final Rule, supra note 3, at 15172 (indicating Washington State
lacks working "wolf conservation and management plan" to maintain wolf
populations).
432. See Shannon Dininny, Commission Questions Wash. Areas for Wolf Recovery,
SEArTL TIMEs (Aug. 29, 2011), http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/201605
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strip state endangered species protection from gray wolves in the
eastern third of the State. 33 Conservation groups oppose any re-
moval of ESA protections.434
Wolves in western Oregon remain under federal protection
and their management is governed by the 2007 Federal/State Coor-
dination Strategy for Implementation of Oregon's Wolf Plan.
Wolves in the eastern third of Oregon have been delisted, but all of
the wolves in Oregon are classified as endangered species under
the Oregon endangered species act and are managed under the
2005 Wolf Conservation and Management Plan. Once the wolf is
federally delisted, Oregon will consider state delisting when there
are four breeding pairs for three consecutive years. The objective
of the plan is for seven breeding pairs in the state. There are cur-
rently five packs and one breeding pair in Oregon (twenty-nine
wolves).6 After delisting, the wolf will be considered a "special
status mammal" under state law.436
Wolves in Utah are federally protected except in the north-cen-
tral part of the state. There are currently no wolves in the state.
The Utah Wildlife Board developed a state management plan in
2005, which permits two breeding pairs in the state.437 Utah en-
acted a law in 2010, which prevents the establishment of packs in
the delisted area until the entire state is delisted. After statewide
delisting, the state plan will be activated.438 Wolves in north-central
Utah are considered a furbearing animal under state law, but rifle
permits cannot be issued. Utah has considered proposals to reclas-
433. See Groups Seek to Delist Wolves in Eastern Washington, DAILY REc. (Oct. 6,
2011), http://www.dailyrecordnews.com/news/groups-seek-to-delist-wolves-in-east-
ern-washington/article_cb4bdb30-f055-11eO-ald5-001cc4c03286.html (discussing
competing interests of hunter and conservationist groups); see also Jeff Barnard,
Ore. and Wash. Want to Handle Wolves on Their Own, SEATTLE TIMES (Aug. 29, 2012),
http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2019004425_aporwolflisting.html (dis-
cussing states' refusal of federal involvement).
434. See Groups Ask Obama to Protect Northwest Wolves, STATES NEWS SERv. (Aug.
14, 2012) (discussing conservation groups' request that Obama continue ESA pro-
tections for wolves).
435. See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., 2011 INTERAGENcy ANNUAL REPORT 2
(2011) (stating current condition in Oregon).
436. 2009 Final Rule, supra note 3, at 15172-73 (describing wolf's new status
under Oregon law after delisting).
437. Id. at 15173-74 (describing state management plan developed by Utah
Wildlife Board).
438. Kirk Robinson, Why Must Utah Be Kept Free of Wolves?, SALT LAKE TRIB.
(Feb. 4, 2010), http://archive.sltrib.com/printfriendly.php?id=14334576&itype=
ngpsid (arguing Utah citizens should be able to live free with wolves); see also Dan
Weist, Gray Wolf Bill Angers Advocates, STANDARD-EXAMINER (Oct. 19, 2010), http://
www.standard.net/topics/congress/2010/10/19/gray-wolf-bill-angers-wildlife-ad-
vocates (explaining condition under which state plan will be activated).
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sify wolves and allow hunting in the delisted area.439 Utah was par-
ticularly concerned about the FWS proposal to reclassify the
Mexican wolf as a distinct subspecies and grant it full protection in
southern Utah and Colorado. 4 4 0 The FWS did not proceed with
the proposal. 4 4 1
B. Wyoming
The April 2009 regulation delisted wolves in NRM DPS, except
in Wyoming, where conflict continued. After the Obama adminis-
tration decided not to appeal the federal district court's decision
that found the FWS rejection of the Wyoming management arbi-
trary and capricious, Wyoming and the DOI negotiated a deal.
Wolves in Yellowstone and Grand Teton National Parks and the Na-
tional Elk Refuge will remain under federal protection. A trophy
game area will be established outside the parks in Northwest Wyo-
ming, which expands from October 15 to the end of February. Wy-
oming promised to manage one hundred wolves and ten breeding
pairs outside of Yellowstone. Wolves will be considered predators
in the remaining ninety percent of the state, where they can be shot
on sight. Wyoming will allow the killing of fifty-two wolves in the
trophy area, twenty-two percent of the state's wolf population, re-
ducing wolves in the area to ten packs. 442 There are presently 328
439. Brandon Loomis, Panel Endorses Wolf Hunt, SALT LAKE TIUB. (Nov. 18,
2011), http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/politics/52932472-90/utah-wolves-state-spe-
cies.html.csp (discussing effects of allowing hunting permits); see also Utah Bill
Would Reclassify Wolf as Game Animal, Assoc. PREss (Dec. 24, 2011), http://
www.heraldextra.com/news/state-and-regional/utah-bill-would-reclassify-wolf-as-a-
game-animal/article-beb08818-f076-525b-al4b-1fOcl9bdala5.html (highlighting
Utah's consideration of proposals concerning wolves' reclassification).
440. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; 90-Day Finding on a
Petition To List the Mexican gray wolf as an Endangered Subspecies With Critical
Habitat, 75 Fed. Reg. 46894 (Aug. 4, 2010) (reclassifying Mexican gray wolf); see
also Utah Wants Wolves Kept Out, UNITED PRESS INT'L (Nov. 10, 2011), http://
www.upi.com/ScienceNews/2011/11/10/Utah-wants-wolves-kept-out/UPI-
83181320974542/ (stating Utah officials worried Mexican gray wolves will be re-
classified for protection); see alsoJuliet Eilperin, Once Nearly Extinct, Wolves Now Fair
Game, WASH. POST (Sept. 17, 2012), http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-336573
12.html (stressing Utah's concern).
441. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; 12-Month Finding on
Petitions to List the Mexican gray wolf as an Endangered Subspecies or Distinct
Population Segment with Critical Habitat, 77 Fed. Reg. 61375 (Oct. 9, 2012) (stat-
ing FWS's decision).
442. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants: Removal of the gray
wolf in Wyoming from the Federal List of Endangered and Threatened Wildlife
and Removal of the Wyoming Wolf Population's Status as an Experimental Popula-
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wolves in twenty-eight packs in Wyoming.4 43
Environmental groups criticized the deal. 4 4 4 The D014 4 5 and
Wyoming officials4 46 praised the outcome. Republican Representa-
443. 2011 INTERAGENCY ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 435, at 2 (stating current
condition of wolves in Wyoming).
444. See Press Release, DOW, DOI Releases Details of Wyoming Shoot-on-
Sight Wolf Plan (Aug. 3, 2011), available at http://www.defenders.org/press-re-
lease/doi-releases-details-wyoming-shoot-sight-wolf-plan (releasing details of wolf
plan). The DOW stated:
Wyoming has settled on the indiscriminate shooting of wolves as the pri-
mary management tool in the state, which is a huge step backwards. In-
stead, the state should be working with all stakeholders to promote
tolerance and prevent conflict by implementing nonlethal, proactive
management tools. It seems that this is no better than a similar plan
rejected by the Fish and Wildlife Service under the Bush administration.
If it was no good then, it's no good now.
Id. Center for Biological Diversity stated: "From our perspective it's once again an
example of the Fish and Wildlife Service stepping away from larger recovery of
wolves in west . . . This is going to make it incredibly difficult for wolves to get
extensive habitat in Colorado and make a comeback there as well." Feds Release
Wyoming WolfDelist Plan, Assoc. PREss (Oct. 4, 2011), http://billingsgazette.com/
news/state-and-regional/wyoming/article_60efbl92-eeb8-1 1e0-bcd7-001 cc4cOO2
e0.html (quoting Noah Greenwald on FWS wolf recovery).
445. See Wyoming, Feds Announce Plan for Delisting Wolves, BILLINGS GAZETTE
(Aug. 3, 2011), http://billingsgazette.com/news/state-and-regional/wyoming/wy-
oming-feds-announce-plan-for-delisting-wolves/article_9cacl742-bdfe-11e0-93e9-
001cc4c03286.html (outlining DOI's praise for plan). Secretary Salazar stated that
the gray wolf is a "great example" of how the ESA works. Id. Secretary Salazar
further noted, "The agreement we've reached with Wyoming recognizes the suc-
cess of this iconic species and will ensure the long-term conservation of gray
wolves." Id.
446. See Press Release, Enzi Encouraged by Wolf Management Agreement,
Capitol Hill (Aug. 3, 2011), available at http://www.enzi.senate.gov/public/index.
cfm/news-releases?ContentRecordid=2712214e-c563-477e-80d7-bl7f091elddf&
ContentType-id=ae7a6475-aOlf-4da5-aa94-0a98973de620&Groupjid=91d2f483-Oa
d8-44ac-bcc4-fc2c82d75e07 (noting Wyoming officials praise for plan). Senator
Enzi (R. Wy) stated:
Wolf populations have exceeded all recovery goals. Their population
growth is endangering our state's wildlife and livestock industries. We
cannot allow that to continue, and it is time to remove Endangered Spe-
cies Act protection from these predators in Wyoming in the same way that
protection was removed from wolves in Idaho and Montana.
Id. Senator Barrasso (R. Wy) declared: "after more fits than starts, the Obama
administration has finally recognized that Wyoming should be in control of man-
aging the wolf, not Washington." Delegation statement on proposed wolf delist-
ing, CONG. DOCUMENTS & PUBL'NS (Oct. 4, 2011); see also Press Release, Senator
Enzi's Office, Statement on Proposed Wolf Delisting (Oct. 4, 2011), available at
http://www.enzi.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/news-re-
leases?ContentRecordid=93b8c559-5c88-4810-8fdf-313aa5f3874d. Representative
Lummis (R. Wy) stated:
Wyoming's nearly decade-long saga on the fully recovered gray wolf is, I
hope coming to an end. There is still work to be done, but today's news
is further momentum to the fight to grant Wyoming on the ground ex-
perts the right to manage our wolves. I look forward to the conclusion of
our state's delisting efforts which have been held up by Washington's in-
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tive Cynthia Lummis of Wyoming attached a provision to the 2012-
13 House Interior Appropriation bill that prohibited judicial review
of the Wyoming management plan.44 7 The provision was excluded
in the conference report.448
Wyoming's state management plan was approved by four of the
five scientists on peer review. Dr.John Vucetich, the lone dissenter,
asserted that the plan was vague and overestimated the annual sus-
tainable wolf mortality rate. 4 4 9 The plan is designed to increase the
elk population for hunters. Furthermore, the long-term commit-
ment of state officials to retain a sustainable wolf population is
questionable. 45 0
trusion and repeated lawsuits that should have been resolves a long time
ago.
Press Release, Senator Enzi's Office, Statement on Proposed Wolf Delisting (Oct.
4, 2011), available at http://www.enzi.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/news-releases?
ContentRecordid=93b8c559-5c88-4810-8fdf-313aa5f3874d. Wyoming Governor
Mead stated: "For years, ranchers and sheep producers have been asked to sacri-
fice, and they have. We have lost significant numbers of elk and moose, and we
have not had a say in the management of an animal inside Wyoming. It's time for
that to change." Wyoming, Feds Announce Plan for Delisting Wolves, supra note 445.
447. Press Release, Senator Enzi's Office, Enzi Encouraged by Wolf Manage-
ment Agreement (Aug. 3, 2011), available at http://www.enzi.senate.gov/public/
index.cfm/news-releases?ContentRecordid=2712214e-c563-477e-80d7-bl7f091e
1ddf&ContentType-id=ae7a6475-aOlf-4da5-aa94-0a98973de620&Group-id=91d2
f483-Oad8-44ac-bcc4-fc2c82d75e07 (stating Representative Lummis' action).
448. See Norman Dick's Statement and Summary of Conference Report,
CONG. DOCUMENTS & PUBL'NS (Dec. 15, 2011) (omitting discussion of judicial re-
view prohibition). Representative Dicks stated: "I have reminded my Republican
colleagues that nothing has done more to obstruct the process than loading down
appropriation bills with partisan or ideological baggage in the form of legislative
provisions that are unrelated to the mission this Committee." Lummis Statement on
Wolf Rider Language in FY 2012 Appropriations Legislation, STATES NEWS SERV. (Dec.
16, 2011), http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-275098445.html. Representative
Lummis stated:
The decision to pull the wolf language was based on politics, not policy.
Radical environmentalists have the ear of many in Washington and their
considerable sway in the White House is the reason for the removal of
this important language. When the deal that gives Wyoming the ability to
manage wolves is complete, environmental groups will resume their re-
lentless lawsuits.
Id. See also Press Release, Administration Playing Both Sides When it Comes to
Wolves (Dec. 22, 2011), available at http://www.enzi.senate.gov/public/in-
dex.cfm/news-releases?ContentRecordid=6a379acO-4a68-438d-9998-a24eeae3Of87
(highlighting exclusion of provision from conference report).
449. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., FINAL PEER REVIEW OF FOUR DOCUMENTS
AMENDING AND CLARIFYING THE WYOMING GRAY WOLF MANAGEMENT PLAN 1-5 (May
2012) (describing a dissenting view of plan).
450. See Ben Neary, One of Five Scientists Takes Issue with Wyo. Wolf Plan, Assoc.
PREss (Jan. 6, 2012), http://trib.com/news/local/state-and-regional/scientist-
takes-issue-with-wyo-wolf-plan/article_1999d3bd-292a-57ba-b940-fcdf0ba52eb6.
html (elaborating on difficulty of sustaining wolf population).
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In March 2012, the Wyoming legislature amended the state
wolf plan to meet federal approval.451 Environmental groups re-
mained skeptical. 452 The Interior delisted the Wyoming wolves on
August 31, 2012.453 Wyoming has taken over wolf management. 454
451. Press Release, DOW, Wyoming Approves Flawed Wolf Plan (Mar. 7,
2012), available at http://www.defenders.org/press-release/wyoming-approves-
flawed-wolf-plan (detailing issues with wolf management plan).
452. See Bob Berwyn, Wyoming Plans to Kill Most Wolves Outside of Yellowstone,
SUMMIT CoUNTy CITIZENS VOICE (May 1, 2012), http://summitcountyvoice.com/
2012/05/01/wyoming-plans-to-kill-most-wolves-outside-yellowstone/ (describing
stance of environmental groups). "This isn't responsible wolf management, it's
predator control under the guise of wildlife management." John Motsinger, Wyo-
ming Approves Flawed Wolf Plan, DEFENDERS BLOC (March 8, 2012), http://
www.defendersblog.org/2012/03/wyoming-approves-flawed-wolf-plan/ (quoting
Mike Leahy, Rocky Mountain director for Defenders). CBD stated Wyoming's
plan is "a recipe for wolf slaughter that will only serve to incite more of the
prejudice against wolves that led to their destruction in the first place . . . . Re-
moval of federal protections for wolves has been a disaster in Idaho and Montana
and will be even worse in Wyoming." Berwyn, supra (quoting Michael Robinson)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Further, "[k]illing most of Wyoming's wolves
will hurt wolves in Colorado, too, where they're only starting to return by way of
Wyoming." Berwyn, supra (quoting Michael Robinson) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
453. See Press Release, Service Declares Wyoming gray wolf Recovered Under
the ESA and Returns Management to the State (Aug. 31, 2012), available at http://
www.fws.gov/mountain-prairie/pressrel/2012/08312012_.Wyoming_.Wolf.html
(highlighting Interior's decision). The FWS noted:
The wolf population has remained healthy under state management in
Idaho and Montana, and we're confident that the Wyoming population
will sustain its recovery under the management plan Wyoming will imple-
ment .... Our primary goal, and that of the states, is to ensure that gray
wolf populations in the Northern Rocky Mountains remain healthy, giv-
ing future generations of Americans the chance to hear its howl echo
across the area . . . No one, least of all Idaho, Montana and Wyoming,
wants to see wolves back on the endangered species list. But that's what
will happen if recovery targets are not sustained.
Id. (quoting Dan Ashe) (internal quotation marks omitted).
454. See Press Release, Senator Barrasso, Gray Wolf Population Removed from
Endangered Species List (Aug. 31, 2012), available at http://www.barrasso.senate.
gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressOffice.PressReleases&ContentRecord id=
7elbb7bf-9b64-eaf3-4ca3-293345bddea5&IsPrint=true (describing Wyoming's ac-
tion in taking over wolf management). Senator Barrasso stated: "Todays rule right-
fully puts Wyoming in control of managing the wolf-not Washington." Id. Senator
Enzi declared: "Wyoming game managers will do their part to maintain the agreed
upon wolf numbers outside the park. Unfortunately, I'm sure there will still be
some wolf advocates who will react the only way they seem to know how to react,
they'll sue." Id. Representative Lummis stated:
Wyoming's ranchers and big game hunters have had to sacrifice for many
years and finally accept a less than perfect deal, but I'm satisfied with the
plan, and am extremely relieved that the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
held up its end of the bargain to delist the gray wolf.
Id.
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Environmental groups plan to challenge the delisting of the Wyo-
ming wolves. 45
VI. CONCLUSION
Wolves have been very beneficial to the ecosystem in the NRM.
Wolf depreciation provides for the removal of diseased animals, the
culling of deformed or genetically inferior animals before repro-
duction, the acceleration of reproductive rates among prey through
higher twining and fertility, and the maintenance of prey popula-
tions at levels that can be supported by the habitat.4 5 6 Reduction in
the principal prey of the wolves, the bison and elk, has allowed wil-
lows and aspen trees to regain their place in the previously over-
grazed area. Beaver colonies have increased, which has improved
riparian hydrology and resulted in an increase in waterfowl. 457
455. See Ben Neary, Groups Intend to Sue Feds over Wyoming Delisting, Assoc.
PREss (Sept. 11, 2012), available at http://mtribune.com/northwest/articlebf25
959f-f228-5e99-8flf-3cdl4d6aed2e.html?mode=jqm (showing environmental
groups' persistence in challenging Wyoming wolves' delisting). "Two coalitions of
environmental groups have filed notice of their intent to sue. EarthJustice repre-
sents one coalition consisting of Defenders of Wildlife, Center for Biodiversity, Na-
tional Resource Defense Council, Sierra Club. The second coalition includes
Wildlife Guardians, AWR, Biodiversity Conservation Alliance, Conservation Con-
gress, Friends of Animals, Friends of Clearwater, National Wolf Watcher Coalition,
and Western Watersheds Project." Id. See also Press Release, DOW, Conservation
Groups Challenge Kill-at-Will Policy for Wyoming Wolves (Sept. 10, 2012), available
at http://www.defenders.org/press-release/conservation-groups-challenge-kill-will-
policy-wyoming-wolves. The DOW declared: "It's extremely disheartening to watch
the Obama administration unravel one of our country's great Endangered Species
Act success stories by turning over the conservation of wolves to states such as Wyo-
ming and Idaho that treat these animals like unwanted vermin." Id. (quoting Mike
Senatore). CBD stated:
Removal of Endangered Species Act protections for Wyoming's wolves is
a disaster for the state's wolf population and for recovery of wolves to
Colorado and other parts of the west . .. Like past versions of Wyoming's
wolf plan that were rejected by the Fish and Wildlife Service, the current
plan fails to ensure the long-term survival and recovery of the state's gray
wolves. Today's decision . . . fails to rely on best science and represents
the worst kind of political intrusion by Secretary Salazar into manage-
ment of endangered species.
Id. (quoting Noah Greenwald). NRDC stated that Wyoming's plan "fails to ade-
quately regulate the kill-on-sight practices that drove wolves to endangerment in
the first place." Id. (quoting Sylvia Fallon).
456. See David Todd, Wolf-Predator Control and Endangered Species Protection:
Thoughts on Politics and Law, 33 S. TEX. L. REv. 459, 478 (1992) (giving examples of
why wolf depredation is beneficial).
457. Yellowstone Transformed 15 Years After Return of the Wolves, OR. STATE UNV.
(Dec. 21, 2011), http://oregonstate.edu/ua/ncs/archives/2011/dec/yellowstone-
transformed-15-years-after-return-wolves [hereinafter Yellowstone Transformed] (il-
lustrating indirect benefits from wolf depredation).
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Wolf reintroduction has improved biodiversity in the northern
Rockies. The wolves kill an elk every few days. The carcasses pro-
vide food for other animals. Grizzly bears benefit from wolf kills,
which provide nourishment before hibernation. The wolves also
kill coyotes, which has led to an increase in rodents and hares that
are the prey of other species, including foxes, owls, hawks, eagles,
badgers, and pine martens.458 The increase in hares has been par-
ticularly beneficial for the recovery of the lynx.459 A recent Oregon
State University study concluded "predation and predation risk as-
sociated with large predators appear to represent powerful ecologi-
cal forces capable of affecting the interactions of numerous animals
and plants, as well as the structure and function of ecosystems." 46 0
The Ninth Circuit in Wild Rockies II correctly held that Con-
gress could exempt the project from existing law through an appro-
priation rider. The appropriation rider delisting the wolf in the
NRM DPS did not violate the constitutional separation of powers.
Congress can deprive the federal courts ofjurisdiction over this stat-
utory issue. The exercise of each of these legislative prerogatives
undermines the republican view and supports public choice theory.
Congress is a marketplace where public goods are sold to interest
groups to enhance reelection possibilities. Congress, capitulating
to the wishes of well-organized interest groups, enacts special inter-
est legislation with concentrated private benefits and dispersed pub-
lic costs. Section 1713 is special interest legislation that advances
the interests of hunters, livestock owners, and state governments at
the expense of ecologically managed public lands and the protec-
tion of an endangered species. Section 1713 undermined the ESA
and deceived the public.
Section 1713 should have been invalidated under other alter-
native theories. The enactment of Section 1713 as a rider on an
unrelated appropriation bill violated Congressional rules that no
458. Yellowstone Wolves in Diversity, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 1998), http://www.ny-
times.com/1998/01/04/opinion/yellowstone-wolves-and-diversity.html (discuss-
ing wolf's effect in Yellowstone); see also Douglas W. Smith, Rolf 0. Peterson &
Douglas B. Houston, Yellowstone After Wolves, 53 BIoSCIENCE 330 (Apr. 2003) (ex-
plaining how wolf's killing of coyotes benefit other animals).
459. Rich Landers, Out & About: Wolf Recovery Might Aid Other Species, SPoKES-
MAN-REv. (Sept. 11, 2011), http://m.spokesman.com/stories/201 1/sep/11 /wolf-
recovery-might-aid-other-species/ (stressing benefits of increase in hares).
460. WilliamJ. Ripple & Robert L. Beschta, Trophic Cascades in Yellowstone: The
First 15 Years After Wolf Reintroduction, BIOL. CONSERV., 8 (Nov. 3, 2011) available at
http://ir.library.oregonstate.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/1957/25603/Ripple
William.Forestry.TrophicCascadesYellowstone.pdf?sequence=3 (studying tri-
trophic cascades in Yellowstone); accord Yellowstone Transformed, supra note 457 (cit-
ing university study to show additional support).
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substantive legislation can be attached to an appropriation bill.
The Supreme Court has treated Congressional rules as legally bind-
ing and recognized the unique status of appropriation bills. Poli-
cymaking through appropriation riders is a flawed process. Special
interest legislation that cannot be promulgated through the con-
ventional legislative process is enacted through the backdoor of ap-
propriation process. The Supreme Court has invalidated
legislation impinging on important public values that was not sup-
ported by adequate fact-finding. Judicial enforcement of Congres-
sional procedural rules, which is less intrusive, would not interfere
with the legislative process. Interest group influence would be cur-
tailed by precluding the backdoor enactment of dubious legisla-
tion, like Section 1713.
Section 1713 violated the public trust doctrine, which requires
Congress to manage public resources in the long-term public inter-
est. The public trust doctrine, like structural review, focuses on
process. Courts protect public resources from undue interest
group influence in legislative arena. Courts become suspicious
when legislative decisions regarding public resources are made in
closed legislative sessions that deny groups the opportunity to par-
ticipate effectively. Congress has broad power over public re-
sources, but it must exercise that power in open, deliberative ways,
not through the backroom appropriation rider in violation of Con-
gressional rules.
Section 1713 violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment by impinging on the public's limited property right in
species protection and balanced public land management. This,
like the public trust doctrine, includes the protection of the ecolog-
ical values of public resources. Congress created this Due Process
procedural right through the enactment of federal environmental
and land use statutes, which implicitly recognize the public's lim-
ited property right. Generally, the Court does not impose Due Pro-
cess requirements on Congress, but since the public must look to
Congress for protection of its rights, courts should examine the leg-
islative process. The Fifth Amendment's procedural Due Process
was violated because Section 1713 was enacted through a flawed
legislative process that denied environmental groups the opportu-
nity for effective participation. Section 1713 should have been re-
manded to Congress for reconsideration in an open deliberative
process.
Section 1713 also violated the Equal Protection component of
the Fifth Amendment by providing unique treatment for the NRM
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wolves. Section 1713 should have been subject to rigorous judicial
review. The federal government should have borne the burden of
explaining why the NRM wolves were exempted from existing legal
requirements and how this exemption furthered the purposes of
the ESA.
Judicial action under each of these theories would have de-
creased interest group influence and forced Congress to operate
through conventional procedures that were subject to public scru-
tiny. Congress could not have removed federal court jurisdiction
over the Constitutional issues.
Congress' premature delisting of the NRM wolves undermined
the ESA, which mandates that decisions be based on science, not
politics. Wyoming was not included in the delisting rider because
the state management plan did not meet federal requirements.
Congressional action delisting the NRM wolves took the pressure
off Wyoming to accommodate federal demands. Wyoming's cur-
rent state management plan is essentially the same as the two prior
plans rejected by the FWS. Nevertheless, the FWS approved Wyo-
ming's management plan and the Wyoming wolves have been de-
listed. Wolves in the NRM DPS should not have been considered
for delisting until Wyoming's management plan was approved.
Wolf reintroduction is part of larger battle over the ESA. Presi-
dent Obama promised to support the ESA. In May 2009, he stated,
"For more than three decades, the Endangered Species Act has suc-
cessfully protected our nation's most threatened wildlife, and we
should be looking for ways to improve it - not weaken it."4O1 Dur-
ing his first two years in office, President Obama did little to fulfill
his promise, much to the consternation of environmental
groups.4 62 The administration began to change direction in 2011.
The FWS agreed to speed up ESA protections for 757 imperiled
species.4 63 The administration followed this initiative by requesting
461. Jamie Rappaport Clark, Interior Decision Imperils More Than Wolves, WASH.
POST (Jan. 1, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2009/12/31/AR2009123101742.html (quoting President Obama for supporting
idea of wolf reintroduction).
462. See id. (discussing criticism of Obama administration decision); see also
Paul Rogers, Obama Decisions on Wildlife Raising Environmentalists Ire, SAN JOSE MER-
CURY NEws (Feb. 21, 2010), http://www.mercurynews.com/breaking-news/ci-
14439195 (explaining President Obama's difficulty during his first two years in
office).
463. Press Release, Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Court Approves Historic
Agreement to Speed ESA Protections for 757 Imperiled Species (Sept. 9, 2011),
available at http://www.talking-naturally.co.uk/court-approves-historic-agreement-
speed-esa-protection-757-imperiled-species/ (showing FWS's effort in protecting
imperiled species).
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twenty-five million dollars for listings, an eleven percent increase
from 2011.464
Congressional Republicans, however, do not support the ESA.
Congressional Republicans sponsored a bill granting the Home-
land Security authority to strip environmental protections from spe-
cies one hundred miles from the United States border for national
security reasons.4 65 Republican Senator Mike Lee of Utah intro-
duced a bill to remove ESA protections from a species located solely
within one state.4 66 Republican Representative Doc Hastings of
Washington, chair of the House Resources Committee, is calling for
an overhaul of the ESA. Representative Hastings stated, "The ESA
unfortunately is now used as a tool in costly lawsuits where politics
trump science and jobs and economic prosperity are put in jeop-
ardy."46 7 A recent CBD study rebuts Republican skepticism and
concludes that ninety percent of the listed species are on the way to
recovery.468 The CBD stated that "[n] o other law in the world has
done so much to rescue species from the brink of extinction and
put them on a path to recovery. Simply put, the Act has been re-
markably successful."46 9
464. Matthew Brown, Hundreds of Plants, Animals up for New Protections, Assoc.
PREss (Sept. 29, 2011), available at http://www.syracuse.com/news/index.ssf/
2011/09/hundredsof plantsanimals up.html (showing how administration sup-
ports ESA protections by requesting more funding).
465. Big Brother is Not So Frightening After All, LEWISTON MORNING TRIB. (Oct. 6,
2011), http://mtribune.com/opinion/article_e0aee9fe-5018-55a8-8ad1-d99e3eac
6e2a.html (illustrating how Congressional Republicans disagree with ESA).
466. See Press Release, DOW, Defenders Senator Lee Tries to Dismantle En-
dangered Species Act (June 13, 2012), available at https://www.defenders.org/
press-release/senator-lee-tries-dismantle-endangered-species-act ("Farm Bill
amendment would gut federal protections for wildlife living within a state's
borders.")
467. Brown, supra note 464 (quoting Representative Doc Hastings) (empha-
sizing Republican's skepticism over ESA).
468. CTR. FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSiry, ON TIME, ON TARGET: HOW THE ENDAN-
GERED SPECIEs Acr IS SAVING AMERICA'S WILDLIFE (2012), available at http://
www.esasuccess.org/report_2012.html (using report to rebut Republican's skepti-
cism regarding ESA).
469. Press Release, Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Study: 90 Percent of Endan-
gered Species Recovering on Time (May 17, 2012), available at http://www.biologi-
caldiversity.org/news/press-releases/2012/esa-success-05-17-2012.html (quoting
KierAn Suckling) (discussing ESA's importance). The CBD noted: "Calling the Act
a failure at this point is like throwing away a 10-day prescription of antibiotics on
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